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This Article offers a critical and penetrating insight into
the bilateral investment treaties (BITs) between Turkey and
countries in Africa. Since 2003, Turkey has concluded BITs
with twenty-eight countries in Africa. This Article seeks answers
to some very important questions. In the BITs between Turkey
and countries in Africa, is Turkey merely conforming to the
norms and standards established by Western countries, or is
Turkey changing these norms in fundamental ways? Compared
to BITs between Western nations and countries in Africa, are
Turkey-Africa BITs more oriented towards sustainable
development and, if so, in what respects? In what ways are
emerging market economies such as Turkey transforming the
global economic landscape and international economic law?
This Article fills an important gap in the literature on
international investment law and the role of emerging market
economies in the global economic system. Thus, although
focused on Turkey-Africa investment relations, this Article
sheds important light on three broader issues. First, this Article
offers a glimpse into the way emerging market economies are
using and sometimes transforming international economic law.
Second, this Article takes on one of the most important issues in
international economic law today-the crisis in the
international investment law-and examines how different
stakeholders are grappling with this crisis. Third, this Article
sheds important light on the dynamics of South-South economic
relations and how countries in Africa are moving beyond
traditional (Western) partners and are engaging or attempting
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to engage with new partners in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin
America. Although emerging market economies and emerging
market multinationals are playing an incredibly significant role
in the global economy and are changing global economic
governance in significant ways, their involvement in the making
and unmaking of international economic law is frequently
ignored or misunderstood. This Article addresses this by
offering critical insight into how emerging market economies are
using, adapting, and sometimes abandoning established
international economic norms.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Slowly, steadily, and silently, the Republic of Turkey (Turkey) is
concluding important and far-reaching BITs with countries in Africa.'
To date, Turkey has concluded BITs with about twenty-eight different
countries in Africa.2 While much attention has focused on China-
Africa economic relations,3 economic cooperation arrangements
between African states and other emerging market economies have
largely flown under the radar. Relations between Turkey and
countries in Africa have been deepening and widening since 1998
when Ankara adopted an Africa Action Plan
4 and stepped up in 2005
when Turkey launched its "Opening to Africa" policy
5 and declared
the year the "Year of Africa."6 The result is that, although Turkey is
still relatively new in African politics, trade, and aid circles, "it has
already expanded its area of influence in the continent by linking its
soft power tools of transportation links, trade, and education closely
1. All of the bilateral investment treaties involving Turkey that are publicly
available can be found on the 'Investment Policy Hub' developed by the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Altogether, Turkey has concluded
109 BITs of which seventy-seven are in force. International Investment Agreements
Navigator-Turkey, U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV.,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/
countries/214/turkey (last visited Oct. 8, 2019) [https://perma.cc/D8V2-YARW]
(archived Aug. 11, 2019) [hereinafter Investment Policy Hub - Turkey].
2. Id.
3. See Uche E. Ofodile, China-Africa Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Critique,
35 MICH. J. INT'L L. 131, 131 (2013); see also Uche E. Ofodile, Trade, Empires and
Subjects: China-Africa Trade: A New Fair Trade Arrangement or The Third Scramble
For Africa?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 505, 505 (2008).
4. Turkey-Africa Relations, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPUBLIC OF
TURK., http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa (last visited Sept. 8, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/83EJ-WWQK] (archived Aug. 11, 2019). The deepening relationship
between Turkey and countries in Africa has been noted in some quarters. See also
Patrick Seale, The Rise and Rise of Turkey, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2009,
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/05/opinion/05iht-edseale.html
[https://perma.cc/LU8H-SFSHI (archived Aug. 11, 2019); Ottoman Dreaming,
ECONOMIST, Mar. 27, 2010, https://www.economist.com/europe/2010/0
3/25/ottoman-
dreaming [https://perma.cclEM5Z-B83W] (archived Aug. 11, 2019); Turkish Foreign
Policy, The Great Mediator, ECONOMIST, Aug. 21, 2010, https://www.economist.com/
europe/2010/08/19/the-great-mediator [https://perma.cclNVN2-KUDN] (archived Aug.
11, 2019); Turkish economy gets Mobius nod of approval, BUS. REP., July 30, 2010,
https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/turkish-economy-gets-mobius-nod-of-
approval-691144 [https://perma.cclHY53-PJC7] (archived Aug. 11, 2019); Owen
Matthews, Ankara in the Middle: Once an unquestioning U.S. ally, and at odds with
most of its neighbors, Turkey is now forging a new foreign policy, with itself at the very
center, 156 NEWSWEEK INT'L, Aug. 2, 2010.
5. Seale, supra note 4.
6. Ottoman Dreaming, supra note 4.
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with its foreign policy." 7 Once limited to North Africa, Ankara's
interest in Africa is now extending to all parts of the continent.8 From
every indication, African countries, individually and collectively, are
responding positively to Ankara's overtures.9 The African Union
(AU), a continental union consisting of fifty-five countries,1 0 granted
Turkey "Observer Status" in 2005.11 In 2008, the AU declared Turkey
a "Strategic Partner" of the African Continent.12 In January 2013,
Turkey became the twenty-sixth nonregional member of the African
Development Bank and the twenty-sixth State Participant to the
African Development Fund.'3 Since 2003, Turkey has concluded BITs
with more than half of the countries in Africa.14 Turkey has
concluded more bilateral investment treaties with countries in Africa
than partners, such as the United States (nine BITs with countries in
Africa)15 and Japan (three BITs with countries in Africa).' 6
7. Alpaslan Ozerdem, How Turkey is emerging as a development partner in
Africa, GUARDIAN, Apr. 10, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-
professionals-network/201 3/apr/10/turkey-development-partner-africa
[https://perma.cc/JZ5F-3JMF] (archived Aug. 11, 2019).
8. See generally Mehmet Ozkan, Turkey discovers Africa: implications and
prospects, SETA FOUND. FOR POL., ECON. & Soc. RES. (2008); DAVID SHINN, TURKEY'S
ENGAGEMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: SHIFTING ALLIANCES AND STRATEGIC
DIVERSIFICATION (Chatham House 2015).
9. The author's assessment is based on deepening economic, diplomatic and
cultural ties between Turkey and countries in Africa. See infra Part I.
10. See AFRICAN UNION, https://au.int/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/M3CA-EATD] (archived Aug. 11, 2019); Mission & Strategy,
AFRICAN DEv. BANK GROUP, https://www.afdb.org/en/about/mission-strategy (last
visited Sept. 8, 2019) [https://perma.cc/2MV8-FQYK] (archived Aug. 11, 2019).
11. Turkey and The African Union, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPUBLIC OF
TURK., http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-and-the-african-union.en.mfa (last visited Sept. 8,
2019) [https://perma.cc/E3DV-SRTM] (archived Aug. 11, 2019).
12. The framework of Africa's strategic partnership takes four distinct forms: (i)
continent to continent partnerships; (ii) continent to country partnerships such as
Africa-India, Africa-Turkey, Africa-China, and Africa-Japan; (iii) partnerships in
demand as new states or regions request additional partnerships; and (iv) partnership
with other institutions such as the Organisation of American States (OAS), the
Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) the Commonwealth and La Francophonie.
Africa's Strategic Partnership with Other Parts of the World, AFRICAN UNION,
https://au.int/en/partnerships/intro (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) [https://perma.ccV835-
BB9A] (archived Aug. 11, 2019).
13. With this admission, Turkey became the following the country's admission
as the 26th State Participant in the African Development Fund and the 78th Member
State of the African Development Bank. Felix Njoku, The Republic of Turkey Joins
African Development Bank Group, AFRICAN DEV. BANK GROUP (Sept. 12, 2013),
https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/the-republic-of-turkey-joins-african-
development-bank-group-12660/ [https://perma.cc/53CL-E6Q3] (archived Aug. 11,
2019).
14. Investment Policy Hub - Turkey, supra note 1.
15. International Investment Agreements Navigator-United States of America,
U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-
investment-agreements/countries/223/united-states-of-america (last visited Sept. 8,
2019) [https://perma.cc/UNR9-EJJ8J (archived Aug. 11, 2019).
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Turkey-Africa economic engagements underscore the shifting,
and growing role of emerging market economies in the global
economy17 and in the economies of many developing countries.'
8 Over
the last two decades, emerging market economies have slowly and
steadily established themselves as key players in the world economy
and as major players on the foreign direct investment (FDI) scene.
19
According to the World Bank's Global Economic Prospects 2018,
capital flows to emerging economies strengthened in 2016 and again
in 2017.20 In turn, emerging market economies are exporting more
and more capital to developed countries, to other emerging market
economies, and to developing economies.2 1 Outward FDI from
emerging economies has grown even as emerging market
multinationals (EMNCs) have become more dominant on the global
stage.22 Since 1990, emerging market economies have launched more
than seventeen thousand large companies according to McKinsey
Global Institute (McKinsey).23 In 2013, emerging market
multinationals accounted for 26 percent of the Fortune 500, up from 5
16. International Investment Agreements Navigator-Japan, U.N. CONFERENCE
ON TRADE & DEV., https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-
agreements/countries/105/japan (last visited July 10, 2019) [https://perma.cc/B6UW-
5BQA] (archived Aug. 16, 2019).
17. Joseph Joyce, How have emerging economies transformed the global
economy?, WE FORUM (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/12/how-
have-emerging-economies-transformed-the-global -economy/ [https://perma.cc/GYL9-
DMAK] (archived Aug. 11, 2019); see also Tarun Khanna & Krishna G. Palepu, How to
define emerging markets, FORBES, May 27, 2010,
http://www.forbes.com/2010/05/27/winning-in-emerging-markets-opinionsbook-
excerpts-khanna-palepu.htm1 [https://perma.cc/U5SJ-LFXB] (archived Aug. 11, 2019).
18. Khanna & Palepu, supra note 17.
19. Peter Gammeltoft, Emerging multinationals: outward FDI from the BRICS
countries, 4 INT'L J. TECH. & GLOBALISATION 1, 5-22 (2008); Peter Gammeltoft & Ari
Kokko, Introduction: Outward foreign direct investment from emerging economies and
national development strategies: Three regimes, 6 INT'L J. TECH. LEARNING,
INNOVATION & DEv. 1, 1-20 (2013); Andrea Goldstein, Multinational Companies from
Emerging Economies Composition, Conceptualization & Direction in the Global
Economy, 45 INDIAN J. INDUS. REL. 137, 137 (2009).
20. GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS: THE TURNING OF THE TIDE, WORLD BANK
(2018).
21. See generally Jonathan Woetzel, Outperformers: High-Growth Emerging
Economies and the Companies that Propel Them, McKINSEY & CO. 1 (Sept. 2018),
https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/innovation-and-growth/outperformers-
high-growth-emerging-economies-and-the-companies-that-propel-them
[https://perma.cc/5URY-ULGF] (archived Aug. 11, 2019).
22. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2014-
INVESTING IN THE SGDS: AN ACTION PLAN, U.N. Doc. UNCTADIWIR/2014, U.N. Sales
No. E.14.II.D.1 (2014); U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT
REPORT 2015: REFORMING INTNERNATIONAL INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE, U.N. Sales No.
E.15.II.D.5 (2015).
23. MCKINSEY & CO., PLAYING TO WIN: THE NEW GLOBAL COMPETITION FOR
CORPORATE PROFITS 1, 41 (McKinsey Glob. Inst. 2015).
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percent between 1980 and 2000.24 Experts predict that by 2025,
emerging market multinationals will "account for more than 45
percent of the Fortune Global 500."25
Turkey and countries in Africa are concluding BITs at a time
when international investment law is in crisis and is witnessing
defectionS26 and facing multiple calls for fundamental overhaul.27
While some countries are exiting the system,2 8 many others are keen
on reforming the system.29 The United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD) has long acknowledged this crisis and
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. In May 2007, Bolivia denounced the ICSID Convention and became the first
state in history to do so. See Bolivia Submits a Notice under Article 71 of the ICSID
Convention, ICSID News Release, May 16, 2007, www.worldbank.org/icsid
[https://perma.cclV69H-GGFB] (archived Aug. 16, 2019). Countries like India, South
Africa and Indonesia are taking steps to terminate most of their BITs. In 2017, India
sent termination notices to as many as 58 countries, including EU states. See India's
Bilateral Investment Pact Under Cloud, Bus. LINE (Jan. 15, 2018),
https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/indias-bilateral-investment-pacts-
under-cloud/article9625580.ece [https://perma.cc/2CAZ-NUGN] (archived Aug. 11,
2019).
27. On January 21, 2014, the EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht
announced plans "to pause" the investor protection and ISDS portion of the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP). In March 2014, the
European Commission launched an "online" public consultation on how to improve the
system. In 2015, following the public consultation, the EU Trade Commissioner
concluded that the consultation showed among other things that "[t]he vast majority of
[international investment agreements] do not include the kind of guarantees that the
EU would like to see." See Improving. ISDS to Prevent Abuse-Statement by EU Trade
Commissioner Karel De Gucht on the Launch of a Public Consultation on Investment
Protection in TTIP, EUROPEAN COMM'N (2014); see also Report Presented Today:
Consultation on Investment Protections in EU-US Trade Talks, EUROPEAN COMM'N
(2015); Questions and Answers: Public Online Consultation on Investor Protection in
TTIP, EUROPEAN COMM'N (2014).
28. Since 2014, Indonesia has progressively terminated each of the sixty-seven
BITs it has signed since the late 1960s. See Investment Treaty Hub - Indonesia, U.N.
CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-
investment-agreements/countries/97/indonesia (last visited Sept. 8, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/YY7B-JPGL] (archived Aug. 11, 2019). Although Indonesia has
terminated many of its BITs, it does not appear to be Indonesia's intention to
completely abandon the IIA regime. See Antony Crockett, The Termination of
Indonesia's BITs: Changing the Bathwater, But Keeping the Baby?, 18 J. WORLD INV. &
TRADE 836, 836 (2017).
29. On October 19, 2018, the Dutch government adopted Netherland's new
model BIT. See Model Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments (May 16, 2018), https://www.internetconsultatie.nl/investeringsakkoorden
[https://perma.cclV6EJ-QZM5] (archived Oct. 8, 2019). After a multi-year BIT review,
India revamped its IIA regime. In 2016, India released a new Model BIT. See Model
Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty 2016, GOV'T OF INDIA,
http://www.dea.gov.in/sites/default/files/ ModelBITAnnex_0.pdf (last visited Sept. 8,
2019) [https://perma.cc/ASQ6-ACE9] (archived Sept. 11, 2019) [hereinafter 2016 Indian
Model BIT]; see also Burghard Ilge & Kavaljit Singh, India Overhauls Its Investment
Treaty Regime, FIN. TIMES, July 15, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/53bd355c-8203-
34af-9c27-7bf990a447dc [https://perma.cc/A326-7XMF] (archived Aug. 11, 2019).
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led the movement for reform.30 In its 2012 Investment Policy
Framework for Sustainable Development (updated in 2015), UNCTAD
presented the organization's vision on designing international
investment policies for sustainable development.3 1 In 2016, the Group
of Twenty (G20) Ministers adopted the G20 Guiding Principles for
Global Investment Policymaking and essentially acknowledged the
need for reform.3 2
This Article underscores a new normal for countries in Africa-
increased engagement with emerging partners in Asia, the Middle
East, and Latin America.3 3 Thanks to emerging partners, the
patterns of trade, investment, and aid to Africa are shifting.
34 Is
Africa ready to engage emerging partners and, if so, on what terms?
Does the shift in global wealth really spell the end of
postcolonialism?35 Does Africa have a strategy for engaging with
emerging partners? Does Africa need a strategy? Is Africa effectively
harnessing its emerging partnerships for sustainable development?
The changing role of emerging market economies in the global
economy is raising a number of interesting questions for international
lawyers and for international economic law. For example, as
emerging markets' economies are transforming the global economy,
are they also transforming or attempting to transform international
economic law and policy? And if emerging markets' economies are
transforming international economic law and policy, to what
30. See UNCTAD's REFORM PACKAGE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
REGIME, U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. 7-8 (2018) (discussing the crisis in
international investment law, the push for reform over the past several years, and the
options for reform); see also WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2015: REFORMING
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE, supra note 22.
31. Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development, U.N.
CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. (2012); U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD
INVESTMENT REPORT 2012: TOWARDS A NEW GENERATION OF INVESTMENT POLICIES,
U.N. Doc. UNCTADIWIR/2012, U.N. Sales No. E.12.II.D.3 (2012).
32. G20 agrees Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking, ORG.
FOR EcoN. COOPERATION & DEV. (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.oecd.org/investment/g
20-
agrees-principles-for-global-investment-policymaking.htm [https://perma.cc/24DT-
A4FL] (archived Aug. 11, 2019).
33. OECD ET AL., African Economic Outlook 2011, in AFRICA AND ITS EMERGING
PARTNERS (2011); see also Uche Ewelukwa Ofodile, India-Africa Trade and Investment:
Ten Critical Questions Africans Should be Asking Their Leaders, AILA BLOG (Apr. 15,
2016), http://blogaila.com/2016/04/15/india-africa-trade-and-investment-ten-critical-
questions-africans-should-be-asking-their-leaders-by-dr-uche-ewelukwa-ofodile-sjd-
harvard/ [https://perma.cc/4QHQ-4ZJ2] (archived Aug. 16, 2019).
34. Africa's Emerging Partnerships, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV.
OBSERVER (2011), http://oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/3558/Africa-
92 s-
emerging_ partnerships.html [https://perma.cc/2QMT-588T] (archived Aug. 11, 2019).
35. Uche Ewelukwa Ofodile, South-South Trade and Investment: The Good, the
Bad and the Ugly -African Perspectives, 20 MINN. J. INT'L L. 513, 513-87 (2011).
9572019]
VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
degree?3 6 In their engagements with other developing countries, are
emerging market economies using and asserting the same norms and
principles that Western nations developed and have deployed for
years?3 7 In 2011, an editorial in the OECD Observer aptly asked:
"Before the talk was in dollars. Now leaders speak equally of Chinese
renminbi, Indian rupees and Brazilian reals. Are the last shackles of
colonialism finally being broken? Or is another form of dependence
taking over, this time based on commodity hungry emerging
markets?"3 8
Against the backdrop of the changing role of emerging markets
in the global economy and the renewed emphasis on sustainable
development among world leaders,39 this Article takes a look at the
BITs that Turkey has concluded, and is still concluding, with
countries in Africa. 40 In the BITs with countries in Africa, is Turkey
merely conforming to the norms and standards established by
developed countries, or is Turkey changing these norms in
fundamental ways? Compared to BITs between Western nations and
countries in Africa, do Turkey-Africa BITs espouse purposes other
than investor protection, and are Turkey-Africa BITs more oriented
towards sustainable development?4 1 Are Turkey-Africa BITs
designed to provide sufficient policy space for host states?
Since 2003, Turkey has concluded thirty-one BITs with twenty-
eight countries in Africa 42 (including two separate BITs with
36. Joseph Joyce, How have emerging economies transformed the global
economy?, WE FoRUm (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/12/how-
have-emerging-economies-transformed-the-global-economy/ [https://perma.cc/EAX7-
2AKA] (archived Aug. 11, 2019) (arguing that "In recent decades the global economy
has been transformed by the rise of the emerging market economies. Their growth
lifted millions out of poverty and gave their governments the right to call for a larger
voice in discussions of international economic governance.").
37. Tanvi Kothari, Masaaki Kotabe & Priscilla Murphy, Rules of the Game for
Emerging Market Multinational Companies from China and India, 19 J. INT'L MGMT.
276, 276-99 (2013).
38. Africa's Emerging Partnerships, upra note 34.
39. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are a collection of 17 global
goals that the United Nations General Assembly set in 2015 and are part of Resolution
70/1 of the United Nations General Assembly. The goals which are set forth in
Paragraph 54 of Resolution A/RES/70/1 cover social and economic development issues
including poverty, hunger, health, education, global warming, gender equality, water,
sanitation, energy, urbanization, environment, and social justice. See G.A. Res. 70/1
(Oct. 21, 2015).
40. At a historic UN Summit in September 2015, world leaders adopted the
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its seventeen Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs). The SDG goals went into effect in January 2016. The SDGs are
enshrined in UN Resolution 70/1 of the United Nations General Assembly. See id.
41. Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development, supra note 31;
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2012: TOWARDS A NEW GENERATION OF INVESTMENT
POLICIES, supra note 31.
42. Investment Policy Hub - Turkey, supra note 1.
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Nigeria,43 Sudan,44 and Tunisia45). Out of the fifty-four countries in
Africa, twenty-eight countries have concluded BITs with Turkey (See
Annex A and B).46 Since 2011, with the exception of 2012 and 2015,
Turkey has concluded at least two BITs every year with countries in
Africa. 47 Turkey concluded two BITs in 2018,48 four BITs in 2017,49
four BITs in 2016,50 two BITs in 2014,51 four BITs in 2013,52 and two
BITs in 2011 with countries in Africa.53
This Article focuses on six BITs that Turkey has with countries
in Africa that are actually in force and are available in English (BITs
with Egypt, 54 Ethiopia,5 5 Libya,5 6 Morocco,
57 Senegal,58 and
43. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the
Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion
and Protection of Investments, Nigeria-Turk., Oct. 8, 1996,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-
files/5196/download [https://perma.cc/6SSQ-FJEH] (archived Sept. 11, 2019)
[hereinafter Turkey-Nigeria BIT (1996)]. Agreement Between the Government of the
Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Concerning
the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Nigeria-Turk., Feb. 2, 2011,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-
files/2109/download [https://perma.cc/G5BR-M5RL] (archived Sept. 11, 2019)
[hereinafter Turkey-Nigeria BIT (2011)].
44. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the
Republic of the Sudan Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments 1999, Sudan-Turkey, Dec. 19, 1999, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/
international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/3596/download [https:f/perma.cc/
RDG2-7ZQN] (archived Sept. 11, 2019) [hereinafter Turkey-Sudan BIT].
45. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the
Republic of Tunisia Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments 1991, Tunis.-Turkey, May 29, 1991, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/
international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/2350/download [https://perma.cc/
Z9DA-NGQ3] (archived Sept. 11, 2019) [hereinafter Turkey-Tunisia BIT].
46. See infra Annexes A, B.
47. Investment Policy Hub - Turkey, supra note 1.
48. In 2018, Turkey concluded BITs with Mali, on March 2, 2018, and
Mauritania, on February 28, 2018. See id.
49. In 2017, Turkey concluded BITs with Burundim on June 14, 2017, Chad, on
February 26, 2017, Mozambique, on January 24, 2017, and Tunisia, on December 27,
2017. See id.
50. In 2016, Turkey concluded BITs with Rwanda, on November 3, 2016,
Somalia, on June 1, 2016, C6te d'Ivoire, on February 29, 2016, and Ghana, on March 1,
2016. See id.
51. In 2014, Turkey concluded BITs with Kenya, on April 8, 2014, Sudan, on
April 30, 2014. See id.
52. In 2013, Turkey concluded BITs with Djibouti, on September 25, 2013,
Gambia, on March 12, 2013, Guinea, on June 18, 2013, and Benin, on December 11,
2013. See id.
53. In 2011, Tanzania concluded BITs with Tanzania, on March 11, 2011, and
Nigeria, on February 2, 2011. See id.
54. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the
Arab Republic of Egypt Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Egypt-Turk., Oct. 4, 1996, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/
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Tunisia5 9). In addition, this Article also reflects on ten additional
BITs that are available and are in English but not in force (BITs with
Algeria,6 0 Cameroon,61 Gabon,6 2 Gambia,63 Nigeria, 64 Kenya,65
international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/ 117/download [https://perma.cc/
LR8C-NLPUJ (archived Sept. 11, 2019) [hereinafter Turkey-Egypt BIT].
55. Agreement Between Republic of Turkey and the Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Eth.-Turk., Nov. 16 2000, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/
international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/1179/download [https://perma.cc/
4Z82-NLX7] (archived Sept. 11, 2019) [hereinafter Turkey-Ethiopia BIT].
56. Agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the Great Socialist People's
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Libya-Turk., Nov. 25, 2009, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-
investment-agreements/treaty-files/5021/download [https://perma.cc/99W2-PU7R]
(archived Sept. 11, 2019) [hereinafter Turkey-Libya BIT].
57. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the
Government of the Kingdom of Morocco Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Morocco-Turk., Apr. 8, 1997,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-
files/2048/download [https://perma.cc/2SKF-P8CP] (archived Sept. 11, 2019)
[hereinafter Turkey-Morocco BIT].
58. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the
Government of the Federal Republic of Senegal Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion
and Protection of Investments, Sen.-Turk., June 15, 2010,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-
files/2247/download [https://perma.cc/3PWN-43U7] (archived Sept. 11, 2019)
[hereinafter Turkey-Senegal BIT].
59. Turkey-Tunisia BIT, supra note 45.
60. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the
Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Alg.-Turk., June 3, 1998,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-
files/60/download [https://perma.cc/X46N-ARWP] (archived Sept. 11, 2019) [hereinafter
Turkey-Algeria BIT].
61. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the
Government of the Republic of Cameroon Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Cameroon-Turk., Apr. 24, 2012,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-
files/597/download [https://perma.cc/N4ZY-F762] (archived Sept. 11, 2019) [hereinafter
Turkey-Cameroon BIT].
62. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the
Government of the Gabonese Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Gabon-Turk., July 18, 2012,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-
files/1307/download [https://perma.cc/QU83-NQCY] (archived Sept. 11, 2019)
[hereinafter Turkey-Gabon BIT].
63. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the
Government of the Republic of the Gambia Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Gam.-Turk., Mar. 12, 2013,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-
files/3345/download [https://perma.cc/SWC7-G853] (archived Sept. 11, 2019)
[hereinafter Turkey-Gambia BIT].
64. Turkey-Nigeria BIT (2011), supra note 43.
65. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Kenya and the
Government of the Republic of Turkey Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Kenya-Turk., Apr. 8, 2014,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-
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Rwanda,6 6 South Africa,67 Sudan,68 and Tanzania69). This Article is
divided into six Parts. Part I examines the history and economic
dimensions of Turkey-Africa relations. Part II offers an overview of
the legal instruments and fundamental principles that underpin
Turkey-Africa relations. The policy tools and institutions that drive
Turkey's foreign policy are examined in Part III. With a focus on
BITs, Part IV examines trends in Turkey-Africa BITs, reviews the
investor-protection elements in these BITs, as well as the sustainable
development elements in the agreements. Drawing on international
best practices, Part V offers a thorough critique of Turkey-Africa
BITs. Part VI discusses policy and practical considerations that could
complicate any effort to reform Turkey-Africa BITs.
Emerging market economies are playing an incredibly significant
role in the global economy and in the economies of developing and the
least developed countries.7 0 This Article fills a very important gap in
the available literature by offering critical insight into how emerging
market economies are using, adapting, and sometimes abandoning
established international economic norms.
files/5543/download [https://perma.cclRT8X-QVP8] (archived Sept. 11, 2019)
[hereinafter Turkey-Kenya BIT].
66. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the
Government of the Republic of Turkey Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Rwanda-Turk., Nov. 3, 2016,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-
files/5415/download [https://perma.cc/AB4E-ENE4] (archived Sept. 11, 2019)
[hereinafter Turkey-Rwanda BIT].
67. Agreement Between Republic of Turkey and the Republic of South Africa
Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, S. Afr.-Turk.,
June 23, 2000, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/internati6nal-investment-
agreements/treaty-files/2279/download [https://perma.cc/LR72-N6J2] (archived Sept.
11, 2019) [hereinafter Turkey-South Africa BIT].
68. Turkey-Sudan BIT, supra note 44.
69. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the
Government of the United Republic of Tanzania Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion
and Protection of Investments, Tanz.-Turk., Mar. 3, 2011,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-
files/2342/download [https://perma.cclEK76-K3C3] (archived Sept. 11, 2019)
[hereinafter Turkey-Tanzania BIT].
70. Emerging market economies are important for a number of reasons
including: contribution to the world GDP as a result of rising productivity, income and
demand, contribution to the achievement of the sustainable development goals, and
foreign direct investment in other countries. See Woetzel, supra note 21, at 5
("Collectively, the outperformers have been the engine for lifting about one billion
people out of extreme poverty, helping to meet a key United Nations Sustainable
Development Goal. Indeed, rising prosperity in these countries has not just reduced
poverty, but also enabled the emergence of a new wave of middle and affluent
classes."); see also Hal Hill & Juthathip Jongwanich, Emerging East Asian Economies
as Foreign Investors: An Analytical Survey, 59 SING. ECON. REV. 1, 1-26 (2014)
(discussing the growing role of emerging market economies in foreign investment).
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II. TURKEY-AFRICA RELATIONS: BACKGROUND AND ECONOMIC
DIMENSIONS
Turkey-Africa relations have evolved in three stages: the period
before 1923 when Turkey became a modern nation-state, the period
between 1923 and 1998, and the period since 1998.71 Much of this
Article focuses on Turkey-Africa relations as they have developed
since 1998. Turkey-Africa relations are evolving on multiple fronts,
including on the economic, development, political, and social fronts.
The relationship is deepening and is measured by indicators such as
institutionalized diplomatic engagement, highly structured multiyear
and/or multicountry development interventions, trade and
investment-facilitating mechanisms, technical assistance,
technological transfer, formal financial engagement, and even
security cooperation.
A. Background
1. Turkey-Africa Relations: Before 1923
Turkey and Africa have long-standing historical ties as a result
of the reach and influence of the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth
century.72 At its height, the Ottoman Empire had its tentacles in
Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and the Horn of Africa.73 In
its engagement with Africa, Turkey has routinely stressed these
historical ties.74 According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),
Turkey "has long-standing historical and cultural relations with the
African continent, dating back centuries," and the first state founded
by the Turks in Africa was the Tulunid Dynasty, which ruled today's
Egypt in the ninth and tenth centuries.75 The MFA asserts on its
website that "[b]eing an Afro-Eurasian state, Turkey's policy of
opening up to Africa is not just the reflection of a transient political
71. Mehmet Ozkan & Birol Akgiin, Turkey's Opening to Africa, 48 J. MOD. AFR.
STUD. 525, 525--46 (2010) [hereinafter Ozkan & Akgiin] (describing Turkey's relations
with Africa as falling into three periods).
72. Abdinor Hassan Dahir, How effective is Turkey's Africa initiative?, DAILY
SABAH (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.dailysabah.com/op-ed/2017/09/19/how-effective-is-
turkeys-africa-initiative [https://perma.cc/GZ2P-DCD7] (archived Aug. 11, 2019)
("Turkey has had historical ties with Africa that date back to the 15th and 16th
centuries.").
73. Ozkan & Akgdin, supra note 71, at 530 (observing that the Turks' relations
with Africa go back centuries).
74. See Ottoman Dreaming, supra note 4; see generally Stanford J. Shaw, The
Apogee of Ottoman Power, 1451-1566, in 1 HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND
MODERN TURKEY 55 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1976).
75. Shaw, supra note 74.
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and economic expectation" but "is the product of a process with strong
historical and cultural aspects."76
2. Turkey-Africa Relations: Between 1923 and 1998
The period between 1923 and 1998 has been described as a dead
era as far as Turkish-African relations are concerned.
77 Upon its
independence in 1923, when the Turkish Republic was created,
Ankara adopted a foreign policy based on westernization and
secularism, which reflected the Kemalist perception of international
relations.7 8 The building blocks of this policy, according to Abdinor
Hassan Dahir, "were secularism and modernization by looking to the
West for direction (westernization) and cutting ties with the Ottoman
past, keeping the country together through securitization based on
the defined borders of the republic, and pursuing inward-looking
noninterventionist/nonrevisionist norms."7 Against the backdrop of
Ataturk's "Peace at Home, peace in the world" approach, Turkey-
Africa relations received little or no attention during this period and
were relegated to the background.80 Nevertheless, Turkey maintained
diplomatic relations with a number of countries in Africa.
81 For
example, Turkey opened the Turkish Consulate General in Lagos in
1956.82
3. Turkey-Africa Relations: After 1998
Turkish activism in Africa started with Ankara's "Opening to
Africa Policy" adopted in the 1998 Action Plan and gained momentum
when the Justice and Development Party's (Turkish: Adalate ve
Kalkinma Partisi (AKP)) rule began in the early 2000s.
8 3 In 2003, the
Turkish government launched "The Strategy Development of
Economic Relationships with Africa,"84 and in 2005, the government
76. Id.
77. Tom Wheeler, Turkey and South Africa: Development of Relations 1860-
2005, SAIIA Rep. No. 47 (observing that 'There is little of substance in South African-
Turkish relations between 1922 and the late 1980s.").
78. Dahir, supra note 72.
79. Id.
80. Ozkan & Akgin, supra note 71, at 531 (noting that in the republican era,
Turkey-Africa relations were down-graded to the lowest level).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Turkey-Africa Relations, supra note 4.
84. Dahir, supra note 72 ("One notable project that has marked a turning point
in Africa-Turkey economic relations was the launching of 'The Strategy Development of
Economic Relationships with Africa' in 2003.").
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unveiled Turkey's "Open to Africa Policy." 85 The Turkish Government
also declared 2005 the "Year of Africa."86 Also in 2005, Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Ethiopia and South Africa
making it "the first official visit by a Turkish prime minister to a
country south of the equator."8 7
The year 2008 marked a significant year in Turkey-Africa
relations. In 2008, the AU declared Turkey a strategic partner of the
Continent.8 8 The first ever "Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit" was
held in 2008.89 The "Second Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit" was
held in 2014.90 The Summit had the theme of "A New Model of
Partnership for the Strengthening of Sustainable Development and
Integration."' The Summit adopted the Declaration and Joint
Implementation Plan for the Period of 2015-2019.92 The third
Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit will be held in 2019.93 In between
the summits, high-level official meetings have occurred.94
B. Economic Dimensions
Economic considerations play a major role in Turkey's Africa
policy.9 5 One visible dimension of Turkey's economic activism is
Ankara's interest in entering new markets beyond those in the West
and in Turkey's immediate neighborhood.96 Turkey's involvement in
85. Turkey-Africa Relations, supra note 4.
86. Id.
87. Ozkan & Akgfin, supra note 71, at 533.
88. A.U. Dec. 397 (XII), A.U. Doc. EX.CL/374 (XII), at 1 (2007).
89. Turkey-Africa Relations, supra note 4.
90. SECOND TURKEY-AFRICA PARTNERSHIP SUMMIT,
http://afrika.mfa.gov.tr/default.en.mfa (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) [https://perma.cc/
PNC9-XS2V] (archived Aug. 11, 2019).
91. Id.
92. Turkey-Africa Relations, supra note 4.
93. Id.
94. The first Turkey-Africa Cooperation High Level Official Meeting took place
in December 2010. This meeting culminated in the adoption of the Joint
Implementation Plan of Africa-Turkey partnership for the period 2010-2014
[hereinafter First Joint Implementation Plan]. The first Turkey-Africa Agriculture
Ministerial Meeting and Agribusiness Forum took place in 2017.
95. See Nicole Sobecki, Turkey seeks economic salvation in Africa, GLOB. POST,
Mar. 11, 2009, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/turkey/090309/turkey-seeks-
economic-salvation-africa [https://perma.cc/ED8Y-JENC] (archived Aug. 11, 2019); see
Turkey-Africa Relations, supra note 4; see supra Part I (discussing the economic
dimensions of Turkey-Africa Relations); see also J. Peter Pham, Turkey's Return to
Africa, WORLD DEF. REV. (May 27, 2010), http://worlddefensereview.com/pham052710.
shtml [https://perma.cc/W6QU-TZCE] (archived Aug. 18, 2019).
96. Hakan Fidan, A Work in Progress: The New Turkish Foreign Policy, 20
MIDDLE E. POL'Y 91, 91 (2013) (discussing the dawn of "a new era of activism" in
Turkey's foreign policy that sees Turkey "increasingly assert[ing] itself as a rising actor
that is determined to make a unique contribution to regional and global affairs"); see
also SECOND TURKEY-AFRICA PARTNERSHIP SUMMIT, supra note 90 (noting that
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Africa is both wide and multifaceted.97 From every indication,
Turkey-Africa economic relations are gaining momentum on multiple
fronts: FDI, trade, and development assistance.
1. Foreign Direct Investment
There are conflicting figures on the volume of Turkish FDI in
Africa.9 8 Turkish direct investment to Africa has seen a tenfold
increase since 2004 and is now between $5 to $8 billion.
99 Turkish
FDI in Africa was less than $100 million in 2003100 but surpassed $6
billion in 2015101 and $6.5 billion in 2017.102 In Africa, Ethiopia is the
largest investment destination for Turkish FDI. 0 3 Over $2.5 billion
of the total $6 billion Turkish FDI in Africa goes to Ethiopia.
104 In
Ethiopia, Turkish companies are engaged in the textile and apparel
industry but are showing growing interest in sectors, such as energy,
steel, ceramics, and construction.105 Beyond FDI, Turkish contractors
are undertaking projects in Africa and have so far undertaken ovrer
1,150 projects in Africa worth $55 billion.
106
2. Trade
Trade "is one of the most important drivers of Turkey's recent
emphasis on Africa." 0 7 There are conflicting figures of the volume of
Turkey-Africa trade, a clear indication that the exact volume of
Turkey-Africa trade is not known.108 According to the Anadolu
"Ankara's increased interest towards the states across the Mediterranean sea and to
the South was initially driven by economical reasons at large.").
97. Ozkan & Akgun, supra note 71, at 528 (describing Turkey's foreign policy in
general as being "a multi-faceted foreign policy.").
98. SHINN, supra note 8, at 11 (" There are conflicting figures on Turkey's
foreign direct investment in SSA.").
99. Turkey's Africa initiative sees six-fold rise in trade with continent, DAILY
SABAH (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.dailysabah.comleconomy/2018/02/28/turkeys-africa-
initiative-sees-six-fold-rise-in-trade-with-continent [https://perma.cc/6S9D-R3M6]




103. Bilal Derso, Africa: Ethiopia Tops Turkish Investment Destinations of Africa
- EIC, ETHIOPIAN HERALD (Jan. 31, 2018), https://allafrica.comlstories/
2018 01 3 106 6 3 .
html [https://perma.cc/P5G3-G5JN] (archived Aug. 11, 2019).
104. Id.; see also Turkey-Africa Relations, supra note 4 (discussing the deepening
relationship between Turkey and Ethiopia).
105. Derso, supra note 109.
106. Alexey Boguslavskiy, Turkey's Venture into Africa, RuSSIAN INT'L AFF.
COUNCIL (May 22, 2017), http://russiancouncil.rulenanalytics-and-comments/analytics/
turkey-s-venture-into-africa/ [https://perma.ccIB23L-9J9P] (archived Aug. 11, 2019).
107. SHINN, supra note 8.
108. Id.
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Agency, an international news agency based in Ankara, Turkey's
trade with African countries has grown sixfold in the past fifteen
years to $17.5 billion in 2017.109 According to the Turkish Ministry of
Trade, "Turkey's trade volume with Africa totaled USD 19.5 billion in
2015, up 16% from 2008 and 258% from 2003. Turkey's export in
2003-2015 increased almost sixfold and import has more than
doubled in the same period."1 10
Turkey's trade with the continent was and is still concentrated in
North Africa, but this is gradually changing. In 2016, Turkey
reportedly had more than $10 billion in trade with Egypt, Algeria,
and Morocco."11 In 2015, Turkey exported $4 billion in goods to sub-
Saharan African countries,112 up from $750 million in 2004.113 South
African Republic, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, and C6te d'Ivoire are
among Turkey's top customers in sub-Saharan Africa. 114 Turkey's
trade with South Africa constitutes approximately 40 percent of
Turkey's trade with sub-Saharan African countries;11 5 in 2015, trade
volume between the two countries stood at $1.4 billion.11 6
3. Development Assistance
Humanitarian aid and development assistance are relatively
new instruments in Turkey's foreign-policy tool kit."1 7 Turkey is
contributing to the geopolitical landscape of humanitarian assistance,
and of development aid more widely."18 Over the past decade, the
109. Turkey's Africa initiative sees six-fold rise in trade with continent, supra
note 99.
110. Turkey-Africa Trade and Economic Relations, MINISTRY OF TRADE,
REPUBLIC OF TURK. (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.trade.gov.tr/multinational-relations/
turkey-africa-economic-and-business-forum/turkey-africa-relations
[https://perma.cc/693U-8SA2] (archived Oct. 8, 2019).




114. Turkey-Africa Partnership High Level Officials Meeting (Talking Points),
AFRICAN UNION (June 19, 2013), https://au.int/sites/default/files/newsevents/working
documents/26682-wd-turkey-africa-partnership-highlevel officials meeting.pdf
[https://perma.ccl9FVB-KHTX] (archived Sept. 11, 2019).
115. Relations between Turkey and the Republic of South Africa (RSA), REPUBLIC
OF TURKEY, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-republic-of-south-
africa.en.mfa (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) [https://perma.cc/778R-HESC] (archived Aug.
11, 2019) (discussing the deepening relationship between Turkey and Ethiopia).
116. Id.
117. Jeannine Hausmann, Turkey as a Donor Country and Potential Partner in
Triangular Cooperation, GERMAN DEV. INST. (2014); see also Johanna Morden,
Humanitarian assistance: Turkey's rise shows growing importance of emergence donors,
DEVEX (July 22, 2013), https://www.devex.com/news/humanitarian-assistance-turkey-s-
rise-shows-growing-importance-of-emerging-donors-81485 [https://perma.ccl5ZJD-
B6XQ] (archived Aug. 11, 2019).
118. See TURKISH COOPERATION AND COORDINATION AGENCY (TIKA), TURKISH
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 2013 REPORT (2014); TURKISH COOPERATION AND
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position of Turkey has gradually moved from that of being an aid
recipient to that of being a donor country." 9 Turkey is now
considered one of the world's top donors and is now a net contributor
of official development assistance (ODA).1 20 According to Luca
Ventura:
Turkey spent US$6 billion on humanitarian aid, more than any other country
except the US ($6.3 billion). Percentage-wise, Turkey's largesse-0.75% of
itsl21 gross national income (GNIy-dwarfs every member of the G20 and is
well ahead of No. 2, United Arab Emirates, at 0.18% of GNI. The OECD has
slightly different numbers, but also shows Turkey's official development
assistance (ODA), which includes humanitarian aid, as having risen sharply in
the last five years.
12 2
In terms of economic assistance to countries in Africa, sub-
Saharan Africa was reportedly the first region to begin receiving
Turkish aid;123 Turkey is steadily increasing its footprint.124 In 2011,
Erdogan (then Prime Minister of Turkey) travelled to Somalia to
raise awareness in the international community about the ongoing
conflict in Somalia1 25 and was the first non-African leader to visit
Somalia over the past two decades.126 Since 2011, Turkey has
committed development assistance to Somalia and other
predominantly Muslim countries in Africa and other regions.'2 7 From
2011-2012, Erdokan committed to help Somalia recover from years of
war and famine, and Turkey quickly became "the largest donor
among non-OECD-DAC countries and one of the most active actors in
humanitarian aid and peace-building" efforts in Somalia.1
28 In
Somalia, Turkish aid has gone beyond direct financial transfers.
129
Turkish aid organizations, such as Turkish Red Crescent (Kizilay)
COORDINATION AGENCY (TIKA), TURKISH DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 2014 REPORT
(2015); TURKISH COOPERATION AND COORDINATION AGENCY (TIKA), TURKISH
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 2015 REPORT (2016); TURKISH COOPERATION AND
COORDINATION AGENCY (TIKA), TURKISH DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 2017 REPORT
(2018).
119. Luca Ventura, Turkey-Now Among World's Top Donor Nations, GLOB. FIN.
MAG. (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.gfmag.com/magazine/october-2017/turkey-now-among-
worlds-top-donor-nations [https://perma.cc/YK7G-5CP7] (archived Aug. 11, 2019).
120. Fidan, supra note 96, at 94 (discussing Turkey's increasing participation in
development assistance and humanitarian aid).
121. SHINN, supra note 8, at 13.
122. Ventura, supra note 119.
123. SHINN, supra note 8, at 13.
124. Id. (discussing the increase in Turkish aid to Africa from $10 million in 1985
to $31 million in 2006 and to $52 million in 2008. By the end of 2011, Turkey had




128. Ozerdem, supra note 7.
129. Id.
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and the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency
(TIKA) "are highly active in a wide range of infrastructure, welfare
and service sector programmes in the country such as clearing
rubbish, providing clean water, building hospitals and running the
Mogadishu's permanent settlement for displaced Somalians."o3 0 As of
2013, Africa was reportedly the largest overall beneficiary of aid from
the TIKA, receiving 33.7 percent of the agency's total
disbursement. 131
Development cooperation between Turkey and countries in
Africa will likely continue. Both sides plan to enhance cooperation in
a wide variety of areas, including the fields of health, youth
development, womens' empowerment, and infrastructure
development.132 In the Second Africa-Turkey Summit Declaration
(2014): "New Model of Partnership for the Strengthening of
Sustainable Development and Integration" (2014 Malabo Declaration)
adopted in 2014, both sides raffirmed their commitment to
cooperating with each other.1 33
C. Political/Diplomatic Cooperation
Political relations between Turkey and countries in Africa are
deepening. Turkey is engaging bilaterally and regionally through
continental-wide institutions, such as the AU and the African
Development Bank.134 Faced with major challenges to European
Union accession1 35 and shifting alliances in the Middle East,136
130. Id.
131. SHINN, supra note 8.
132. See generally New Model of Partnership for the Strengthening of Sustainable
Development and Integration, SECOND AFRICA-TURKEY SUMMIT DECLARATION (2014).
133. Id.
134. Founded in 1964, the African Development Bank is a multilateral
development finance institution with a focus on the continent of Africa. The
overarching objective of the African Development Bank (AfDB) Group is to
spur sustainable economic development and social progress in its regional
member countries (RMCs). See Mission & Strategy, supra note 10.
135. After more than a decade negotiation to join the European Union, Turkey is
not anywhere near joining the EU. In fact, Turkey's EU bid appears to have all but
collapsed. Turkey's formal EU accession negotiations began in October 2005. However,
in April 2017, the European Parliament called for a formal suspension of Turkey's EU
membership bid. Furthermore, in September 2017, German Chancellor Angela Merkel
announced that she will seek an end to Turkey's membership talks. Negotiation talks
are now effectively frozen. Although Turkey remains a candidate for membership and
although the Turkish Prime Minister has said the Turkey still seeks full EU
membership many experts do not see the possibility of that happening anytime soon.
See Factbox: Turkey's Collapsing EU membership bid, REUTERS, Sept. 4, 2017,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-turkey-eu-factbox/factbox-turkeys-
collapsing-eu-membership-bid-idUSKCN1BFITH [https://perma.cc/5G27-ANV9]
(archived Aug. 11, 2019); see also Tom Batchelor, Turkey still wants 'full membership'
of EU, Erdogan says, INDEPENDENT, Mar. 26, 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/
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Turkey is going farther to find trade, investment, and diplomatic
partners.
1. Bilateral Relations
Enlarging the level of its representation in the continent is
important to Ankara.1 3 7 Consequently, the last decade has seen
Turkey decisively opening new embassies in Africa and supporting
numerous official visits to the continent.
38
In 2009, Turkey had only twelve Embassies in Africa.1 39 Since
2009, Turkey has embarked on an ambitious goal of opening
embassies and consulates in almost every country in Africa.
140
According to David Shinn:
Turkey has engaged in an ambitious programme to establish diplomatic
missions in SSA countries, and has encouraged the reciprocal opening of
embassies in Ankara. Embassies were established in C6te d'Ivoire and
Tanzania in 2009, adding to its existing missions in the [Democratic Republic
of Congo], Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Sudan. Further
embassies were opened in 2010 (in Angola, Cameroon, Ghana, Madagascar,
Mali and Uganda), 2011 (The Gambia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Somalia,
South Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe), 2012 (Burkina Faso, Gabon, Namibia
and Niger) and 2013 (Chad, Guinea, Djibouti and Eritrea). When Turkey
opened its embassy in Eritrea in 2013, it became the first country in the world
to have ambassadorial representation in every country in the Horn of
Africa.
141
In 2017, Turkey announced plans to open five new embassies in
Africa, bringing Turkish embassies in the region to about forty-
four.142 Turkey plans to open even more embassies in Africa.1
4 3 In
news/worldleurope/erdogan-turkey-eu-full-membership-european-union-commitment-
president-a8274166.html [https://perma.cc/7SB7-CRPE] (archived Aug. 11, 2019).
136. Ryan Crocker, Hussein Ibish, Billent Aras, Saudi Arabian-Turkish Rivalry
in the Middle East, 25 MIDDLE E. POL'Y (2018), https://www.mepc.org/journal/saudi-
arabian-turkish-rivalry-middle-east [https://perma.cc/9X5K-5S3J] (archived Oct. 21,
2019) (discussing the growing tension between Turkey and Saudi Arabia); Turkey and
Iran: Bitter Friends, Bosom Rivals, CRISIS GROUP MIDDLE EAST BRIEFING N
051
Istanbul/Tehran/Brussels, Dec. 13, 2016, https://d207landvipOwj.cloudfront.net/bO5l-
turkey-and-iran-bitter-friends-bosom-rivals.pdf [https://perma.cclW5Q9-CVEP]
(archived Oct. 21, 2019) (observing that a profound disagreement over core interests in
Iraq and Syria is putting Turkey and Iran on a major collision course); see also, Robert
Malley, The Unwanted Wars: Why the Middle East Is More Combustible Than Ever,
FOREIGN AFF. (2019).





142. Turkey to open 5 new embassies in African countries, DAILY SABAH (Oct. 31,
2017), https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2017/11/01/turkey-to-open-5-new-
9692019]
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response to Ankara's diplomatic overtures, a growing number of
countries in Africa now have embassies in Turkey, and more have
declared their decisions to open embassies in Ankara.144
High-level official visits are also a very important tool in
Ankara's opening up to Africa agenda.14 5 To strengthen bilateral
relations with countries in Africa, President Erdogan has stepped up
his visits to Africa.1 46 Indeed, "[b]etween 2009 and 2011 there were
37 visits to Africa made by either the Turkish president, prime
minister, parliamentary speaker or minister of foreign affairs. Over
the same period, there were 76 visits to Turkey by African leaders of
similar rank."147 In the last ten years, President Erdogan has paid
more than thirty visits to twenty-eight African countries as both
prime minister and president prompting Alexey Boguslavskiy to
observe, "[t]he President of Turkey R. Erdokan has become an
absolute record-breaker among leaders of non-African states by the
number of visits on the African continent, Sub-Saharan African
countries being the major focus." 148 Official visits from African
leaders to Turkey are increasing.14 9
2. Relations with Continental and Subregional Organizations
Beyond bilateral relations, Turkey is also pursuing relations
with regional organizations in Africa, such as the African Union and
the African Development Bank (the Bank).150 Turkey has been an
Observer Country since 2005 and Strategic Partner since 2008 of the
African Union.1 51 Since 2009, Turkey has been making an annual
embassies-in-african-countries [https://perma.cc/H9SM-NEVQ] (archived Aug. 11,
2019).
143. Turkey aims to open more embassies in Africa, says Erdogan, HURRIYET
DAILY NEWS (Sept. 7, 2018), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-aims-to-open-
more-embassies-in-africa-says-erdogan- 136561 [https://perma.cc/DHW4-FJTW]
(archived Aug. 11, 2019) (discussing Turkey's plan to increase the number of it
embassies in Africa from 41 to 54).
144. Gabon to open embassy in Ankara in 2015, HURRIYET DAILY NEWS (May 12,
2015), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/gabon-to-open-embassy-in-ankara-in-2015-
82303 [https://perma.cclL922-HR5K] (archived Aug. 11, 2019).
145. Boguslavskiy, supra note 106 (discussing Erdokan's numerous visits to the
African continent).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 7.
148. Id.; Boguslavskiy, supra note 106.
149. Kgalema Motlanthe, Motlanthe on Africa Day, POLITICSWEB (May 25, 2010),
http://www.politicsweb.co.zalpoliticsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71656?oid=177864&s
n=Detail [https://perma.cc/2MPC-2T7C] (archived Aug. 18, 2019).
150. Turkey-Africa Relations, supra note 4.
151. A number of emerging economies are also non-African members of the AfDB
including China, India, Saudi Arabia, Brazil. See Member Countries, AFRICAN DEV.
BANK GROUP, https://www.afdb.org/en/about-us/corporate-information/members/ (last
visited Sept. 8, 2019) [https://perma.cclDK5M-Q8MB] (archived Aug. 11, 2019).
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contribution of $1 million to the African Union.15
2 Turkey has also
pledged to "remain committed to support the institutional capacities
of the African Union and other regional organizations in achieving
progress on the priority areas which will consolidate African
ownership of African matters."15 3 In his 2014 speech delivered on the
occasion of the second Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit, President
Erdokan "welcome[d] the increasing political significance of the
African Union in 'addition to its forceful representation, and the
active role it plays in solving the problems arising in the member
countries," and pledged that Turkey "will continue [its] financial
contribution to the budget of the African Union in the coming
years."154
Turkey is increasingly involved in the activities of the African
Development Bank.155 In January 2013, Turkey became the twenty-
sixth nonregional member of the African Development Bank and the
twenty-sixth State Participant of the African Development Fund.
156
In March 2014, Turkey gave its consent for the African Development
Bank to issue bonds denominated in Turkish Lira.?
5 7 To date, the
African Development Bank has issued numerous bonds denominated
in Turkish Lira, and has raised 1,337.4 million TRY since 2009
through forty-four transactions.158 In 2016, the African Development
Bank, together with the Under Secretariat of the Turkish Treasury
and Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey, organized the first
Business Opportunities Seminar to strengthen partnerships between
the Bank and stakeholders in Turkey.159 In April 2018, the Bank
initiated technical cooperation with the Turk Eximbank.1
60
152. African Union-Turkey Partnership Joint Implementation Report, 2015-2017,
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPUBLIC OF TURK. (Feb. 12, 2018),
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/african-union---turkey-partnership-joint-implementation-
report -2015-2017--12-february-2018_en.en.mfa [https://perma.cc/Y86Q-KRYN]
(archived Oct. 8, 2019) (providing a report of the African Union-Turkey Partnership
Implementation Plan, 2015-2019).
153. Id.
154. Recep Tayyip Erdokan, President of the Republic of Turkey, Address at
Second Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit (Nov. 21, 2014) (transcript available in the
Second Turkery-Africa Partnership Summit website).
155. Turkey-Partnership Overview, AFRICAN DEV. BANK GROUP,
https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/non-regional-member-countries/turkey (last visited
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Turkey is also engaging countries in Africa at the level of
regional economic communities and has obtained observer status in
most of the regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa. 161
D. Global Governance IMultilateralism
Turkey is gradually positioning itself as a leading international
voice in Africa and as a voice for and a strategic ally of Africa on the
global stage.162 In 2013, when Turkey was actively campaigning for a
seat on the United Nations Security Council, Ankara promised
African states that "[i]f elected, Turkey's UNSC membership in 2014-
2015 will be an opportunity for the AU to be even much more
stronger on the international scene, as Turkey, an Afro-Eurasian
country, will indeed be the voice of Africa in this century which is the
Century of Africa."1 63 In 2010, Turkey cochaired the "International
Donor's Conference for the Reconstruction and Development of
Darfur." 164 In May 2011, Turkey hosted the Fourth United Nations
Conference on the Least Developed Countries in Istanbul.165 In line
with its resolve to pursue robust comprehensive policy in Africa, in
2016, Turkey hosted the High Level Partnership Forum for Somalia
in Istanbul.6 6
161. Since 2005, the Turkish Embassy in Abuja has been accredited to the
Economic Community of West African States. Since 2010, the Turkish Embassy in Dar-
es-Salaam has been accredited to the East African Community. In 2012, the Turkish
Embassy in Lusaka became accredited to Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa, and in 2012, the Turkish Embassy in Addis Ababa became accredited to the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development Partners Forum. Since 2013, the
Turkish Embassy in Libreville has been accredited to Economic Community of Central
African States. See Turkey-Africa Relations, supra note 4; see also Turkey-Africa
Partnership High Level Officials Meeting (Talking Points), supra note 114.
162. See generally Aylin Taghan, Turkey's Emergence as a Global Actor in Africa:
A Special Focus on Mozambique, FOREIGN POL'Y INST. (Aug. 8, 2016),
http://foreignpolicy.org.tr/dis-politika-foreign-policy-vol-xxxxiii-no-1-2016-turkeys-
emergence-as-a-global-actor-in-africa-a-special-focus-on-mozambiquel
[https://perma.cc/8FGN-5WQU] (archived Aug. 11, 2019).
163. Turkey-Africa Partnership High Level Officials Meeting (Talking Points),
supra note 114.
164. Darfur donor meeting in March eyes $2 billion - Egypt, REUTERS, Mar. 11,
2012, https://www.reuters.comlarticle/idUSMCD175712 [https://perma.cc/PU4L-DD36]
(archived Aug. 11, 2019).
165. Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries, UNITED
NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/conf/ldc/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/NLB9-KYK2] (archived Aug. 11, 2019).
166. The Somalia High Level Partnership Forum is the highest decision-making
mechanism of a process in which the Somali Government, the United Nations (U.N.),
and key donor countries are parties. The sixth meeting of the Forum was held in
Istanbul under the co-chairmanship of President Erdokan, H.E. Hassan Sheikh
Mohamud, President of Somalia, and H.E. Jan Eliasson, U.N. Deputy Sec'y-Gen. See
Press Release, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Release Regarding the High
Level Partnership Forum on Somalia to be Held on 23-24 February 2016 in Istanbul
(Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-48-22-february-2016-press-release-
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At the global level, Turkey has attempted to champion causes
important to Africa.16 7 Turkey "defined its G20 presidency as
representing the interests of low income, least developed, and SSA
countries."16 8 During the Turkish G20 Presidency, G20 Leaders
adopted a framework to strengthen the dialogue between G20 and
low income developing countries. 169
III. TURKEY-AFRICA RELATIONS: EMERGING LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
FRAMEWORK
A number of legal instruments underpin the unfolding economic
relations between Turkey and countries in Africa. These documents
set out the vision for Turkey-Africa relations, identify key areas of
cooperation, and map the agenda for deepening the relationship
between the two sides in the coming years.
A. Legal Instruments in Turkey-Africa Relations
A growing number of legal instruments are shaping Turkey-
Africa relations. While some instruments (e.g., BITs) are binding if
and when they are ratified, most of the instruments that underpin
Turkey-Africa relations are not binding and could be classified as
"soft law" instruments.170 Free trade agreements are not very
common in Turkey-Africa relations. Turkey has signed free trade
regarding-the-high_1evel-partnership-forum-on-somalia-to-be-held-on-
2 3 24-february-
2016-in-istanbul.en.mfa [https://perma.cc/C98D-GK2J] (archived Aug. 11, 2019).
167. Turkey-Africa Relations, supra note 4 (noting that Turkey, under its G20
Presidency in 2015, organized events in line with the Africa's "Agenda 2063." In this
regard, the High Level Conference on Access to Energy in Sub-Saharan Africa was held
on October 1, 2015 for the first time under G20 framework).
168. Id.; see also G20 2015 Turkey, the Group Development Agenda, and Sub-
Saharan Africa Representation1, HEINRICH BOLL STIFTUNG ISTANBUL (June 23, 2016),
https://tr.boell.org/de/2017/06/23/g20-2015-turkey-group-development-agenda-and-sub-
saharan-africa-representation1 [https://perma.cclQK8K-R3UT] (archived Aug. 11,
2019).
169. G-20, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPUBLIC OF TURK.,
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/g-20-en.en.mfa (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) [https://perma.ccl8J5V
-WC4J] (archived Aug. 19, 2019).
170. See generally W. Michael Reisman, The Concept and Functions of Soft Law
in International Politics, in 1 ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUDGE TASLIM OLAWALE ELIAS
135, 135 (Bola A. Ajibola & Emmanuel G. Bello eds., 1992); Andrew T. Guzman &
Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 172 (2010)
("Thus, soft law is most commonly defined to include hortatory, rather than legally
binding, obligations."); Timothy Meyer, Soft Law as Delegation, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
888, 890 (2009) (noting that "soft legal obligations are those international obligations
that, while not legally binding themselves, are created with the expectation that they
will be given some indirect legal effect through related binding obligations under either
international or domestic law.").
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agreements with four African countries: Egypt (December 27,
2005),171 Morocco (April 7, 2004),172 Tunisia (November 25, 2004),173
and Mauritius (2011).174 There are reports that Turkey is currently in
trade talks with Cameroon, the DRC, and Seychelles, but these
reports cannot be substantiated.1 7 5 Overall, key legal instruments in
Turkey-Africa relations include
* The Istanbul Declaration on Turkey-Africa Partnership:
Cooperation and Solidarity for a Common Future adopted at
the First Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit in 2008 (2008
Istanbul Declaration);176
* The Cooperation Framework for Turkey-Africa Partnership
adopted at the First Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit in
2008;177
* The Joint Implementation Plan of Turkey-Africa Partnership
2010-2014 (First Implementation Plan);17 8
* The Joint Declaration and the Joint Action Plan adopted at
the first Ministerial meeting held on the 16th December 2011
in Istanbul;179
* The Second Africa-Turkey Summit Declaration (2014): "New
Model of Partnership for the Strengthening of Sustainable
Development and Integration" (2014 Malabo Declaration);18 0
171. Agreement Establishing a Free Trade Area Between the Arab Republic of
Egypt and the Republic of Turkey, Egypt-Turk., Dec. 27, 2005.
172. Free Trade Agreement Between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Republic of
Turkey, Morocco-Turk., Apr. 7, 2004.
173. Free Trade Agreement Between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of
Tunisa, Tunis.-Turk., Nov. 25, 2004.
174. Free Trade Agreement Between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of
Mauritius, Turk.-Mauritius, Sept. 9, 2011.
175. Nail Ersoy, Free Trade Agreements of Turkey, Republic of Turkey, MINISTRY
OF ECONOMY, REPUBLIC OF TURK. (Sept. 2013), http://yoikk.gov.tr/upload/IDB/
FTAsCompatibilityMode.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UCE-2EFB] (archived Sept. 8, 2019).
176. The Istanbul Declaration on Africa-Turkey Partnership: Solidarity and
Partnership for a Common Future, Second Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Turkey (adopted Aug. 19, 2008) [hereinafter Instanbul
Declaration]. According to Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, forty-nine African
countries participated in the "Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit" which was held
August 18-21, 2008. See Turkey-Africa Relations, supra note 4.
177. Framework of Cooperation for Africa-Turkey Partnership, Second Turkey-
Africa Partnership Summit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Turkey (adopted Aug. 19, 2008)
[hereinafter Framework of Cooperation 2008].
178. First Joint Implementation Plan, supra note 94.
179. Joint Declaration and Joint Action Plan, First Ministerial Review
Conference of the Africa-Turkey Partnership, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
REPUBLIC OF TURK., Dec. 16, 2011, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-first-ministerial-review-
conference-of-the-turkey-africa-cooperation-december- 16 2011.en.mfa
[https://perma.cc/4EKQ-75GR] (archived Oct. 23, 2019).
180. Declaration, Second Africa-Turkey Summit, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
REPUBLIC OF TURK., Nov. 21, 2014, http://afrika.mfa.gov.tr/data/21-november-2014-
summit-declaration.pdf [https://perma.cc/96VY-FM4H] (archived Sept. 8, 2019)
[hereinafter Malabo Declaration]. According to Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
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* The Turkey-Africa Joint Implementation Plan 2015-2019,
adopted at the Second Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit in
2014; and181
* Thirty-eight Economic Cooperation Agreements, including at
least thirty-one known BITs. 182
In addition to the legal instruments that underpin Turkey-
Africa relations, there are numerous investment contracts and
construction agreements between Turkish businesses and countries
in Africa.' 83 Security pacts between Turkey and a growing number of
countries in Africa are also important, such as the pact that laid the
foundation for Ankara to establish and launch Turkey's biggest
overseas military base in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 2017.184
B. Principles That Underpin Turkey-Africa Relations
The principles that underpin Turkey-Africa relations are spelled
out in the 2008 Istanbul Declaration85 and the 2014 Malabo
Declaration.186 In the Istanbul Declaration, the parties identified
several principles that will guide the Africa-Turkey partnership.18 7
These include inter alia the principles of: respect for the principles of
the United Nations (UN) Charter and the Constitutive Act of the
African Union, sovereign equality of states, the universality of human
rights and respect of fundamental freedoms, and peaceful settlement
of disputes.
In the Malabo Declaration, the parties reaffirmed their
adherence to the goals and principles stipulated in the Istanbul
Declaration.188
almost 30 African countries participated in the Malabo Summit held in November
2019. See Turkey-Africa Relations, supra note 4.
181. Joint Implementation Plan of Africa-Turkey Partnership 2015-2019, Afr.-
Turk., Nov. 21 2014, http://afrika.mfa.gov.tr/data/turkey-africa-joint-implementation-
plan-2015-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NDZ-R6U7] (archived Sept. 8, 2019) [hereinafter
Second Joint Implementation Plan].
182. Turkey-Africa Relations, supra note 4.
183. Given rising Turkish investments in Africa and construction deals, it stands
to reason that the investments and contruction projects are all on the basis of binding
contracts between Turkish companies and governments in Africa. Id.
184. Turkey Sets Up Largest Overseas Army Base in Somalia, AL JAZEERA (Oct.
1, 2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/turkey-sets-largest-overseas-army-
base-somalia-171001073820818.html [https://perma.cc/2ABN-2SRY] (archived Aug. 19,
2019) (observing that the military base "cost about $50 million, will train 10,000
Somali troops and has the capacity to train at least 1,500 soldiers at a time.").
185. See Istanbul Declaration, supra note 176.
186. See Malabo Declaration, supra note 178.
187. See Istanbul Declaration, supra note 176.
188. See Malabo Declaration, supra note 178, at 4 ("[S]trengthen the follow up
mechanism which was established by the Framework of Cooperation for Africa-Turkey
Partnership, done in Istanbul on 19 August 2008; through regular and intensified
contacts. . . ").
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C. The Agenda for Turkey-Africa Cooperation
The agenda for Turkey-Africa cooperation is quite extensive. At
the Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit held in 2008 with the
participation of forty-nine countries, the two sides agreed to cooperate
with vigor, in nine areas: (1) intergovernmental cooperation; (2) trade
and investment; (3) agriculture, agribusiness, rural development,
water resources management, and small and medium scale
enterprises (SMEs); (4) health; (5) peace and security; (6)
infrastructure, energy, and transport; (7) culture, tourism, and
education; (8) media, information, and communication technology;
and (9) the environment.1 8 9 To advance the identified agenda, the
parties adopted the Framework of Cooperation for implementing the
Istanbul Declaration.1'o In 2014, the two sides expressed interest in
deepening collaboration in a number of fields. Specifically, the two
sides agreed to continue collaboration in a number of fields including
the fields of peace and security, trade, investment, agriculture, and
infrastructure development.
D. Turkey-Africa Relations: Emerging Institutional Framework
In 2008, the Parties adopted the Joint Implementation Plan of
Turkey-Africa Partnership 2010-2014 (First Implementation Plan) in
accordance with the Istanbul Declaration.19i In 2014, the parties
adopted the Joint Implementation Plan of Africa-Turkey Partnership
2015-2019 (Second Implementation Plan).19 2 The two documents lay
down the basis for establishing the strengthening institutional
mechanisms that will shape Turkey-Africa cooperation
arrangements. the parties have agreed to, inter alia, "strengthen
their inter-governmental inks and explore new areas of cooperation";
"promote the exchange of high level visits"; and "conduct regular
inter-governmental dialogue and cooperation in order to create and
maintain a favorable climate for business contacts and trade between
Africa and Turkey."19 3
The parties have also agreed to establish follow-up mechanisms
at several levels as follows:
189. Istanbul Declaration, supra note 176. The information about the number of
countries that participated in the the Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit in 2008 is
from Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Whether the countries that participated
were represented at by their heads of state, at the ministerial level, or by lower-level
officials is hard to tell. See Turkey-Africa Relations, supra note 4.
190. Framework of Cooperation 2008, supra note 177.
191. Istanbul Declaration, supra note 176.
192. See Second Joint Implementation Plan, supra note 179.
193. First Joint Implementation Plan, supra note 94.
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(a) "the Africa-Turkey Summit to be held every five years in Africa and in
Turkey, on a rotational basis";
(b) "[a] Ministerial Review Conference that will meet every third year in the
period between Summits to assess and evaluate the progress of implementation
of the Programme of Action and prepare for the Summit meeting";
(c) "[a] meeting of Senior Officials that will take place twice in between two
summits to review the progress of implementation of agreed programs and
projects, disseminate information about cooperation arrangements, propose
new initiatives, and report to and prepare for the Ministerial Review
Conference."
19 4
IV. TURKEY IN AFRICA: FOREIGN POLICY TOOLS AND INSTITUTIONS
Using a multitude of strategies, tools, and institutions, Turkey
has been fairly successful in penetrating Africa.19 5 In the last decade,
"a wide array of new liberal instruments has been added to the toolkit
of Turkish diplomats."196 Turkey is using both traditional tools of
foreign policy (e.g., trade, aid, and investment) and soft power (e.g.,
development assistance, humanitarian aid, and cultural diplomacy)
to make an influence in Africa.1
97
194. Second Joint Implementation Plan, supra note 179, at 1 17(1)-(3).
195. Turkey-Africa Relations, supra note 4 (discussing Turkey's engagement with
countries in Africa).
196. Id.
197. Coined by Joseph S. Nye back in the 1980s, the term soft power generally
refers to the ability of a country to persuade other countries to do what it wants
without resorting to military force or coercion. Agents of soft power are typically
companies, foundations, universities, religious organizations, and other institutions of
civil society. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power, 80 FOREIGN POL'Y 153, 167 (1990). To
Nye, proof of power "lies not in resources but in the ability to change the behavior of
states." Id. at 155. He argues that today, "[t]he ability to affect what other countries
want tends to be associated with intangible power resources such as culture, ideology,
and instritutions." Id. at 166-67. Nye defines 'co-optive power' as "getting others to
want what you want" and identifies soft power resources to include cultural attraction
ideology, and international institutions. According to Nye:
Soft co-optive power is just as important as hard command power. If a state can
make its power seem legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less
resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will
more willingly follow. If it can establish international norms consistent with its
society, it is less likely to have to change. ge. If it can support institutions that
make other states wish to channel or limit their activities in ways the
dominant state prefers, it may be spared the costly exercise of coercive or hard
power. Id. at 167.
With soft power, some countries try to shape the long-term attitudes and preferences of
people of other nations. Whether successful states need both hard and soft power and
whether soft power is effective are continuing debate in international relations circles.
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A. Turkey's Display of Soft Power in Africa
Turkish foreign policy makers are constantly adding new
instruments to their tool kit even while improving conventional tools.
Conventional devices deployed so far by Turkey in Africa include
trade, aid, and FDI.19 s Soft power has also been an important tool in
Turkey's foray into Africa.' 9 9 Turkey is using new means, such as
flights, hospitals, schools, scholarships, and other civil society
organizations to get into Africa.20 0 In March 2018, National Public
Radio's Peter Kenyon observed
There are now over 40 Turkish embassies in Africa, and state-controlled
Turkish Airlines flies to more than 50 African destinations. Last fall, Turkey
opened a military base in Somalia, its first in Africa and the largest of its
overseas bases. If you get sick in Somalia, you may be treated at the Recep
Tayyip Erdogan Hospital. Visitors arrive at an airport terminal run by a
Turkish company, and travel on roads built by Turkey's development authority.
Garbage collection is handled by the Turkish Red Crescent.2 0 1
Schools and hospitals are very important in Turkey's Africa
agenda and are some of the primary tools that Turkey relies on for its
soft projection of power in Africa. 2 02 "The Gillen movement-founded
by Turkish cleric Fethullah Giilen-was initially an instrument of
Turkey's soft power approach in Africa." 203 However, since the
Turkish government's fallout with Fethullah Gillen, the government
See Eric X. Li, The Rise and Fall of Soft Power, FOREIGN POL'Y MAG. (Aug. 20, 2018,
1:25 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/20/the-rise-and-fall-of-soft-power/
[https://perma.cclS7QK-3B35] (archived Aug. 19, 2019). On Turkey's use of soft power,
see Zafer Yoruk & Pantelis Vatikiotis, Soft Power Or Illusion of Hegemony: The Case of
the Turkish Soap Opera "Colonialism," 7 INT'L J. COMm. 2361, 2361 (2013). See also
Ibrahim Kalin, Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey, 16 PERCEPTIONS: J. INT'L
AFF. 5, 7 (2011).
198. See infra Part H.B.
199. See Suraj Sharma, Turkey Scrambles for Africa: Ankara Eyes New Empire
in Old Backyard, MIDDLE E. EYE (Aug. 7, 2017, 11:45 AM),
http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-scramble-africa-1794375465
[https://perma.cclYLE2-UJUZC] (archived Aug. 19, 2019) (stating that "[wihen the AKP
government began its push into Africa in 2005, it relied heavily on soft power to find
leverage in Africa, particularly in eastern and southern Africa.").
200. Fidan, supra note 96, at 92 (observing that Turkish diplomats now "have a
larger set of instruments to draw on as they launch new policies to advance the
country's regional and global agenda . . . Turkey's soft power now comprises, among
others things, cultural diplomacy, development assistance and mediation services.").
201. Peter Kenyon, Turkey is Quietly Building Its Presence in Africa, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO (Mar. 8, 2018, 11:27 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2018/03/08/
590934127/turkey-is-quietly-building-its-presence-in-africa [https://perma.cclL2ZN-
BQ8E] (archived Aug. 19, 2019).
202. See Sharma, supra note 199 ("The primary tool it relied on for this soft
projection of power was Fethullah Gulen's educational institutions.").
203. Daragh Neville & Alex Vines, President Erdogan's Africa Agenda: From
Business to Embassy-Building, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 26, 2017, 8:59 AM),
https://www.newsweek.com/erdogans-agenda-turkey-africa-548136 [https://perma.cc/
6AA8-QCAY] (archived Aug. 18, 2019).
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has tried to steer its activities through government-run agencies.
204
The Maarif Foundation, a government-run agency, is beginning to
operate schools in Africa.205 Established in 2016 by the ruling Justice
and Development Party, the Maarif Foundation has taken over
seventy-six schools linked to the Gillen movement in ten countries in
Africa.206 The Maarif Foundation has reportedly "opened 32 new
schools in eleven countries: Gambia, Sierra Leone, Djibouti, Sao Tome
and Principe, the United States, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Georgia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Tanzania and Macedonia, having a total of
1,127 students."2 0 7 The Turkish Ministry of National Education, and
the Maarif Foundation, hosted the first Turkey-Africa Education
Ministers Conference in 2017.208 Since 1992, Turkey has reportedly
provided undergraduate, graduate, and doctorate scholarships to over
eight thousand African students.2 0
9
Turkish Airlines' "bullish African expansion" has been noted by
external observers and is welcomed---even celebrated-by many in
Africa. 210 Today, Turkish Airlines is "the largest international carrier
in Africa in terms of total number of destinations."
2 11 In 2012, when
Turkish Airlines launched twice daily service to Mogadishu, Somalia,
it became the "third carrier to operate at Mogadishu International
Airport and the first carrier from outside Africa to offer scheduled
flights to and from Mogadishu in 21 years."
212 Africa Experience
Sharing Program, a program akin to the U.S. Peace Corps, provides
an opportunity for Turkish students to visit several African countries
204. See Kareem Shaheem, Erdogan v the Gulenists: from political allies to
Turkey's bitter rivals, GUARDIAN (July 19, 2019, 2:54 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/19/thousands-detained-as-turkey-vows-to-
smoke-out-gulen-supporters [https://perma.cc/4UXR-MKQN] (archived Aug. 19, 2019).
205. Erdogan's foundation takes over 76 Gulen movement schools in 10 countries,
TURKISH MINUTE (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.turkishminute.com/2018/04/
2 4 /
erdogans-foundation-takes-over-76-gulen-movement-schools-in-10-countries/
[https://perma.ccl56YW-XRPG] (archived Aug. 19, 2019).
206. The ten countries are: Guinea, Somalia, Sudan, People's Republic of the
Congo, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Tunisia, Senegal, and Chad with their 8,506 students.
Id.
207. Id.
208. Pinar Dost-Niyego, Turkey's Growing Presence in Africa, and Opportunities




(archived Aug. 19, 2019).
209. Id.
210. Natural Resources and Economic Growth Draw Turkish Airlines to Africa,
CTR. FOR AVIATION (Jan. 29, 2012, 5:41 PM), https://centreforaviation.com/analysis/
reports/natural-resources-and-economic-growth-draw-turkish-airlines-to-africa-
6 69 08
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to volunteer.2 13 "The program is organized by the Turkish
Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) in cooperation with
Turkish Airlines, Anadolu Agency, and state broadcaster Turkish
Radio and Television (TRT)." 214
B. Turkey's Foreign Policy Institutions
At the forefront of Turkish foreign policy is the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (Ministry).215 The Ministry was established in 1920
and is responsible for Turkey's foreign relations.216 Between 1923 and
2001, Turkey's foreign policy was largely based on the Western-
inspired reforms of Mustafa Kemal Atatirk, which placed heavy
emphasis on Turkey's relationship with the Western world.2 17 Since
the end of the Cold War, Turkey's foreign relations have been
characterized by relation diversification.218 In 1924, Turkey had a
total of thirty-nine missions abroad.2 19 In 2002, Turkey only had 163
diplomatic missions abroad.220 Today, Turkey is represented by about
233 official missions throughout the world.221 According to the Lowy
213. Turkish Students Continue Volunteer Work in Africa, DAILY SABAH (Aug. 25,
2017), https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/2017/08/26/turkish-students-continue-
volunteer-work-in-africa [https://perma.cc/TRC4-MTS8] (archived Aug. 19, 2019).
214. Id.
215. See generally MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPUBLIC OF TURK.,
http://www.mfa.gov.tr (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) [https://perma.cc/A2LB-8YE5]
(archived Aug. 19, 2019).
216. Brief History of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey,
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPUBLIC OF TURK., http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-
cumhuriyeti-disisleri-bakanligi-tarihcesi.en.mfa (last visited Sept. 8, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/W5BA-CN49] (archived Aug. 19, 2019).
217. Id.
218. Id.; see F. STEPHEN LARRABEE & IAN 0. LESSER, TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN
AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTLY 128 (Rand Corp. 2003) (observing that although Turkey's
business community tends to be secular and highly supportive of Turkish integration
in European and Western institutions and is generally not a community that looks
South or East, culturally or politically, it is nonetheless among the most active
proponents of Turkish economic engagement in Eurasia and the Middle East); see also
Yusuf K. Bagir, Impact of the Presence of Foreign Missions on Trade: Evidence from
Turkey, MUNICH PERSONAL REPEC ARCHIVE 4 (2017), https://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/80845/1/MPRA paper_80845.pdf [https://perma.cc/88RT-ENHS]
(archived Oct. 21, 2019) ("Turkey has experienced a significant change in its foreign
policy objectives since the beginning of the 21th century. The main goal of this change
was to develop a multi-dimensional and more proactive foreign policy which in part led
to the expansion of relations with long-time neglected Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin
America and Asia-Pacific regions."
219. See Foreign Relations of Turkey, supra note 217.
220. Turkey to open 5 new embassies in African countries, supra note 142
(discussing the steady rise in the number of Turkish missions since 2002, when the
ruling Justice and Development Party came to power).
221. Of Turkey's 233 missions around the world, 135 are embassies, thirteen are
permanent representations, eighty-four are consulates-general and one is a trade office.
See List of Diplomatic Missions of Turkey, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
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Institute's Global Diplomacy Index "2017 Country Ranking," Turkey
is the sixth country, only after United States, China, France, Russia,
and Japan, in the number of worldwide representations.
2 22 "In the
year 2009 there were only 12 Turkish embassies in African countries
(5 of them in North Africa)." 223 Today, Turkey has some forty-four
embassies in the continent and reportedly plans to open an embassy
in every capital city in Africa.2 24 In its engagement with countries in
Africa three Turkish institutions are proving very important: Tiurk
Eximbank, Turkey's Foreign Economic Relations Board, and TIKA.
1. Tilrk Eximbank
Turk Eximbank was established in 1987 as Turkey's official
export credit agency.225 The main objectives of Tilrk Eximbank are
Increasing the volume of exports; Diversification of export goods and services;
Developing new export markets; Increasing the exporters' share of
international trade and providing necessary support for their initiatives;
Gaining competitiveness and bringing assurance to exporters, overseas
contractors, and investors on the international markets; and "romoting and
supporting the production and sale of investment goods for export through
overseas investments.
2 2 6
Tiurk Eximbank plays a very important role in supporting Turkey's
efforts in Africa and is eyeing more international cooperation.
227 Thus
far, Tilrk Eximbank's loans are supporting a number of infrastructure
and development projects throughout Africa. 228 Countries in Africa
are also turning to the bank for financing.229 In the 2008 Cooperation
Framework for Turkey-Africa Partnership, the parties "welcome[d]
List of diplomatic-missionsofLTurkey (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) [https://perma.cc/
86YV-PZFD] (archived Aug. 19, 2019).
222. Global Diplomacy Index: 2017 Country Ranking, LowY INST. (2017),
https://globaldiplomacyindex.lowyinstitute.org/country-rank.html#
[https://perma.cc/8T5J-BHY2] (archived Aug. 19, 2019).
223. Turkey-Africa Relations, supra note 4.
224. Neville & Vines, supra note 203.
225. See TURK EXIMBANK, https://www.eximbank.gov.tr/en (last visited Sept. 8,
2019) [https://perma.cc/8N4P-TKFE] (archived Aug. 19, 2019).
226. Turk Eximbank in Brief, TURK EXIMBANK, https://www.eximbank.gov.tr/en/
about-us/corporate (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) [https://perma.cc/FC6Y-GAVH] (archived
Aug. 19, 2019).
227. Turk Eximbank hits road for more international cooperation, HURRIYET
DAILY NEws (Feb. 18, 2018), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turk-eximbank-hits-
road-for-more-international-cooperation-127479 [https://perma.ccfWQH5-2MBT]
(archived Aug. 19, 2019).
228. Id.
229. Tanzania seeks Turkish loan for railway, AFR. NEWS (Jan. 1, 2017),
http://www.africanews.com/201
7/0 1/24/tanzania-seeks-turkish-loan-for-railway/
[https://perma.cclPW63-GKXE] (archived Aug. 19, 2019).
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the willingness of the Turkish Eximbank as well as the Turkish
government to provide loans for the financing of African development
projects including continental infrastructure network in Africa." 230
2. Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK)23 1
Established in 1986, the Foreign Economic Relations Board
(DEIK) is responsible for leading and managing the foreign economic
relations of the Turkish private sector.232 In executing its task, the
DEIK focuses particularly on foreign trade, international investment
and services, international construction activities, and logistics. One
of its tasks is to explore inward and outward investment
opportunities, work towards increasing exports for Turkish
businesses, and help with coordinating other business development
activities.233 Pursuant to Law No. 6552 enacted on September 11,
2014, the DEIK has full responsibility of "managing the foreign
economic relations of the Turkish private sector."234
Through entities called the Business Councils, the DEIK
establishes business-to-business cooperations with other countries.235
Suggesting a desire to deepen economic ties with Africa, the DEIK
has opened Business Councils with its counterparts in thirty-one
African countries.236
3. Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA)
TIKA is a government department of the Prime Ministry of
Turkey and is directly responsible for organizing the majority of
Turkey's official development assistance to developing countries.237
Established in 1992 to as a technical aid organization under the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to deal with some of the humanitarian
230. Framework of Cooperation 2008, supra note 177.
231. About the Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (DEK), TURK--U.S.
Bus. COUNCIL, http://www.taik.org.tr/about-deik.php (last visited Sept. 8, 2019)




235. Id. ("The Business Councils constitute the backbone of DEIK, while their
Executive Committees are responsible for the implementation of the decisions taken.").
Published in 2017, 'The Regulation on Working Procedures and Principles of Foreign
Economic Relations Board and Business Councils" (the "Regulation") sets out the
functions of the Business Council. The Regulation was published in Official Gazette no.
30252 on November 26, 2017, and entered into effect on the same date. There are three
different types of Business Councils, namely Bilateral Business Councils, Sectoral
Business Councils, and Special Purpose Business Councils. Id.
236. The Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK) established business councils
with forty-two African countries.
237. About DEIK, supra note 231.
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crisis resulting from the disintegration of the Soviet Union.2
3 8 On
May 28, 1999, TIKA became an organization working under the
Prime Ministry of the Republic of Turkey.23 9 Although the initial
focus of TIKA was on the Turkic (Turkish-speaking) countries in
Central Asia,240 the agency's focus has expanded considerably since
the end of the Cold War.241 The number of TIKA's Programme
Coordination Offices went from twelve in 2002, to twenty-five in
2011, thirty-three in 2012, and sixty-one today.242 Today, TIKA is
considered an integral part of Turkish foreign policy and its focus
extends well beyond Turkey's immediate neighborhood.243 Today,
through its sixty-one Programme Coordination Offices located in
about fifty-nine countries, TIKA is engaged in a wide variety of
development cooperation activities in many countries around the
world.244 Since 2002, Turkey's budget for development assistance has
grown.245 In 2002, Turkey's development aid comprised about $85
million, by 2015, this amount increased to $3.9 billion. 246
Of TIKA's sixty-one Programme Coordination Offices around the
world, twenty-one offices are in Africa. 24 7 "In 2008, TIKE [sic]
initiated an African Agricultural Development Programme" that
initially targeted thirteen countries in Africa. 24 8 Today, TIKA's
agricultural assistance program can be found in many countries in
Africa including Somalia,249 Sudan,250 and Kenya.251 "TIKA's projects
238. History of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA),
MINISTRY OF CULTURE & TOURISM, REPUBLIC OF TURK., http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/page/
history-oftika-8526 (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) [https://perma.ccl5RG2-TSBU]
(archived Aug. 19, 2019) [hereinafter History of TIKA].
239. Id.
240. History of TIKA, supra note 238 ("In the '90s, our country's first priority
regarding the issue of Central Asia became the recognition of the young Turkic
countries by the international community. This was followed by our country carrying
out projects for our cognates living in the newly founded countries of Central Asia in







247. Overseas Offices, TiKA, http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/overseasofflces (last
visited Sept. 9, 2019) [https://perma.cc/GKN7-SNWE] (archived Aug. 19, 2019).
248. Ozkan & Akgfin, supra note 71, at 538.
249. Agriculture School Project in Somalia Brings Results, TIKA,
http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/news/agriculture-school-projectLin-somalia-bringsresults-
19330 (last visited Sept. 9, 2019) [https://perma.cc/A48Z-ASBD] (archived Aug. 19,
2019).
250. Id.
251. Turkey's TiKA launches projects to support education, economy in Africa,
DAILY SABAH (May 31, 2016), https://www.dailysabah.com/life/2016/06/01/turkeys-tika-
launches-projects-to-support-education-economy-in-africa [https://perma.cc/9JTA-
9832019]
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and activities in Africa are designed to serve long-term purposes such
as the development of social infrastructure, cultural co-operation and
communication, the production sectors, economic infrastructure, and
to a lesser extent provide support in urgent humanitarian crises."252
In conclusion, in its charm offensive in Africa, Turkey has used
and is using every tool at its disposal. While traditional tools of
foreign policy are important in Turkey-Africa relations, in its
engagement with countries in Africa, Turkey is relying heavily on soft
power.25 3
V. TURKEY-AFRICA BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
Since 2011, and with the exception of 2012 and 2015, Turkey has
concluded at least two BITs every year with countries in Africa. 254
This Part reviews BITs that Turkey has concluded with states in
Africa that are publicly available and are in English.
A. Trends of Turkey-Africa BITs
Turkey has concluded BITs with twenty-eight countries in
Africa. 255 However, in total, Turkey has concluded thirty-one BITs
with countries in the region:256 two each with Nigeria,257 Sudan,2 58
and Tunisia.259 In terms of trends, Turkey-Africa BITs share some
similarities. First, a relatively large number of BITs that Turkey has
with countries in Africa are not in force. Out of the thirty-one BITs
concluded since 1999, only seven are in force (See Annex A and B).260
Second, Turkey-Africa BITs are fairly recent. A majority of Turkey-
Africa BITs were concluded only in the past ten years.261 Only four
Turkey-Africa BITs were concluded prior to 2010-the BITs with
Algeria (June 3, 1998),262 Sudan (December 19, 1999),263 Nigeria
(October 8, 1996),264 and South Africa (June 23, 2000).265 Third,
similar to traditional BITs between developed countries and
B2U4] (archived Aug. 19, 2019) (discussing the donation of agricultural equipment to
provide sustainable agricultural development and food security in regions with
important agricultural potential and fertile lands in Kenya).
252. Ozkan & Akgain, supra note 71, at 537.
253. See Kalin, supra note 197; Ozerdem, supra note 7.
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developing countries, Turkey-Africa BITs address investor rights and
protection and afford significant protections to investors.2 66
B. Investor Protection Elements in Turkey-Africa BITs
Bilateral investment treaties establish "minimum guarantees
regarding the treatment of foreign investment."267 The G20 Guiding
Principles for Global Investment Policymaking (2016) states that
"[i]nvestment policies should provide legal certainty and strong
protection to investors and investments, tangible and intangible."
268
Very similar to the BITs that countries in Africa have concluded with
Western nations, Turkey-Africa BITs are designed primarily to
protect investors, and they provide investors with seven core benefits.
First, the BITs require that investors and their "covered investments"
are treated as favorably as the host state treats its own investors and
their investments (national treatment).269 Second, the BITs require
that investors and their covered investments are treated as favorably
as the host state treats investors and investments from any third
country (most favored nation treatment).270 Third, almost all Turkey-
Africa BITs guarantee investors absolute standard of treatment
including "fair and equitable treatment" (FET), "full protection and
security" (FPS), and protection against unreasonable or
discriminatory measures.271 Fourth, the BITs establish "clear limits
on the expropriation of investments and provide for payment of
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation" in the event of an
expropriation.272 Fifth, the BITs provide for the transferability of
investment-related funds into and out of a host state without delay
266. Bilateral Investment Treaties, MINISTRY OF TRADE, REPUBLIC OF TURK.
(Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.trade.gov.tr/legislation/bilateral-investment-treaties
[https://perma.cclR7MT-PGUV] (archived Sept. 11, 2019) (highlighting the protections
available to investors under Turkey's BITs); see also Ismail G. Esin et al., Turkey,
GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH - INv. TREATY ARB. 89, 89-90 (2015),
https://www.esin.av.tr/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/GTDT-Investment-Treaty-
Arbitration-2015.pdf [https://perma.cclTR6L-SH5D] (archived Sept. 11, 2019).
267. See Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006: Trends in Investment
Rulemaking, U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. 1 (2007),
https://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiia20065_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TL8-SPGX] (archived
Oct. 8, 2019) [hereinafter Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006].
268. G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking, Annex III to the
G20 Trade Ministers Meeting Statement, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. (July
9-10, 2016), https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/G20-Trade-Ministers-
Statement-July-2016.pdf [https://perma.cclWE5Y-MA6Z] (archived Oct. 8, 2019)
[hereinafter G20 Guiding Principles].
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and using a market rate of exchange.273 Sixth, the BITs guarantee
investors and their investments most favored nation (MFN)
treatment in the event of a loss due to war.274 Seventh, in the event of
an investment-related dispute between an investor and a host state,
the BITs give investors the right to submit such disputes to
international arbitration.275
1. National Treatment
The concept of national treatment has been defined as "a
principle whereby a host country extends to foreign investors
treatment that is at least as favourable as the treatment that it
accords to national investors in like circumstances."276 Essentially,
"the national treatment standard seeks to ensure a degree of
competitive equality between national and foreign investors."2 77 The
concern about the national treatment standard is that although it is
extremely important to investors, it can reach deeply into the
domestic policy space of host states. According to UNCTAD:
The national treatment standard is perhaps the single most important
standard of treatment enshrined in international investment agreements
(IIAs). At the same time, it is perhaps the most difficult standard to achieve, as
it touches upon economically (and politically) sensitive issues. In fact, no single
country has so far seen itself in a position to grant national treatment without
qualifications, especially when it comes to the establishment of an
investment.
2 7 8
National treatment protection is available in all Turkey-Africa
BITs.2 79 Article 3(2) of the Turkey-Senegal BIT provides that once
established, each Contracting Party shall accord to the investments,
"treatment no less favourable than that accorded in like
circumstances to investments of its investors.2 80 Article 3(2) of the
Libya-Turkey BIT states: "[n]either Contracting Party shall in its
tertitory subject investments or returns of investors of other
Contracting Party to treatment less favorable than that which it




276. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., NATIONAL TREATMENT, at IV-1, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/11, U.N. Sales No. E.99.II.D.16 (1999).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See, e.g., Turkey-Egypt BIT, supra 54, at art. 11(2); Turkey-Ethiopia BIT,
supra note 55, at art. 11(2); Turkey-Rwanda BIT, supra note 66, at art 4; Turkey-
Nigeria BIT (2011), supra note 43, at art. 5(4).
280. Turkey-Senegal BIT, supra note 58, at art. 3(2).
281. Turkey-Libya BIT, supra note 56, at art. 3(2).
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2. Most Favored Nation Treatment
The MFN treatment "ensures that a host country extends to the
covered foreign investor and its investments, as applicable, treatment
that is no less favourable than that which it accords to foreign
investors of any third country."282 In the context of foreign
investment, the MFN standard ensures an equality of competitive
conditions between foreign investors of different nationalities seeking
to set up an investment or operating that investment in a host
country.2 83 The MFN treatment is provided for in all Turkey-Africa
BITs.284
Article 4 of the Turkey-Rwanda BIT, states:
ARTICLE 4
Treatment of Investments
1. Each Contracting Party shall admit in its territory investments on a basis no
less favourable than that accorded in like circumstances to investments of
investors of any third State, within the framework of its laws and regulations.
2. Each Contracting Party shall accord to these investments, once established,
treatment no less favourable than that accorded in like circumstances to
investments of its investors or to investments of investors of any third State,
whichever is the most favourable, as regards the management, maintenance,
use, operation, enjoyment, extension, sale, liquidation or disposal of the
investment.
2 8 5
3. Absolute Standard of Treatment: Fair and Equitable Treatment,
Full Protection and Security, and Nonimpairment
Almost all Turkey-Africa BITs guarantee investors absolute
standard of treatment including fair and equitable treatment (FET),
full protection and security, and protection against unreasonable or
discriminatory measures.286
282. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., MOST FAVORED NATION TREATMENT,
at 13, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/10, U.N. Sales No. E.99.II.D.11 (2010).
283. Id. at 14.
284. See, e.g., Turkey-Egypt BIT, supra note 54, at art. II(1)-(2); Turkey-
Ethiopia BIT, supra note 55, at art. II(1)-(2); Turkey-Rwanda BIT, supra note 66, at
art. 4; Turkey-Nigeria BIT (2011), supra note 43, at art. 5(4); Turkey-Senegal BIT,
supra note 58, at art. 3(1)-2); Turkey-Kenya BIT, supra note 65.
285. Turkey-Rwanda BIT, supra note 66.
286. The Turkey-Egypt BIT and Turkey-Tunisia BIT do not guarantee investors
absolute standards of treatment. See Turkey-Egypt BIT, supra note 54; Turkey-
Tunisia BIT, supra note 45.
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The fair and equitable treatment standard is available in almost
all the BITs examined, including Turkey's BIT with Cameroon,28 7
Ethiopia,2 88 Gabon,28 9 Gambia,2 90 Senegal,2 9' and Kenya.292 Article
2(2) of Libya-Turkey BIT states that "[i]nvestments of investors of
each Contracting Party shall at all times be accorded fair and
equitable treatment."2 93 The fair and equitable treatment standard is
found in the preamble of the Turkey-Ethiopia BIT as well as in the
text of the treaty.2 94 Article 2(2) of the Turkey-Morocco BIT simply
states that "[e]ach Contracting party shall ensure fair and equitable
treatment."29 5
The full protection and security guarantee is found in numerous
Turkey-Africa BITs including those with Cameroon,296 Ethiopia,2 97
Gabon,298 Gambia,2 9 9 and Kenya.30 0 Article 2(2) of Libya-Turkey BIT
states that "[i]nvestments of investors of each Contracting Party . . .
shall enjoy full protection in the territory of the other Contracting
Party."3 0' Article 2(2) of the Turkey-Morocco BIT provides: "Each
Contracting party shall . . . subject to the strictly necessary measures
to maintain the public order provide full protection and security for
investments of investors of the other Contracting Party."302
The guarantee of protection against unreasonable or
discriminatory measures is found in many of the BITs reviewed,
including those between Turkey and Cameroon,3 0 3 Ethiopia,30 4
Gabon,305 Gambia,30 6 and Kenya.3 0 7 The second sentence of Article
2(2) in the Libya-Turkey BIT states that: "[n]either Contracting
Party shall in any way impair by unreasonable or discriminatory
measures the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, extension,
287. Turkey-Cameroon BIT, supra note 61, at art. 3(2).
288. Turkey-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 55, at art. 11(2).
289. Turkey-Gabon BIT, supra note 62, at art. 3(2).
290. Turkey-Gambia BIT, supra note 63, at art. 3(2)
291. Turkey-Senegal BIT, supra note 58, at art. 2(2).
292. Turkey-Kenya BIT, supra note 65, at art. 2(2).
293. Turkey-Libya BIT, supra note 56, at art. (2)(2).
294. Turkey-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 55, Preamble ("Agreeing that fair and
equitable treatment of investment is desirable in order to maintain a stable framework
for investment and maximum effective utilization of economic resources.").
295. Turkey-Morocco BIT, supra note 57.
296. Turkey-Cameroon BIT, supra note 61, at art. 3(2).
297. Turkey-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 55, at art. 11(2).
298. Turkey-Gabon BIT, supra note 62, at art. 3(2).
299. Turkey-Gambia BIT, supra note 63, at art. 3(2).
300. Turkey-Kenya BIT, supra note 65, at art. 2(2).
301. Turkey-Libya BIT, supra note 56, at art. 2(2).
302. Turkey-Morocco BIT, supra note 57.
303. Turkey-Cameroon BIT, supra note 61, at art. 3(2).
304. Turkey-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 55, at art. 11(2).
305. Turkey-Gabon BIT, supra note 62, at art. 3(2).
306. Turkey-Gambia BIT, supra note 63, at art. 3(2).
307. Turkey-Kenya BIT, supra note 65, at art. 2(3).
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or disposal of such investments."3 08 The standard is worded a bit
differently in Article 2(2) of the Turkey-Morocco BIT, which
stipulates, "[c]ontracting Party shall impair by discriminatory
measures the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal
of investments in its territory of investors of other Contracting
Party."309
Article 3 of the Turkey-Rwanda BIT states:
ARTICLE 3
Promotion and Protection of Investments
2. Investments of investors of each Contracting Party shall at all times be
accorded treatment in accordance with international law minimum standard of
treatment, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and
security in the territory of the other Contracting Party. Neither Contracting
Party shall in any way impair the management, maintenance, use, operation,
enjoyment, extension, sale, liquidation or disposal of such investments by
unreasonable or discriminatory measures.
3 1 0
4. Protection Against Expropriation
Under customary international law, "states have a sovereign
right to take property held by nationals or aliens through
nationalization or expropriation for economic, political, social, or
other reasons."3 11 Not every expropriation triggers the international
responsibility of a state; a distinction is made between lawful and
unlawful expropriation. To be considered lawful, international law
requires that four conditions are met: an investment asset has to be
taken for a public purpose, on a nondiscriminatory basis, in
accordance with due process of law, and the taking must be
accompanied by compensation.3 12 Over the years, particularly during
the first and second phase of mass expropriation in the 1960s and
1970s,3 13 the exercise by states of the right to expropriate investment
property triggered conflicts, debates, and disagreements, and
308. Turkey-Libya BIT, supra note 56, at art. 2(2).
309. Turkey-Morocco BIT, supra note 57.
310. Turkey-Rwanda BIT, supra note 66.
311. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., EXPROPRIATION, at 1, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD[DIAE/IA/2011/7, U.N. Sales No. E.12.II.D.7 (2012).
312. Id.
313. Id. (observing that "In the first part of the twentieth century, the first major
phase of mass expropriations (nationalizations) occurred during revolutionary
movements in Russia and Mexico." Also noting that "A second wave of nationalizations
and expropriations followed the period of decolonization that took place after the
Second World War.").
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prompted states to use BITs to clarify the rights and duties of host
states vis-&-vis those of foreign investors.314
Turkey-Africa BITs do not prohibit expropriation but rather
impose strict limits on the right of a host state to expropriate an
investment. In general, expropriation must be for a public purpose,
must be on a nondiscriminatory basis, and must be against the
payment of compensation.315
Regarding compensation that must be paid when an investment
is expropriated, some BITs call for prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation3 16 and some do not.3 1 7 Some BITs provide that
expropriation must be in accordance with legal due process and
others do not.3 1 8 Consider the following examples:
Turkey-Senegal BIT Turkey-Libya BIT Turkey-Sudan BIT
Article 5 Article 4 Article 3
Expropriation and Expropriation Expropriation and
Compensation Compendation
1. Investments shall 1. Investments shall 1. Investments shall
not be expropriated, not be expropriated, not be expropriated,
nationalized or nationalized or nationalized or
subject, directly or subject, directly or subject, directly or
indirectly, to indirectly, to indirectly, to
measures of similar measures of similar measures of similar
effects (hereinafter effects except for a effects except for a
referred as public purpose, in a public purpose, in a
314. Id.
315. See generally Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006, supra note 267
(stating "In general, BITs allow countries to expropriate foreign investments on a non-
discriminatory basis, for a public purpose and against the payment of compensation.");
see, e.g., Turkey-Tunisia BIT, supra note 45, at art. 111(1) (stating that investments
shall not be expropriated . . . except for a public purpose in a non-discriminatory
manner, upon payment of prompt adequate and effective compensation, and in
accordance with due process of law."). Not all BITs between Turkey and countries in
Africa require that all four standards be met. The BIT between Turkey and Morocco
only requires that expropriation be for public purpose and on a non-discriminatory
basis. Article 4(1) states that "[m]easures of nationalization, expropriation or any other
measures having an equivalent effect . . . must be neither discriminatory nor taken
other than for a public purpose. Turkey-Morocco BIT, supra note 57, at art. 4(1).
316. Turkey-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 55, at art. IV(1).
317. Turkey-Egypt BIT, supra note 54, at art. 111(1) (calling for "prompt,
adequate and fair compensation"); see also Turkey-Morocco BIT, supra note 57, at art.
4(2) ("The contracting Party that takes such measures shall, give to the beneficiaries a
fair and equitable compensation which shall amount to the market-value of the
concerned investment on the day before the one the said measures were taken or
became public knowledge.").
318. The following BITs have a due process requirement in the expropriation
clause: Turkey-Egypt BIT, supra note 54, at art. 3(1); Turkey-Ethiopia BIT, supra
note 55, at art. IV(1); Turkey-Senegal BIT, supra note 58, at art. 5(1). Some BITs do
not have a due process requirement. See, e.g., Turkey-Morocco BIT, supra note 57, at
art. 4(2).
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expropriation) except









process of law and
the general principles
of treatment provided










process of law and
the general principles
of treatment provided










process of law and
the general principles
of treatment provided
for in Article II of
this Agreement.
3 2 1
5. Right to Transfer Capital
Transfer of funds provisions constitute one of the core provisions
in international investment agreements.
322 Investors need assurance
that they "will be able to enjoy the financial benefits of a successful
investment."323 Consequently, transfer provisions typically "set forth
a host country's obligation to allow free flow of all investment related
transactions, guaranteeing the transfer, conversion and liquidation of
any form of capital, proceeds, payments, profits and others without
restrains."324 Transfer provisions also define the nature of transfers
covered, the nature of the obligation on host states, and any
permissible exceptions and derogations.
Turkey-Africa BITs guarantee investors the right to transfer
capital out of the host state. For example, Article IV of the Turkey-
Egypt BIT declares that "[e]ach Party shall permit in good faith all
transfers related to an investment to be made freely and without
unreasonable delay into and out of its territory."
325 Article 6(1) of the
Turkey-Morocco BIT stipulates that "[e]ach Contracting Party shall
permit to investors of the other Contracting Party the free transfer,
319. Turkey-Senegal BIT, supra note 58.
320. Turkey-Libya BIT, supra note 56.
321. Turkey-Sudan BIT, supra note 44.
322. See generally Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006, supra note 267.
323. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
AGREEMENTS: KEY ISSUES, at 1-257, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD[ITE/IIT/2004/10, U.N. Sales
No. E.05.II.D.6 (2004).
324. Id. at 1-258.
325. Turkey-Egypt BIT, supra note 54.
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after discharge of fiscal obligations, of their assets invested."32 6
Article IV(1) of the Turkey-Tunisia BIT provides that "[s]ubject to the
laws and regulations each Party shall permit all transfers related to
an investment to be made freely and without unreasonable delay into
and out of its territory."32 7
6. Transparency Obligations
In investment treaties, transparency "denotes a state of affairs in
which the participants in the investment process are able to obtain
sufficient information from each other in order to make informed
decisions and meet obligations and commitments."3 28 Generally, the
aim of transparency provisions is "to enhance the predictability and
stability of the investment relationship and to provide a check against
circumvention and evasion of obligations, by resort to covert or
indirect means."32 9 The 2012 United States Model BIT incorporates
transparency standards,330 as does Canada's Model Foreign
Investment Protection Act (FIPA).331
Transparency provisions are not common in Turkey-Africa BITs.
However, at least one BIT (Turkey-Rwanda) obliges the contracting
states to be transparent.3 3 2 Article 13 of the Turkey-Rwanda BIT
stipulates:
Each Contracting Party shall to the extent possible, ensure that its laws,
regulations and administrative rulings of general application respecting any
matter governed by this Agreement are promptly published or otherwise made
available in such a manner as to enable interested investors of the other
Contracting Party to become acquainted with them.3 3 3
326. Turkey-Morocco BIT, supra note 57 (emphasis added).
327. Turkey-Tunisia BIT, supra note 45.
328. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., TRANSPARENCY, at 3, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2003/4, U.N. Sales No. E.04.II.D.7 (2004).
329. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: KEY ISSUES, supra note 323, at
282.
330. See 2012 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, art. 10,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%2OMeeting.pdf (last
visited Sept. 10, 2019) [https://perma.cc/XAF3-FG7J] (archived Aug. 13, 2019); see also
Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of Burkina Faso
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-Burk. Faso, Apr. 20, 2015, art.
12, https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/agr-acc/burkina-fasofipa-apie/index.aspx?lang-eng#bl2
[https://perma.cc/TZB7-E3VN] (archived Aug. 13, 2019).
331. See Model Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Gov'T OF CAN., art. 19, https://www.italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-
en.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2019) [https://perma.cclSL8P-DN25] (archived Aug. 13, 2019)
[hereinafter Canada's Model BIT].
332. Turkey-Rwanda BIT, supra note 66.
333. Id. at art. 13.
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7. Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Traditionally, BITs allow investors to bypass the domestic courts
of host states by giving them rights to initiate claims against host
states with international tribunals. Increasingly, investors are
activating BITs by bringing arbitral claims to challenge a broad range
of actions by host states.334 Claims have been brought challenging
host state measures relating to drinking water,
33 5  the
environment,336 taxation,337 and health.338 African countries are not
immune to international investment arbitration, and a growing
number of countries in the region are just now facing their first
(known) claims. The Republic of Benin (Benin) faced its first
international investment arbitration case in 2017,339 the Republic of
Madagascar (Madagascar) in 2013,340 and the Republic of Equatorial
Guinea (Equatorial Guinea) in 2012.341
Turkey-Africa BITs all provide for investor-state dispute
settlement (ISDS). Examples can be seen with the BITs between
Turkey and Algeria,34 2 Cameroon,343 Ethiopia,3
44 and Gambia.345
334. See Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE
& DEV., http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS (last visited Sept. 10, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/B94T-DLF5] (archived Aug. 13, 2019).
335. See Biwater Gauff (Tanz.) Ltd. v United Republic of Tanz., ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/22, Award, ¶ 105 (Jul. 24, 2008).
336. See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶ 44 (Aug. 30, 2000); Methanex Corp. v. U.S., NAFTA-
UNCITRAL, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiciton and Merits, ¶ 2 (Aug. 3,
2005), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita05
2 9 .pdf
[https://perma.cc/9FNV-FGTH] (archived Aug. 13, 2019).
337. See Occidental Expl. & Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, L.C.I.A. Case No.
UN3467, Final Award, ¶¶ 37, 64 (July 1, 2004), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/ita0571.pdf [https://perma.cclPYE9-WEQP] (archived Sept. 11,
2019).
338. See Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Austl., UNCITRAL PCA
Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1 5 (Dec. 17, 2015),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7303_0.pdf
[https://perma.cclFFU5-YFLB ] (archived Sept. 11, 2019); Philip Morris Brands Sarl,
Philip Morris Prods. S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay,
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, 1 10 (July 8, 2016).
339. Puma Energy Holdings S.A.R.L. v. Republic of Benin, SCC EA Case No.
2017/092, Award (June 8, 2017), https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-
dispute-settlement/cases/820/puma-energy-v-benin [https://perma.cc/4JEP-ALYZ]
(archived Aug. 13, 2019).
340. De Sutter et al. v. Republic of Madag., ICSID Case No. ARB/17/18, Award
(Aug. 29, 2014); see also Courts (Indian Ocean) Ltd. & Courts Madag. S.A.R.L. v.
Republic of Madag., ICSID Case No. ARB/13/34, Request for Institution of Arbitration
Proceedings (Dec. 23, 2013).
341. Grupo Francisco Hernando Contreras v. Republic of Equatorial Guinea,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/2, Notice of Arbitration (Mar. 23, 2012).
342. Turkey-Algeria BIT, supra note 60.
343. Turkey-Cameroon BIT, supra note 61, at art. 10.
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Economic factors are very important in Turkey's foreign policy,
and this is reflected in the number of BITs Turkey has concluded in
the past decade.346 Turkey's BITs are conceived primarily "as a
valuable tool to promote and protect foreign investment."347 As
Turkey's Ministry of Trade noted, "[t]he main purposes of Turkey's
BIT program are to increase the bilateral flows of capital and
technology, and provide protection to the investments of international
investors in Turkey [as] well as Turkish investors abroad against
non-commercial risks in the framework of international law."34 8
C. Sustainable Development Elements in Turkey-African BITs
International investment agreements were originally designed
primarily to protect investors and foreign investments. Today, "[a]
shared view has emerged on the necessity to ensure that the
international investment treaty regime works for all stakeholders"
and advances the goals of sustainable development. 349 While
recognizing that investment policies should protect both investors
and investments, the G20 Guiding Principles state unequivocally that
"[i]nvestment policies and other policies that impact on investment
should be . . . consistent with the objectives of sustainable
development and inclusive growth."3 5 0
Very similar to many BITs that countries in Africa have
concluded with Western nations,3 5 1 Turkey-Africa BITs do not
directly address sustainable development.352 However, a growing
number of Turkey-Africa BITs, particularly recent agreements,
appear to support sustainable development goals to the extent that
they appear to be designed to respect the right of host states to
regulate in the public interest.353 First, Turkey-Africa economic
344. Turkey-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 55, at art. VII.
345. Turkey-Gambia BIT, supra note 63, at art. 10.
346. Fidan, supra note 96 (noting that economic factors "have increasingly
occupied a major role in the making of Turkish foreign policy.").
347. Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 266.
348. Id.
349. UNCTAD's REFORM PACKAGE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
REGIME, supra note 30, at 7 (noting that in recent years countries are redesigning their
international investment treaties and are undertaking reform actions in the pursit of
sustainable development-oriented investment treaties).
350. G20 Guiding Principles, supra note 287, ¶ V.
351. See Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006, supra note 286, at xiv (stating
that "[c]urrent BIT practice does not, in general, expressly deal with development
matters beyond the inherent objective of BITs of investment protection."); see generally
Investment Policy Hub - ZAs by Economy, U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV.,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/by-economy
(last visited Oct. 21, 2019) [https://perma.cc/3M5A-RKUN] (archived Oct. 21, 2019).
352. Sustainable development is not mentioned explicitly in most of the BITs
that Turkey has concluded with countries in Africa. See Investment Policy Hub -
Turkey, supra note 1.
353. The argument is that if the regulatory powers of a state are not constrained,
the state can regulate in the public interest and can adopt laws and regulations to
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development is mentioned in the preamble as an expected outcome of
foreign direct investment in an increasing number of Turkey-Africa
BITs.354 Increasingly, contracting parties affirm, in the preamble,
that treaty objectives can be achieved without relaxing health, safety,
and environmental measures as well as internationally recognized
labor rights.355 Second, treaty protection typically extends only to
investments made in accordance with the host state's domestic
laws.356 Third, under almost all Turkey-Africa BITs, contracting
parties retain the right to admit only investments that are in
compliance with domestic law.35 7 Fourth, a growing number of
Turkey-Africa BITs contain a "General Exception" clause somewhat
akin to Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
3 58
ensure corporate responsibility and accountability. Conversely, when BITs restrict the
regulatory powers of a state, the result is regulatory chill and an inability of the state
to protect human rights and advance other sustainable development goals.
Increasingly the right to regulate is explicitly addressed in BITs.
354. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the
Government of the Republic of Burundi Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Turk.-Burundi, June 14, 2017, https://investmentpolicy.
unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/583
8 /download
[https://perma.cc/HH6Z-FGG3] (archived Oct. 21, 2019) [hereinafter Turkey-Burundi
BIT] ("Recognizing that agreement upon the treatment to be accorded such investment
will stimulate the flow of capital and technology and the economic development of the
Contracting Parties."); see also Turkey-Gabon BIT, supra note 62, Preamble
("Recognizing that agreement upon the treatment to be accorded such investment will
stimulate the flow of capital and technology and the economic development of the
Contracting Parties.").
355. See, e.g., Turkey-Rwanda BIT, supra note 66, Preamble ("Convinced that
these objectives can be achieved without relaxing health, safety and environmental
measures of general application as well as internationally recognized labor rights."); see
also Turkey-Gabon BIT, supra note 62, Preamble ("Convinced that these objectives can
be achieved without relaxing health, safety and environmental measures of general
application as well as internationally recognized labor rights.").
356. See, e.g., Turkey-Rwanda BIT, supra note 66, at art. 2 ("This Agreement
shall apply to investments in the territory of one Contracting Party, made in
accordance with its national laws and regulations, by investors of the other contracting
party. . ."); see also Turkey-Gabon BIT, supra note 62, at art. 2 ("This Agreement shall
apply to investments in the territory of one Contracting Party, made in accordance
with its national laws and regulations, by investors of the other Contracting Party.").
357. See, e.g., Turkey-Gabon BIT, supra note 62, at art. 4(1) ("Each Contracting
Party shall admit in its territory investments ... within the framework of its laws and
regulations").
358. Id. at art. 5 ("General Exceptions"). Article XX of the GATT provides inter
alia: "Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; ...
(e) relating to the products of prison labour;
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Fifth, in a growing number of BITs, contracting parties make a
distinction between indirect expropriation, which is impermissible
and the so-called regulatory takings, which are permissible.35 9 Thus,
"[n]on-discriminatory legal measures designed and applied to protect
legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health, safety, and
environment," are increasingly explicitly protected.360 Sixth, the "no
lowering of standards" clause is beginning to appear in Turkey-Africa
BITs.36 1 With the "no lowering of standards" clause, contracting
parties declare their expectation that they will not encourage foreign
investment by relaxing domestic health, safety, and environmental
measures.362 Seventh, a nonderogation clause is found in a few (older)
BITs and generally provides that the agreements shall not derogate
from certain obligations, including international legal obligations,
assumed by the contracting parties.363
1. Economic Development in the Preamble
Economic development and improvement of living standards are
mentioned as a treaty objective in the preamble of Turkey's BITs with
Cameroon,364 Egypt,365 Ethiopia,366 Gabon,367 Gambia,3 6 8 Kenya,3 69
Rwanda,3 70 and Nigeria.371 Economic development does not appear as
a treaty objective in some BITs, however.372 In the preamble to a
(f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or
archaeological value;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption." See also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX, Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.AS. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; see also GATT,
ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW & PRACTICE 519-20 (6th ed. 1994); Elissa
Alben, GATT and the Fair Wage: A Historical Perspective on the Labor-Trade Link, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1431 (2001).
359. See, e.g., Turkey-Rwanda BIT, supra note 66, at art. 6(2) (stating "Non-
discriminatory legal measures designed and applied to protect legitimate public
welfare objectives, such as health, safety and environment, do not constitute indirect
expropriation.").
360. Id.
361. See, e.g., Turkey-Cameroon BIT, supra note 61, Preamble ("Convinced that
these objectives can be achieved without relaxing health, safety and environmental
measures of general application as well as internationally recognized labor rights.").
362. Id.
363. See, e.g., Turkey-Egypt BIT, supra note 54, at art. 6.
364. See, e.g., Turkey-Cameroon BIT, supra note 61.
365. See, e.g., Turkey-Egypt BIT, supra note 54.
366. See, e.g., Turkey-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 55.
367. Turkey-Gabon BIT, supra note 62.
368. Turkey-Gambia BIT, supra note 63.
369. Turkey-Kenya BIT, supra note 65.
370. Turkey-Rwanda BIT, supra note 66.
371. Turkey-Nigeria BIT (2011), supra note 43.
372. Turkey-Algeria BIT, supra note 60; see also Turkey-Nigeria BIT (1996),
supra note 43.
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number of BITs (e.g., the Turkey-Senegal BIT, 37 3 the Turkey-
Rwanda BIT, 3 74 and the Turkey-Kenya BIT 3 7 5), contracting parties
state their understanding that the treaty "objectives can be achieved
without relaxing health, safety, and environmental measures of
general application, as well as internationally recognized labor
rights."376 In the preamble to the Turkey-Kenya BIT, contracting
parties while
"DESIRING to promote greater economic cooperation between them
particularly with respect to investment by investors of one Contracting Party in
the territory of the other Contracting Party,"
were also
"CONVINCED that these objectives can be achieved without relaxing health,
safety and environmental measures of general application as well as
internationally recognized labour rights."
37 7
There is a noticeable difference between the treaty objectives listed in
the preamble to the Turkey-Morocco BIT (1997) and the treaty
objectives identified in the preamble to the Turkey-Cameroon which
is a more recent agreement. The preambles to the two agreements
provide as follows:
Turkey-Morocco BIT (1997) Turkey-Cameroon BIT (2012)
Preamble Preamble
The Government of the Republic The Government of the Republic
of Turkey and the Government of of Turkey and The Government
the Kingdom of Morocco of the Republic of Cameroon,
hereinafter referred to as the hereinafter referred to as "the
"Contracting Parties," Contracting Parties,"
Desiring to create favourable Desiring to promote greater
conditions for greater economic economic cooperation between
cooperation between them and in them, particularly with respect to
particular through investments investment by investors of one
by investors of one State in the Contracting Party in the territory
territory of the other State; of the other Contracting Party;
Recognising the importance of Recognizing that agreement upon
373. Turkey-Senegal BIT, supra note 58.
374. Turkey-Rwanda BIT, supra note 66.
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the reciprocal encouragement
and protection of investments
and its contribution to stimulate
inflows of capital and business
initiative and to increase
prosperity in both States;
Have agreed as follows: 3 7 8
the treatment to be accorded
such investment will stimulate
the flow of capital and technology
and the economic development of
the Contracting Parties;
Agreeing that fair and equitable
treatment of investments is
desirable in order to maintain a
stable framework for investment
and will contribute to
maximizing effective utilization
of economic resources and
improve living standards;
Convinced that these objectives
can be achieved without relaxing
health, safety and environmental
measures of general application
as well as internationally
recognized labor rights; and




Have agreed as follows: 3 7 9
2. Scope of Application Clause
In BITs, the scope of application clause is used to define the
scope of the temporal and substantive scope of the treaty. Generally,
these clauses address whether or not a treaty is retroactive but can
also be used to limit the scope of a treaty in other ways.3 80 In Turkey-
378. Turkey-Morocco BIT, supra note 57.
379. Turkey-Cameroon BIT, supra note 61 (emphasis added).
380. For example, in the India-BIT (2018), Contracting Parties addressed
reproactivity but also excluded several economic sectors and government measures
from the scope of the agreement. Article 2 of the BIT is titled "Scope and General
Provisions. In Article 2.4, the Contracting Parties agreed that the BIT shall not apply
inter alia to "any measure by a local government," "any law or measure regarding
taxation, including measures taken to enforce taxation obligations," and "subsidies or
grants provided by a Party." See Treaty Between the Republic of Belarus and the
Republic of India on Investment, Beir.-India, art. 2.4, Sept. 24, 2018,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/
5724/download [https://perma.cc/J3LX-SR94] (archived Sept. 11, 2019) [hereinafter
India-Belarus BIT].
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Africa BITs, the scope of application clause tends to address the
temporal scope of the agreements and nothing else. Essentially,
contracting parties are not making any effort to limit the subject
matter or geographic scope of the agreements. However, by limiting
treaty protection to only those investments made in accordance with
domestic law of a host state, contracting states retain some control
over foreign investors and foreign investments and can introduce
sustainable development objectives and criteria into their domestic
law. For example, Article 12 of the Turkey-Kenya BIT states: "This
Agreement shall apply to investments in the territory of one
Contracting Party, made in accordance with its national laws and
regulations, by investors of the other Contracting Party, whether
prior to, or after the entry into force of the present Agreement."3 8 A
similar provision is found in other BITs including the Turkey-
Cameroon BIT (Article 2),382 the Turkey-Rwanda BIT (Article 2),
and the Turkey-Gabon BIT (Article 2 ).3M Article 2 of the Turkey-
Rwanda BIT reads:
Scope of Application
This Agreement shall apply to investments in the territory of one Contracting
Party, made in accordance with its national laws and regulations, by investors
of the other Contracting Party, whether prior, or after the entry into force of
the present Agreement. However, this Agreement shall not apply to any
disputes that have arisen before its entry into force.
3 85
3. Postestablishment Rights: the Right of Host State to Restrict
Admission of Investor/Investments
In BIT practice, "the issue of admission and establishment refers
to the entry of investments of investors of a contracting party into the
territory of another contracting party."38 6 Under customary
international law, countries "have the right to regulate the admission
of foreign investors and their investments in their territories."
3 87
Historically, "most countries refrain from granting foreign nationals
an unrestricted right to invest in their economies," as such
unrestricted access can undermine their economic and security
381. Turkey-Kenya BIT, supra note 65.
382. Turkey-Cameroon BIT, supra note 61.
383. Turkey-Rwanda BIT, supra note 66.
384. Turkey-Gabon BIT, supra note 62.
385. Turkey-Rwanda BIT, supra note 66.
386. Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006, supra note 267, at 21.
387. Id.
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interests.3 8 8 In BIT practice, two basic models are used.3 89 The
"admission clause" model makes "the admission and establishment of
foreign investment subject to the domestic laws of the host
country."3 90 The "right of establishment" model grants foreign
investors a right of establishment, but "not in an absolute manner,"
meaning that the entry of foreign investors and investors is not
typically subject to domestic laws and regulations.3 9i
Turkey-Africa BITs adopt the admission clause model. In all
Turkey-Africa BITs, the host state retains the right to admit foreign
investors based on their domestic law.3 92 Article 3 of the Turkey-
Kenya BIT is titled "Treatment of Investment" and essentially obliges
each contracting party to admit investments by investors of the other
contracting party in accordance with its domestic laws.39 3 Article 3
states: "Each Contracting Party shall admit in its territory
investments by investors of the other Contracting Party on a basis no
less favourable than that accorded in like circumstances to
investments of investors of any third State, and in accordance with its
laws and regulations."3 9 4 In the same vein, Article 4(1) of the Turkey-
Cameron BIT provides, "[e]ach Contracting Party shall admit in its
territory investments on a basis no less favourable than that accorded
in like circumstances to investments of investors of any third State,
within the framework of its laws and regulations."3 9 5
4. General Exception
In the past, "general exceptions" clauses were not common in
BITs but are now beginning to appear in a growing number of
investment treaties.3 96 In principle, a general exceptions clause can
provide ample flexibility for host states to regulate in the public
interest because they are generally designed to "relieve host states
from treaty liability for good faith measures taken to pursue public
welfare objectives."3 9 7 In many investment treaties, "the general
388. Id. (noting that "[a]ccess limitations imposed on foreign investment have




392. See, e.g., Turkey-Kenya BIT, supra note 65, at art 2.
393. Id.
394. Id. at art. 3.
395. Turkey-Cameroon BIT, supra note 61.
396. See generally Andrew Newcombe, General Exceptions in International
Investment Agreements, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW
351 (Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger et al. eds., Wolters Kluwer 2011); see also Kotera
Akira & Mori Tadashi, General Exception Clauses in International Investment
Agreements Concluded by Japan, RES. INST. EcON., TRADE & INDUSTRY 14007 (2014).
397. Levant Sabanogullari, The Merits and Limitations of General Exception
Clauses in Contemporary Investment Treaty Practice, INv. TREATY NEWS (May 21,
2015), https://www.iisd.org/itn/201 5/05/21/the-merits-and-limitations-of-general-
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exception clause is very closely modeled on, or incorporates the
general exception provisions in Article XX of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)." 3 98 Typically, general exception clauses
share three important elements. First, "[a]n exhaustive list of
permissible policy objectives; for example, the protection of human,
animal, or plant life or health, or the conservation of natural
resources."3 99 Second, "[a] nexus requirement, denoting the required
link between a state measure and a permissible objective; frequently
used nexus requirements include 'necessary for,' 'relating to,' and
'designed and applied for."'400 Third, "[a] prohibition of discriminatory
or arbitrary application."40 1 Most general exception clauses state that
nothing in the agreements can or shall be construed to prevent a
contracting party from adopting, maintaining, or enforcing
nondiscriminatory legal measures that are designed and applied to
promote public interest objectives in the areas of public health and
environmental protection.402
A general exception clause is found in several of the BITs that
Turkey has concluded with African countries including the BITs
between Turkey and Tanzania,4 03 Cameroon,404 Gabon,40 5 Gambia,4 06
Kenya,407 Nigeria,408 and Rwanda.4 09 General exception clauses are
absent from most of the older treaties that Turkey has with countries
in Africa such as Turkey's BITs with Algeria and Ethiopia.
4 10 An
example of a general exception clause from Article 5 of the Turkey-
Rwanda BIT is as follows:
Article 5
General Exceptions
1. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Contracting Party
from adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any non-discriminatory legal
measures:
exception-clauses-in-contemporary-investment-treaty-practice/ [https://perma.cc/7S3X-
AYH4] (archived Aug. 19, 2019).
398. See Akira & Tadashi, supra note 410.
399. Sabanogullari, supra note 397.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Canada's Model BIT, supra note 345, at art. 10.
403. Turkey-Tanzania BIT, supra note 69.
404. Turkey-Cameroon BIT, supra note 61, at art. 5.
405. Turkey-Gabon BIT, supra note 62, at art. 5.
406. Turkey-Gambia BIT, supra note 63, at art. 5.
407. Turkey-Kenya BIT, supra note 65, at art. 4.
408. Turkey-Nigeria BIT (2011), supra note 43.
409. Turkey-Rwanda BIT, supra note 68, art. 5.
410. Turkey-Algeria BIT, supra note 60; Turkey-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 55.
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(a) designed and applied for the protection of human, animal or plant life or
health, or the environment;
(b) related to the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural
resources.
2. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed:
(a) to require any Contracting Party to furnish or allow access to any
information the disclosure of which it determines to be contrary to its essential
security interests;
(b) to prevent any Contracting Party from taking any actions that it considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests;
(i) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to
such traffic and transactions in other goods, materials, services and technology
undertaken directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military or
other security establishment,
(ii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations, or
(iii) relating to the implementation of national policies or international
agreements respecting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices; or
(c) to prevent any Contracting Party from taking action in pursuance of its
obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of
international peace and security.41 1
A modest version of the general exception clause is found in
Article IX of the Turkey-Tunisia BIT which provides that "[t]his
agreement shall not preclude the application by either Party of
measures necessary for the maintenance of public order and
morals, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the
maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or
the protection of its own essential security interests."4 12
5. Limits on Expropriation
Expropriation raises significant issues in international
investment law. Investors need assurance that their property is
protected. However, unless it is carefully drafted, the expropriation
clause in an international investment agreement can expose a host
state to considerable legal liability. In many investment arbitration
cases involving African states, claimants successfully asserted claims
411. Id.
412. Turkey-Tunisia BIT, supra note 45, at art. IX.
1002
EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES AND INVESTMENT LAW
of direct and indirect expropriation.
4 13 Ideally, an expropriation
clause should be drafted with a view to accommodating the concerns
of foreign investors as well as national policy makers. The goal should
be to afford investors meaningful protection and at the same time
limit exposure to liability for nondiscriminatory public interest
regulation.
All Turkey-Africa BITs protect investors and their investment
from unlawful and discriminatory expropriation.
414 However, a
growing number of Turkey-Africa BITs provide policy space for a host
state by limiting the types of measures that constitute indirect
expropriation. For example, Article 6(2) of the Turkey-Rwanda BIT
explicitly states that "[n]on-discriminatory legal measures designed
and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as
health, safety and environment, do not constitute indirect
expropriation."415 A similar provision can be found in Turkey's BITs
with Gabon,416 Gambia,417 and Nigeria.
418
6. The "Not Lowering of Standards" Clause
Turkey-Africa BITs do not provide for corporate social
responsibility but most contain the "not lowering of standards"
clause.419 The not lowering of standards clause is designed to
discourage states from relaxing environmental and labor standards to
attract investment. In a growing number of agreements, contracting
parties declare their expectation that protecting foreign investment
"can be achieved without relaxing health, safety, and environmental
measures and internationally recognized labor rights."420 Although
typically found in the preamble, this not lowering of standards clause
is found in the body of some BITs.
4 21 For example, Article 4 of the
Turkey-Ethiopia BIT provides:
413. See, e.g., Goetz v. Rdpublique du Burundi, ICSID Case No. ARB/95/3, Award
(Feb. 10, 1999); Siag & Vecchi v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15,
Award (June 1, 2009); Funnekotter v. Republic of Zim., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/6,
Award (Apr. 22, 2009); Bernhard von Pezold v. Republic of Zim., ICSID Case No.
ARB/10/15, Award (July 28, 2015).
414. Investment Policy Hub - Turkey, supra note 1.
415. Turkey-Rwanda BIT, supra note 68.
416. Turkey-Gabon BIT, supra note 62, at art. 6.
417. Turkey-Gambia BIT, supra note 63, at art. 6(2).
418. Turkey-Nigeria BIT (2011), supra note 43, at art. 7(2).
419. See, e.g., Turkey-Rwanda BIT, supra note 66.
420. See e.g., Turkey-Senegal BIT, supra note 58, Preamble ("Convinced that
these objectives can be achieved without relaxing health, safety and environmental
measures of general application as well as internationally recognized labor rights.").
421. See Turkey-Senegal BIT, supra note 58, Preamble ("Convinced that these
objectives can be achieved without relaxing health, safety and environmental measures
of general application as well as internationally recognized labor rights.").
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ARTICLE 4
Health, Safety and Environmental Measures
The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by
relaxing domestic health, safety and environmental measures. Accordingly, a
Party should not waive or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such
measures as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or
retention in its territory of an investment of an investor. If a Party considers
that the other Party offered such an encouragement, it may request
consultations with the other Party and the two Parties shall consult with a
view to avoiding any such encouragement.4 22
7. Nonderogation Clause
In a few BITs between Turkey and some countries in Africa,
contracting parties explicitly state that the agreements do not
derogate from some obligations including international legal
obligations, laws and regulations, administrative practices or
procedures, or the administrative or adjudicatory decisions of




This agreement shall not derogate from:
(a) laws and regulations, administrative practices or procedures or
administrative or adjudicatory decisions of either Party,
(b) international legal obligations, or,
(c) obligations assumed by either Party, including those contained in an
investment agreement or an investment authorization... 423
Surprisingly, the nonderogation clause appears in the older BITs
that Turkey has with countries in Africa (e.g., the Turkey-Algeria
BIT 424 and the Turkey-Egypt BIT seen above 425) but not in more
recent agreements (e.g., the Turkey-Rwanda BIT). 4 26 One possible
explanation for why the nonderogation clause does not feature in
more recent BITs involving Tyekry may simply be that it has been
422. Turkey-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 55.
423. Turkey-Egypt BIT, supra note 54.
424. Turkey-Algeria BIT, supra note 60.
425. Turkey-Egypt BIT, supra note 54.
426. Turkey-Rwanda BIT, supra note 66.
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replaced by the "general exceptions" clause, which arguably affords
more policy space to host states.427
8. Limits on Investor Rights and Guarantees
In some Turkey-Africa BITs, particularly recent agreements, the
host country's right to regulate is preserved through carve-out clauses
that qualify and/or limit the rights and privileges afforded to
investors.42 8 For example, in most of the BITs, the right of investors
to transfer capital in and out of a host state is conditioned on the
investor fulfilling all tax obligations.429 Article 7(1) of the Turkey-
Kenya BIT provides that "[u]pon fulfillment of all tax obligations,
each Contracting Party shall permit in good faith all transfers,
related to an investment, to be made freely and without delay into
and out of its territory. "In addition, Article 7 states the host state is
allowed to limit transfers of capital in the event of a serious balance
of payment crisis. Article 8(3) of the Turkey-Cameron BIT stipulates:
"Where, in exceptional circumstances, payments and capital
movements cause or threaten to cause serious balance of payments
difficulties, each Contracting Party may temporarily restrict
transfers, provided that such restrictions are imposed on a non-
discriminatory and in good faith basis."430
In conclusion, sustainable development is not explicitly
mentioned as a treaty objective in most of the BITs that Turkey has
concluded with countries in Africa and most of the agreements do not
contain provisions specifically designed to promote sustainable
development in a host state.431 Moreover, none of the BITs reviewed
oblige contracting parties to respect human rights or protect the
investment.432 However, a growing number of Turkey-Africa BITs
provide some policy space for host states to regulate in the public
427. This conclusion is based on a side-by-side comparison of Article 6 of the
Turkey-Egypt BIT (Derogations) and Article 5 of Turkey-Rwanda BIT buttresses this
point. Investment tribunals have not interpreted either clause or determined their
precise scope and effectiveness. See generally Turkey-Egypt BIT, supra note 54;
Turkey-Rwanda BIT, supra note 66.
428. Turkey-Cameroon BIT, supra note 61, at art. 8 (stating that "upon
fulfillment of all tax obligations, each Contracting Party shall permit in good faith all
transfers related to an investment to be made freely and without delay into and out of
its territory.") (emphasis added).
429. Id.
430. Similar provisions are found in Turkey's BITs with the following countries:
Gambia (Art. 8(3)), Rwanda (Article 8(3)), Gabon (Article 8(3)), Tanzania (Article 8(3)),
and Kenya (Article 7(3)).
431. Id.
432. Turkey-Cameroon BIT, supra note 61.
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interest and advance sustainable development goals.4 3 3 There is a
growing realization that although economic agreements create
economic opportunities for states, "they can also affect the domestic
policy space of Governments," and make it extremely difficult for
states to fully implement human rights and environmental
legislation.4 34
VI. TURKEY-AFRICA BIIATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: A CRITIQUE
BITs are not benign policy instruments. 43  BITs can chill
regulatory action and can expose host states to considerable legal
risks and to legal claims before international investment tribunals.436
Questions are increasingly being asked about the impact of
investment treaties on human rights, the environment, and
sustainable development more generally.4 37 Increasingly, states are
urged to "ensure that they retain adequate policy and regulatory
ability to protect human rights under the terms of such agreements,
while providing the necessary investor protection."4 38 According to
Principle 9 of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights, "[s]tates should maintain adequate domestic policy
space to meet their human rights obligations when pursuing
business-related policy objectives with other States or business
enterprises, for instance through investment treaties or contracts."439
433. Turkey-Gabon, supra note 62.
434. Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, U.N. Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights, at 11, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (2011).
435. See generally Turkey-Gabon, supra note 64; Turkey-Egypt BIT, supra note
54; Turkey-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 55.
436. PIA EBERHARDT & CECILIA OLIVET, PROFITING FROM INJUSTICE: How LAw
FIRMS, ARBITRATORS AND FINANCIERS ARE FUELING AN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
BOOM 16 (Helen Burley ed., 2012).
437. In Canada, negotiations on international investment agreements are subject
to the 2001 Framework for Conducting Environmental Assessment of Trade
Negotiations. The Canadian government takes the position that environmental
assessments of trade negotiations are "an important decision-making tool for
promoting sustainable development, can contribute to more open decision-making, and
can also improve overall policy coherence at the national level by assisting decision-
makers to understand environmental implications of trade policy." Framework for
Conducting Environmental Assessments of Trade Negotiations, GLOB. AFF. CAN. (Feb.
2001), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/env/
framework-cadre.aspx?lang-eng [https://perma.cc/84DG-J4YZ] (archived Sept. 11,
2019); see also Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, Strategic
Environmental Assessment: The Cabinet Directive on the Environmental Assessment of
Policy, Plan and Program Proposals, GOV'T OF CAN. (2010), https://www.canada.calen/
impact-assessment-agency/programs/strategic-environmental-assessment/cabinet-
directive-environmental-assessment-policy-plan-program-proposals.html
[https://perma.cc/W9KP-3AMG ] (archived Sept. 11, 2019).
438. U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 434, at
11.
439. Id.
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This begs the question, based on the evolving best practices of states
and developments in international law, generally, is anything
missing from Turkey-Africa BITs? This Part analyzes shortcomings
in Turkey-Africa BITs and discusses options for countries in Africa
that wish to reform their BITs with Turkey.
A. Turkey-Africa BITs: Missing Elements
Explicit commitments to sustainable development, provisions
addressing corporate social responsibility and the obligations of
investors, and policy space for host states are missing from Turkey-
Africa BITs, particularly in older BITs.
1. Sustainable Development Not Explicitly Mentioned as a Treaty
Objective
Economic development, but not "sustainable economic
development," appears in most of the BITs that Turkey has with
countries in Africa.440 Sustainable development has been defined as
"development that meets the needs of the present, without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs."4 41 At its core, sustainable development "is an approach to
development that looks to balance different, and often competing,
needs against an awareness of the environmental, social and
economic limitations we face as a society."44 2 Sustainability is at the
very core of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the
leading global framework for international cooperation today.
44 3
Although health, safety, and environmental measures are
mentioned in the preamble to some of the BITs that Turkey has with
countries in Africa, sustainable development is not explicitly listed as
a treaty objective.444 Rather, contracting parties express an
expectation that the treaty objective (investor protection) can be
440. A common formulation is that found in the preamble to the Turkey-Egypt.
Turkey-Egypt BIT, supra note 54; see also Turkey-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 55,
Preamble.
441. What is Sustainable Development?, SUSTAINABLE DEV. COMM'N,
http://www.sd-commission.org.uk/pages/what-is-sustainable-development.html (last
visited Sept. 10, 2019) [https://perma.cclEVK5-4DNX] (archived Aug. 19, 2019); see also
Rep. of the World Comm'n on Env't & Dev., Our Common Future, 1 27, U.N. Doc.
A/42/427 (Aug. 4, 1987).
442. Id.
443. G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 39, at 1 1-2.
444. See, e.g., Turkey-Senegal BIT, supra note 58, Preamble (contracting parties
expressed a conviction that the treaty objectives "can be achieved without relaxing
health, safety and environmental measures of general application as well as
internationally recognized labor rights.").
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achieved without lowering human rights, labor, and environmental
standards.445
This lack of explicit reference to sustainable development in the
preambles to Turkey-Africa BITs is concerning for three reasons.
First, sustainable development is driving investment treaty reform
today and explicit reference to sustainable development can
potentially affect how an investment treaty is construed and
interpreted.446 Although preambles do not directly create rights and
obligations, under Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, preambles are considered part of treaties for purposes of
interpretation.447 Thus, mentioning sustainable development, even in
the preamble to a BIT, could potentially shape the meaning and scope
of a BIT. Second, in a growing number of HAs, treaty parties
articulate the goals of sustainable development and explicitly
reaffirm the right of host states to regulate in the public interest. For
example, in the preamble to the Comprehensive and Economic Trade
Agreement (CETA), a trade deal between the EU and Canada,
contracting parties: "RECOGNIS[ED] the importance of international
security, democracy, human rights and the rule of law for the
development of international trade and economic cooperation" and
"REAFFIRM[ED] their commitment to promote sustainable
development of international trade in such a way as to contribute to
sustainable development in its economic, social and environmental
dimensions."448 In the preamble to the Brazil-United Arab Emirates
BIT (2019), contracting parties "[r]ecogniz[ed] the essential role of
investment in promoting sustainable development."4 49 Third,
increasingly continental policy instruments in Africa stress the
importance of sustainable development. In the preamble to the Draft
PAIC, African Union member states "RECOGNIZ[ED] their right to
regulate all the aspects relating to investments within their
territories with a view to meeting national policy objectives and to
promoting sustainable development objectives."450 Article 22(3) of the
445. Id.
446. UNCTAD'S REFORM PACKAGE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
REGIME, supra note 30, at 10 (noting that "[g]rowing concerns with the functioning of
the IIA regime, together with the evolution of the global investment landscape and the
sustainable development imperative, have in recent years triggered a move towards
reforming international investment rule -making.").
447. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(2), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 18232.
448. See Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), Can.-EU, art.
8, Sept. 21, 2017, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-
agreements/treaty-files/5380/download [https://perma.cc/7K8E-XVT5] (archived Sept.
11, 2019) (discussing the 'investment' portion of the trade agreement).
449. See Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement Between the
Federative Republic of Brazil and the United Arab Emirates, Braz.-U.A.E., Preamble,
Mar. 15, 2019 [hereinafter Brazil-UAE BIT].
450. DRAFT PAN-AFRIcAN INVESTMENT CODE, AFRICAN UNION COMM'N ECON.
AFF. DEP'T 3 (Dec. 2016), https://au.int/en/documents/20161231/pan-african-
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Draft PAIC stipulates that "[i]nvestors shall contribute to the
economic, social and environmental progress with a view to achieving
sustainable development of host States."4 51
2. Corporate Social Responsibility Ignored
None of the BITs that Turkey has concluded with countries
explicitly address corporate social responsibility or corporate
accountability and none impose specific obligations on investors. In
this regard, Turkey-Africa BITs are no different from the BITs that
African countries have with Western countries.45 2
The fact that Turkey-Africa BITs do not address corporate social
responsibility or investor liability is of concern for a number of
reasons. The absence of corporate social responsibility clauses from
Turkey-Africa BITs is at odds with regional and continental
standards in Africa.4 53 Chapter 4 of the 2016 Draft Pan African
Investment Code (Draft PAIC), a nonbinding comprehensive guiding
instrument on investment for all African Union member states, is
titled "Investor Obligation."454 Chapter 4 of the Draft PAIC addresses
a number of important topics including, "Framework for Corporate
Governance" (Article 19), "Socio-political Obligations" (Article 20),
"Bribery" (Article 21), "Corporate Social Responsibility" (Article 22),
"Obligations as to the use of Natural Resources" (Article 23), and
"Business Ethics and Human Rights" (Article 24). Article 22 of the
Draft PAIC states that investors "shall abide by the laws, regulations,
administrative guidelines and policies of the host State;"
4 55 "shall, in
pursuit of their economic objectives, ensure that they do not conflict
with the social and economic development objectives of host States
and shall be sensitive to such objectives;"456 and "shall contribute to
the economic, social and environmental progress with a view to
achieving sustainable development of the host State."
457 Article 23 of
the Draft PAIC is focused on natural resource extraction and declares
that investors "shall not exploit or use local natural resources to the
investment-code-paic [https://perma.cc/7EW8-G77L] (archived Sept. 11, 2019)
[hereinafter DRAFT PAIC].
451. Id. at art. 22(3).
452. UNCTAD's REFORM PACKAGE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
REGIME, supra note 30, at 66 (acknowledging that corporate social responsibility
clauses are not common in BITs but also observing that "[t]he last decade has seen the
development of CSR standards as a unique dimension of 'soft law' that is rapidly
evolving.").
453. DRAFT PAIC, supra note 450.
454. Id.
455. Id. at art. 22(1).
456. Id. at art. 22(2).
457. Id. at art. 22(3).
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detriment of the rights and interests of the host State"458 and "shall
respect rights of local populations, and avoid land grabbing practices
vis-A-vis local communities."4 59 Article 24 lists principles that should
govern compliance by investors with business ethics and human
rights.460 Principles listed include inter alia: support and respect the
protection of internationally recognized human rights;46 1 eliminate
all forms of forced and compulsory labor, including the effective
abolition of child labor;4 62 and ensure equitable sharing of wealth
derived from investments.463
The absence of explicit reference to corporate social responsibility
in Turkey-Africa BITs is also at odds with the evolving best practices
of states. References to corporate social responsibility are found in a
growing number of international investment treaties and Model
BITs.464 Chapter III of India's Model BIT is titled "Investor,
Investment and Home State Obligations" and "prescribes the
minimum obligations for investors and their investments for
responsible business conduct."465 The chapter addresses a number of
topics including "Obligation against Corruption" (Article 9),
"Disclosure" (Article 10), "Taxation" (Article 11), and "Compliance
with Law of Host State" (Article 12).466 The objective of the chapter is
"to ensure that the conduct, management and operations of Investors
and their Investments are consistent with the Law of the Host State,
and enhance the contribution of Investments to inclusive growth and
sustainable development of the Host State."4 67 Corporate social
responsibility clauses are also found in investment treaties involving
a growing number of countries including Brazil, 468 Canada,46 9 and
Australia.470
458. Id. at art. 23(1).
459. Id. at art. 23(2).
460. Id. at art. 24.
461. Id. at art. 24(a).
462. Id. at art. 24(c).
463. Id. at art. 24(e).
464. Chapter III of India's Model BIT is titled "Investor, Investment and Home
State Obligations," and addresses the concept of corporate social responsibility
extensively. See 2016 Indian Model BIT, supra note 29.
465. Id.
466. Id. at arts. 9-12.
467. Id. at art. 8.1.
468. Brazil-UAE BIT, supra note 449, at art. 15 (titled "Corporate Social
Responsibility" and addressing the obligation of investors).
469. See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, Can.-Guinea, May 27, 2014, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/
international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5095/download [https://perma.cc/
TP94-7CV2] (archived Sept. 11, 2019) [hereinafter Canada-Guinea BIT]. Article 16 of
the Canada-Guinea BIT is titled "Corporate Social Responsibility" and states that
"[e]ach Party should encourage enterprises operating within its territory or subject to
its jurisdiction to voluntarily incorporate internationally recognized standards of
corporate social responsibility in their practices and internal policies, such as
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The omission of direct reference to corporate social responsibility
in Turkey-Africa BITs is also troubling because as members of the
United Nations and members of regional organizations, such as the
European Union and the African Union, Turkey and countries in
Africa have made commitments to address the growing challenge of
business and human rights.471 On April 16, 2014, the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted the Declaration of the
Committee of Ministers supporting the UN Guiding Principles.
472 In
2016, the Committee of Ministers adopted Recommendation
CM/Rec(2016)3 on Human Rights and Business
(Recommendation).4 7 3  On the whole, the Recommendation offers
guidance "to assist states in preventing and remedying human rights
violations by business enterprises."4 74 The Recommendation requires
states to consider possible human rights impacts of the trade and
investment agreements that they conclude.
47 5 Paragraph 23 of the
Recommendation states:
23. When concluding and during the term of trade and investment agreements
or other relevant conventions, member States should consider possible human
rights impacts of such agreements and take appropriate steps, including
through the incorporation of human rights clauses, to mitigate and address
identified risks of adverse human rights impacts.
4 7 6
statements of principle that have been endorsed or are supported by the Parties." Id. at
art. 16.
470. See " Investment Agreement, Austl.-H.K., Mar. 23 2019,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/
5830/download [https://perma.cc/TV3F-6HK4] (archived Sept. 11, 2019) [hereinafter
Australia-Hong Kong BIT]. Article 16 of the Australia - Hong Kong BIT is titled
"Corporate Social Responsibility" and provides that "[t]he Parties affirm the
importance of each Party encouraging enterprises operating within its Area or subject
to its jurisdiction to voluntarily incorporate into their internal policies those
internationally recognised standards, guidelines and principles of corporate social
responsibility that have been endorsed or are supported by that Party." Id. at art. 16.
471. See, e.g., U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra
note 434.
472. Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on the UN Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights, COUNCIL OF EuR. (Apr. 16, 2014), https://www.coe.int/en/
web/human-rights-intergovernmental-cooperation/work-completed/human-rights-and-
business [https://perma.cc/NBQ3-GZQN] (archived Aug. 19, 2019).
473. See Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on
Human Rights and Business, Council of Eur., Mar. 2, 2016 (adopted at the 1249th
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3. Lack of Policy Space in "Old-Generation" BITs
There is widespread concern that international investment
agreements unduly restrict the host state's right to regulate in the
public interest.477 This concern is particularly directed at treaties
concluded before 2010 before sustainable development-oriented
reform "entered the mainstream of international investment
policymaking."478
Although most of Turkey's BITs with countries in Africa are of
fairly recent origin (concluded after 2010),479 some can be considered
"old-generation," agreements having been concluded between 1985-
2010.480 Among the old-generation Africa-Turkey BITs are Turkey's
BITs with Egypt (1997),481 Morocco (1997),482 Algeria (1998),483
Ethiopia (2000),484 South Africa (2000),485 and Libya (2009).486 Most
of the old-generation BITs lack the policy space found in more recent
agreements. A good example is the Turkey-Ethiopia BIT (2005).487
The Turkey-Ethiopia BIT does not have a "general exception" clause
and does not provide exceptions to most of the obligations on host
states.488 Article V of the Turkey-Ethiopia BIT provides for the right
of investors to repatriate capital but does not make this right
contingent upon fulfillment of tax obligations and does not provide
policy space for a host state to address a balance of payment crisis
should the need arise.48 9 Compare the "Repatriation and Transfer"
477. Sabanogullari, supra note 397.
478. UNCTAD's REFORM PACKAGE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
REGIME, supra note 30, at 71 (observing that old-generation treaties abound and that
95 per cent of all treaties in force were concluded before the year 2010).
479. Investment Policy Hub - Turkey, supra note 1 (indicating that most BITs
that Turkey has with countries in Africa were only signed in the last ten years).
480. UNCTAD has used the term "old-generation" IIAs to refer to investment
agreements concluded prior to 2010. The treaties are considered old-generation in large
part because they lack most of the reform features found in an increasing number of
recent treaties. See UNCTAD, Phase 2 of IlA Reform: Modernizing the Existing Stock of
Old-Generation Treaties, IIA ISSUE NOTE (2017) (noting more than 2,500 IIAs in force
today-ninety-five percent of all treaties in force-were concluded before 2010 and that
the continued existence of these treaties "creates overlaps and fragmentation in treaty
relationships and poses interaction challenges.").
481. Turkey-Egypt BIT, supra note 54.
482. Turkey-Morocco BIT, supra note 57.
483. Turkey-Algeria BIT, supra note 60.
484. Turkey-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 55.
485. Turkey-South Africa BIT, supra note 67.
486. Turkey-Libya BIT, supra note 56.
487. Turkey-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 55.
488. Id.
489. Id. at art. V ("Each Party shall allow all transfers related to an investment
to be made freely and without delay into and out of its territory in accordance with its
laws and regulations.").
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1. Each Party shall permit in
good faith all transfers related to
an investment to be made freely
and without unreasonable delay
into and out of its territory such
transfers include:
2. Transfers shall be made in the
convertible currency in which the
investment has been made or in
any convertible currency at the
rate of exchange in force in the
host country at the date of
transfer, unless otherwise agreed
by the investor and the hosting
Party.
A similar problem is found in the provision dealing with
expropriation. Missing from the old-generation BITs are safeguards
designed to limit the otherwise broad scope of the treaties and
immunize a host state's regulatory measures taken in the public
490. Compare Turkey-Gabon BIT, supra note 62, at art. 8, with Turkey-Egypt
BIT, supra note 54, at art. 4 (emphasis added).
2019]
I
1. Upon fulfillment of all tax
obligations, each Contracting
Party shall permit in good faith
all transfers related to an
investment to be made freely and
without delay into and out of its
territory. Such transfers include:
2. Transfers shall be made in the
convertible currency in which the
investment has been made or in
any convertible currency at the
rate of exchange in force at the
date of transfer, unless otherwise




capital movements cause or
threaten to cause serious balance
of payments difficulties, each
Contracting Party may
temporarily restrict transfers,
provided that such restrictions
are imposed on a non-
discriminatory and in good faith
basis. ,
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interest.491 Specifically, the Turkey-Ethiopia BIT, does not have a
provision comparable to Article 6(2) of the Turkey-Gabon BIT which
state:
Turkey-Ethiopia BIT (2000) Turkey-Gabon BIT (2012)
Article IV Article 6
Expropriation and Expropriation
Compensation
1. Investments shall not be 1. Investments shall not be
expropriated, nationalized or expropriated, nationalized or
subject, directly or indirectly, to subject, directly or indirectly, to
measures of similar effects except measures of similar effects
for a public purpose, in a non- (hereinafter referred as
discriminatory manner, upon expropriation) except for a public
payment of prompt, adequate purpose, in a non-discriminatory
and effective compensation, and manner, upon payment of
in accordance with due process of prompt, adequate and effective
law and the general principles of compensation, and in accordance
treatment provided for in the with due process of law and the
Article III of this Agreement.4 9 2  general principles of treatment
provided for in Article 4 of this
Agreement.
2. Non-discriminatory legal
measures designed and applied to
protect legitimate public welfare
objectives, such as health, safety




Old-generation BITS are not benign legal instruments that
contracting states can simply ignore. UNCTAD is right in its warning
that "old treaties bite" and pose legal risks for host states.4 94 At the
end of 2017, almost every known treaty-based investment arbitration
claim involving African states was filed pursuant to treaties
concluded before 2000.495 Congo v. Mitchell was based on the 1984
491. UNCTAD's REFORM PACKAGE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
REGIME, supra note 30, at 72 (noting most old-generation treaties contain broadly
worded defitions and substantive provisions, and safeguards).
492. Turkey-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 55.
493. Turkey-Gabon BIT, supra note 62 (emphasis added).
494. UNCTAD's REFORM PACKAGE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
REGIME, supra note 30, at 72 (noting international investment agreements are not
harmless political declarations and have serious legal consequences).
495. Id. at 73 (stating that at the end of 2016, virtually all of the known treaty
based investment arbitration were filed pursuant to treaties concluded before 2010).
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BIT between the United States and the Democratic Republic of
Congo.496 Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt was based on
the United Kingdom-Egypt BIT of 1975497 and Middle East Cement
Shipping and Handling Co. v. Arab Republic of Egypt was based on
the Egypt-Greece BIT of 1993.498
4. Legal Minefields Arising from Broad and Vague Obligations
In almost every Turkey-Africa BIT, the obligations imposed on
contracting parties are vaguely worded and ill-defined. Lack of clarity
in treaty obligations exposes host states to considerable legal risks
and can create regulatory chill.4 99 As UNCTAD notes, broad and
vague formulation of investment treaty provisions "has generated
unanticipated (and at times inconsistent) interpretations by arbitral
tribunals, and has resulted in a lack of predictability as to what
[international investment agreements] actually require from
States."5 00
In almost all the BITs reviewed, absolute guarantees, such as to
the guarantee of "fair and equitable treatment," "full protection and
security," and protection against "unreasonable or discriminatory
measures" are not defined nor is their scope limited.
50 1 In some of the
BITs (e.g., the Turkey-Gabon BIT) an attempt is made to limit the
scope of the guarantees by linking them to international minimum
standards of protection, but this is not found in most of the other
BITs (e.g., the Turkey-Ethiopia BIT). These examples are seen below:
Turkey-Gabon BIT (2013) Turkey-Ethiopia BIT (2005)
Article 3 Article II (2)
Investments of investors of each Investments of investors of each
Contracting Party shall at all Party shall at all times be
times be accorded treatment in accorded fair and equitable
accordance with international treatment and shall enjoy full
law minimum standard of protection in the territory of the
496. Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7,
Award (Feb. 9, 2004).
497. Wena Hotels Ltd. (U.K) v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No
ARB/98/4, Award (Dec. 8, 2000).
498. Middle East Cement Shipping & Handling Co. v. Arab Republic of Egypt,
ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6, Award (Apr. 12, 2002).
499. UNCTAD's REFORM PACKAGE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
REGIME, supra note 30, at 16 (observing that "[b]road and vague formulation of IIA
provisions has allowed investors to challenge core domestic policy decisions, for
instance in the area of environmental, energy and health policies.").
500. Id.
501. See generally Turkey-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 55; Turkey-Gabon BIT,
supra note 62.
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treatment, including fair and other Party.5 0 3
equitable treatment and full
protection and security in the
territory of the other Contracting
Party.502
Overall, when it comes to clarifying treaty obligations, Turkey-
Africa BITs are out of step with a growing number of recent BITs that
other countries are concluding. Increasingly, states are taking extra
care to reduce exposure to legal risks by defining their obligations
carefully and circumscribing those obligations when appropriate.
Regarding the FET standard, one option is for states to qualify
the standard by deference to the minimum standard of treatment
under customary international law; this approach is found in a
growing number of treaties.50 4 Second, in some BITs, contracting
parties clarify the meaning and scope of the FET standard by
providing an open-ended list of the types of measures that are
prohibited.5 0 5 Third, in some recent treaties, contracting parties
clarify the FET standard with an exhaustive "closed list" of the
protection to be accorded investors.50 6 Fourth, a growing number of
investment treaties contracting parties include a clause that provides
for a review, upon request, of the content and scope of the FET
standard.5 0 7 Fifth, some states are choosing to provide a list of factors
that should be taken into account in determining if the FET standard
has been violated.5 08 For example, Article 2.4(3) of the EU-Singapore
IPA states that
[i]n determining whether the fair and equitable treatment obligation . . . has
been breached, a Tribunal may take into account, where applicable, whether a
Party made specific or unambiguous representations to an investor so as to
induce the investment, that created legitimate expectations of a covered
502. Id.
503. Turkey-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 55.
504. See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, Japan-
U.A.E., arts. 5(1H2), Apr. 30, 2018, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000360123.pdf
[https://perma.cclQG4D-BKTTJ (archived Sept. 11, 2019) [hereinafter Japan-UAE
BIT]; SADC MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY TEMPLATE, SOUTHERN AFRICAN
DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY art. 5 (2012).
505. See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, Arg.-
Japan, art. 4(2)(a), Dec. 1, 2018 ('[Flair and equitable treatment' includes the
obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil or administrative adjudicatory
proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the principal
legal systems of the world.").
506. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and the
Republic of Singapore, EU-Sing., art. 2.4(2), Oct. 12, 2018 [hereinafter EU-Singapore
IPA]; SADC MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY TEMPLATE, supra note 504, at art.
5.
507. See, e.g., EU-Singapore IPA, supra note 506, at art. 2.4(4).
508. Id. at art. 2.4(3).
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investor and which were reasonably relied upon by the covered investor, but
that the Party subsequently frustrated.
Finally, although still relatively rare, some BITs omit the FET
standard altogether.5 09 In the Brazil-UAE BIT (2019), the
contracting parties are explicit and clear about their intention to
exclude the FET standard and replace it with a list of prohibited
conduct. Article 4 of the Brazil-UAE BIT provides as follows:
Article 4
Treatment
1. Each Party shall treat investors of the other Party and their investments
according to its applicable rules and regulations and in conformity with this
Agreement.
2. Based on the applicable rules of international law as recognized by each of
the Parties and their respective national law, no Party shall subject investors of
the other Party and their investments to measures which constitute:
(i) Denial of access to justice in any judicial or administrative proceedings;
(ii) Breach of due process;
(iii) Targeted discrimination, such as gender, race, religious or political beliefs;
(iv) Manifestly abusive treatment, such as coercion, duress and harassment; or
(v) Discrimination against investments of investors of the other Party in law 1
enforcement and the provision of public security.
510
A comparison of the FET clause in the Kazakhstan-Singapore BIT
(2018) and that in the Turkey-Rwanda BIT (2016) highlights some of
the deficiencies in the BITs that Turkey has with countries in Africa:
Turkey-Rwanda BIT (2016) Kazakhstan-Singapore BIT
Article 3 (2018)
Promotion and Protection of Article 3
Investment Promotion and Protection of
Investment
2. Investments of investors of Each Party shall accord to
each Contracting Party shall at investments of investors of the
509. The FET standard is omitted from the Rwanda-Morocco BIT (2016) and
from the India-Belarus BIT (2018). The FET standard is also absent from the draft
EAC Model Investment Treaty.
510. Brazil-UAE BIT, supra note 449, at art. 4.
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all times be accorded treatment
in accordance with international
law minimum standard of
treatment, including fair and
equitable treatment and full
protection and security in the
territory of the other Contracting
Party. Neither Contracting Party
shall in any way impair the
management, maintenance, use,
operation, enjoyment, extension,




State of the other Party fair and
equitable treatment and full
protection and security in
accordance with customary
international law.
The obligation to provide 'fair
and equitable treatment" includes
the obligation not to deny justice
in criminal, civil or
administrative adjudicatory
proceedings.
The obligation to provide 'full
protection and security" requires
each Party to provide the level of
police protection required under
customary international law.
The concepts of "fair and
equitable treatment" and "full
protection and security" do not
require treatment in addition to
or beyond that which is required
under customary international
law and do not create additional
substantive rights.
3. A determination that there has
been a breach of another
provision of this Agreement, or of
a separate international
agreement, does not establish
that there has been a breach of
this Article. 512
511. Turkey-Rwanda BIT, supra note 66 (emphasis added).
512. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the
Government of the Republic of Singapore on the Promotion and Mutual Protecion of
Investments, Kaz.-Sing., art. 3, Nov. 21, 2018 [hereinafter Kazakhstan-Singapore
BIT].
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Turkey-Rwanda BIT (2016) Kazakhstan-Singapore BIT
Article 3 (2018)
Promotion and Protection of Article 3
Investment Promotion and Protection of
Investment
2. Investments of investors of
each Contracting Party shall at
all times be accorded treatment
in accordance with international
law minimum standard of
treatment, including fair and
equitable treatment and full
protection and security in the
territory of the other Contracting
Party. Neither Contracting Party
shall in any way impair the
management, maintenance, use,
operation, enjoyment, extension,




Each Party shall accord to
investments of investors of the
State of the other Party fair and
equitable treatment and full
protection and security in
accordance with customary
international aw.
The obligation to provide "fair
and equitable treatment" includes
the obligation not to deny justice
in criminal, civil or
administrative adjudicatory
proceedings.
The obligation to provide "full
protection and security" requires
each Party to provide the level of
police protection required under
customary international law.
The concepts of "fair and
equitable treatment" and "full
protection and security" do not
require treatment in addition to
or beyond that which is required
under customary international
law and do not create additional
substantive rights.
3. A determination that there has
been a breach of another
provision of this Agreement, or of
a separate international
agreement, does not establish
that there has been a breach of
this Article.
514
513. Turkey-Rwanda BIT, supra note 66 (emphasis added).
514. Kazakhstan-Singapore BIT, supra note 512, at art. 3 (emphasis added).
,
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5. Variations among Turkey-Africa BITs
Turkey-Africa BITs are not all created equal in the sense that
some afford more policy space for host states than others. Variations
can be found even as between relatively recent BITs that Turkey has
concluded with countries in Africa. Compare, for example, Article 8 of
the Turkey-Rwanda BIT ("Repatriation and Transfer")5 15 with
Article 7 of the Turkey-Kenya BIT ("Repatriation and Transfer").5 16
In both agreements, the right of investors to repatriate capital is
contingent upon the fulfillment of all tax obligations.5 17 In both
agreements, contracting states reserve the right to temporarily
restrict capital transfers "where, in exceptional circumstances,
payments and capital movements cause or threaten to cause serious
balance of payments difficulties."51 8 However, a very important
provision in the Turkey-Rwanda BIT (Article 8(4)) is completely
absent from the Turkey-Kenya BIT-this is the provision that allows
a host state to prevent a transfer of capital through the equitable and





4. A Contracting Party may prevent a transfer through the equitable, non-
discriminatory, and good faith application of its laws relating to:
(a) bankruptcy, insolvency, or the protection of the rights of creditors;
(b) issuing, trading, or dealing in securities, futures, options, or derivatives;
(c) financial reporting or record keeping of transfers when necessary to assist
law enforcement or financial regulatory authorities;
(d) criminal or penal offences;
(e) ensuring compliance with orders or judgments ill judicial or administrative
proceedings; or (f) social security, public retirement or compulsory savings
schemes.
515. Rwanda-Turkey BIT, supra note 66, at art. 8.
516. Turkey-Kenya BIT, supra note 65, at art. 7.
517. Compare id. at art. 8, with Rwanda-Turkey BIT, supra note 66, at art. 8.
518. See Turkey-Kenya BIT, supra note 65, at art. 7(3). Identical language can
be found in the Rwanda-Turkey BIT. Rwanda-Turkey BIT, supra note 66, at art. 8 (3).
519. Rwanda-Turkey BIT, supra note 66, at art. 8(4).
1020 [VOL. 52-'949
EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES AND INVESTMENT LAW
As already noted, in BITs, broad treaty scope could chill regulatory action by
host states, trigger investment arbitration even for routine non-discriminatory
regulatory measures, and make it difficult for a host state to effectively enforce
its criminal, fiscal and securities laws and policies.
5 20
6. Development Dimension not Prioritized
Turkey-Africa BITs do not address development concerns in a
meaningful or coherent fashion. To the extent that development
dimension is addressed, it is only addressed in the preamble through
hortatory statements. In some BITs, preambular paragraphs typically
refer to the promotion of development as one of the main objectives of
the agreement. Only one BIT, the Turkey-Gabon BIT, addresses the
issue of technology transfer, and it merely calls on contracting parties
to encourage technology transfer.521
Although in the past, BITs focused almost exclusively on
investment protection and rarely addressed issues of concern to host
states, this is now changing. Increasingly BITs address a host of
issues not traditionally found in investment agreements, such as
prudential measures,522 balance of payment,523 denial of benefits,
524
temporary safeguards,525 intellectual property rights (IPRs),
526 rule of
law, consumer protection, and corruption.5
27
Addressed in the Draft PAIC, but not in most of the BITs
between Turkey and countries in Africa, are topics such as:
520. Id.
521. Turkey-Gabon BIT, supra note 62, at art. 9 (Article 9, titled "Transfer of
Technology and Formation," provides that "subject to its laws and regulations, each
Contracting Party may encourage their investors who invest in the territory of the
other Contracting Party to organize professional training programs, and facilitate
transfer of technology and know-how for the benefit of the host Contracting Party.").
522. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Argentine Republic and Japan for the
Promotion and Protection of Investment, Arg.-Japan, art. 20, Jan. 12, 2018,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-
files/5799/download [https://perma.cc/AWT7-WJHP] (archived Sept. 11, 2019)
[hereinafter Argentina-Japan BIT]; Japan-UAE BIT, supra note 504, at art. 20;
Australia-Hong Kong BIT, supra note 470, at art. 21 (Prudential Exception and
Related Exception).
523. Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area, art. 25,
May 23, 2007, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-
agreements/treaty-files/3092/download [https://perma.cc/47F5-JXVT] (archived Sept.
11, 2019).
524. See, e.g., Argentina-Japan BIT, supra note 522, at art. 23 (Denial of
Benefits); see also, Kazakhstan-Singapore BIT, supra note 512, at art. 18 (Denial of
Benefits).
525. See, e.g., Japan-UAE BIT, supra note 504, at art. 19 (Temporary Safeguard
Measures).
526. See, e.g., id. at art. 21 (Intellectual Property Rights).
527. See, e.g., Argentina-Japan BIT, supra note 522, at art. 9 (Measures Against
Corruption).
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"Competition Law and Policy" (Article 28); "Transfer of Technology"
(Article 29); "Environment and Technologies" (Article 30); "Human
Resource Development" (Article 36); and "Consumer Protection"
(Article 40).528 The Netherlands Model Investment Agreement
addresses a host of issues not traditionally found in BITs including,
Rule of Law (Article 5) and Sustainable Development (Article 6).529
7. The Right to Regulate Is Not Affirmed Explicitly
BITs establish rights for investors and not corresponding rights
for states or obligations for investors. By establishing broad
protection for investors, BITs "inevitably place limits on contracting
parties' sovereignty in domestic policymaking."53 0 To avoid this
problem, in a growing number of recent treaties, contracting states
explicitly affirm their respective rights to regulate in the public
interest. Article 23 of the Morocco-Turkey BIT (2016) is titled "Right
of State to Regulate," and Article 23(1) provides in part that "the Host
State has the right to take regulatory or other measures to ensure
that development in its territory is consistent with the goals and
principles of sustainable development, and with other legitimate
social and economic policy objectives."53 1 Article 23(3) states further
that "[flor greater certainly, non-discriminatory measures taken by a
State Party to comply with its international obligations under other
treaties shall not constitute a breach of this Agreement."53 2
Although in Turkey-Africa BITs, an attempt is made to respect
domestic regulatory space, the BITs do not explicitly acknowledge the
right of states to regulate in the public interest.533 In this regard, the
528. DRAFT PAIC, supra note 463, at arts. 28, 29, 30, 36, 40.
529. Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments
(Netherlands Draft Model BIT), Gov'T OF THE NETH., https://globalarbitrationreview
.com/digital assets/820bcdd9-08b5-4bb5-a81e-d69e6c6735ce/Draft-Model-BIT-NL-2018
.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) [https://perma.cc/G72P-UZFY] (archived Sept. 11, 2019)
[hereinafter Netherlands Model BIT].
530. UNCTAD's REFORM PACKAGE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
REGIME, supra note 30, at 22.
531. Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement Between the
Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the Government of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria, Morocco-Nigeria, art. 23(3), Dec. 3, 2016, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/
international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5409/download
[https://perma.cclFT3E-8YDV] (archived Oct. 9, 2019) [hereinafter Morocco-Nigeria
BIT].
532. Id.
533. The right to regulate is mentioned in a number of EAC BITs including:
Tanzania-China BIT; Rwanda-UAE BIT; Kenya-Japan BIT. See, e.g., Agreement
Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the
United Republic of Tanzania Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, China-Tanz., Mar. 24, 2013; Agreement Between the Republic of Rwanda
and the United Arab Emirates Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, Rwanda-U.A.E., Jan. 11, 2017; Agreement Between the Government of
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BITs examined are at odds with continental policy instruments and
with evolving best practices. In the Draft PAIC, African Union
Member States, "RECOGNIZ[ED] their right to regulate all the
aspects relating to investments within their territories."
5 34 In the
preamble to the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free
Trade Agreement that went into effect on May 30, 2019, Member
States "REAFFIRM[ED] the right of State Parties to regulate within
their territories and the State Parties' flexibility to achieve legitimate
policy objectives in areas including public health, safety,
environment, public morals and the promotion and protection of
cultural diversity."5 35 A right to regulate clause appears in a good
number of recent investment treaties. For example:
* "RECOGNISING their right to regulate and resolving to
preserve their flexibility to set legislative and regulatory
priorities, safeguard public welfare and protect legitimate
public welfare objectives." Australia-Hong Kong (2019).536
* "RECOGNISING their inherent right to regulate and
resolving to preserve the flexibility of the Parties to set
legislative and regulatory priorities, safeguard public welfare
and protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as
public health, safety, the environment, the conservation of
living or non-living exhaustible natural resources, the
integrity and stability of the financial system and public
morals." Australia-Uruguay BIT (2019).53
* "Reaffirming the right of Parties to regulate investments in
their territory in accordance with their law and policy
objectives." India-Belarus BIT (2018).538
* "Reaffirming the right of the State Parties to regulate and to
introduce new measures relating to investments in their
territories in order to meet national policy objectives, and-
taking into account any asymmetries with respect to the
Japan and the Government of the Republic of Kenya for the Promotion and Protection
of Investment, Japan-Kenya, Aug. 28, 2016.
534. DRAFr PAIC, supra note 450.
535. Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area,
Preamble, Mar. 21, 2018, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36437-treaty-
consolidated text on_ cfta_-_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QSV-99B3] (archived Oct. 9,
2019).
536. Australia-Hong Kong BIT, supra note 470.
537. Agreement Between Australia and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay on the
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austl.-Uru., Preamble, Apr. 5, 2019,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-
files/5853/download [https://perma.cc/L3CG-57T3] (archived Sept. 11, 2019)
[hereinafter Australia-Uruguay BIT].
538. India-Belarus BIT, supra note 380, Preamble.
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measures in place-the particular need of developing
countries to exercise this right." SADC Model BIT (2012).53 9
* "REAFFIRMING each Party's right to adopt and enforce
measures necessary to pursue legitimate policy objectives
such as social, environmental, security, public health and
safety, promotion and protection of cultural diversity." EU-
Singapore IPA (2018).540
* "The Parties reaffirm their right to regulate within their
territories to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as the
protection of public health, social services, public education,
safety, environment or public morals, social or consumer
protection privacy and data protection and the promotion and
protection of cultural diversity." EU-Singapore IPA (2018).541
B. Reforming Turkey-Africa BITs: Options for Countries in Africa
There are undoubtedly many positive features in the BITs that
Turkey has concluded with countries in Africa. In the evolution of
Turkey-Africa BITs, an attempt to keep in step with evolving best
practices is noticeable. However, despite many positive features,
many, if not all, Turkey-African BITs have major shortcomings.
Countries in Africa can choose to ignore the shortcomings and accept
the agreements as they are. On the other hand, countries in Africa
may choose to address the shortcomings in these agreements as part
of a broader agenda to engage in comprehensive reform of their BITs.
Since 2012, UNCTAD has encouraged countries to modernize their
investment treaties and move toward a new generation of IIAs. 542
With older BITs (those concluded before 2010), the best approach
may well be to terminate those agreements after their initial term
expires and to negotiate new ones in their place. With respect to more
recent agreements, a distinction must be made between unratified
treaties and the treaties that have been ratified and are binding.
1. Termination and Renegotiation
Countries in Africa may choose to terminate those BITs that do
not appear to be balanced and oriented towards sustainable
development.54 3 In the last ten years, a growing number of countries
539. SADC MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY TEMPLATE, supra note 504.
540. EU-Singapore IPA, supra note 506, Preamble.
541. Id. at art. 2.2(1).
542. WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2012: TOWARDS A NEW GENERATION OF
INVESTMENT POLICIES, supra note 31, at xxiii.
543. WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2014: INVESTING IN SDGS: AN ACTION PLAN,
supra note 22, at 116.
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(e.g., India,544 Indonesia,5 45 and South Africa 546) have taken steps to
terminate most of their BITs. To avoid legal liability, it is important
that countries adhere to the provisions of each BIT relating to
termination. Article 54 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties stipulates that the termination of a treaty or the withdrawal
of a party may take place "in conformity with the provisions of the
treaty" or "at any time by consent of all the parties after consultation
with the other contracting States."5 47
Although a growing number of states have taken steps to
unilaterally terminate their BITs, two factors complicate the
termination of BITs. First, almost all Turkey-Africa BITs have an
initial fixed duration of ten years, and termination, to be considered
lawful, can only be done at the end of the initial term of a BIT (See
Annex D).548 For example, Article 13 (3) of the Turkey-Kenya BIT
states: "Either Contracting Party may, by giving one year's written
notice to the other Contracting Party, terminate this Agreement at
the end of the initial ten-year period or at any time thereafter."
549
Second, all Turkey-Africa BITs have survival (sunset) clauses that
have the effect of prolonging the effect of a treaty even after the
treaty has been terminated. Most Turkey-Africa BITs specify a ten-
year survival period (See Annex D).5 50 For example, Article 3(5) of the
Turkey-Kenya BIT stipulates: 'With respect to investments made or
acquired prior to the date of termination of this Agreement and to
which this Agreement otherwise applies, the provisions of all of the
other Articles of this Agreement shall thereafter continue to be
effective for a further period of ten (10) years from such date of
termination."5 51
544. Ilge & Singh, supra note 29.
545. Arif Havas Oegroseno, Indonesia's Bilateral Investment Treaties:
Modernising for the 21st Century, 140 RSIS COMMENTARY 1 (Nanyang Tech. Univ.
2014) [hereinafter Oegroseno, Indonesia's Bilateral Investment Treaties].
546. Mzukisi Qobo & Mills Soko, SA's Cancellation of Bilateral Investment
Treaties-Strategic or Hostile?, FIN24 (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.fin24.com/Opinion/
sas-cancellation-of-bilateral-investment-treaties-strategic-or-hostile-
2 0180928-3
[https://perma.cc/BLB4-535S] (archived Sept. 11, 2019); Jackwell Feris, Challenging
the Status Quo - South Africa's Termination of its Bilateral Trade Agreements, DLA
PIPER (Dec. 10, 2014), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/
2 014/12
/international-arbitration-newsletter-q4-2014/challenging-the-status-quo/
[https://perma.cc/K3TG-BUSV] (archived Sept. 11, 2019).
547. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 447, at art. 54.
548. Turkey-Kenya BIT, supra note 65, at art. 13 (stating "this Agreement shall
remain in force for a period of ten (10) years and shall continue in force unless
terminated in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article.").
549. Id. (emphasis added).
550. See, e.g., Turkey-Nigeria BIT (2011), supra note 43, at art. 8; Turkey-
Cameroon BIT, supra note 63, at art. 12; Turkey-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 55, at art. 9.
551. Turkey-Kenya BIT, supra note 65 (emphasis added).
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The question of termination is particularly pertinent with
regards to older treaties because most lack important reform features
found in more recent agreements. Surprisingly, even when new
treaties are concluded, presumably to replace older BITs, contracting
states are often not in a hurry to ratify such treaties. Turkey and
Tunisia concluded their first BIT on May 29, 1999, and their second
BIT on December 27, 2017.552 Presently, only the 1999 BIT is in
force.55 3 Overall, although Turkey has negotiated new BITs with
three countries in Africa-Nigeria, Sudan, and Tunisia-presently
none of the new agreements have entered into force, as seen below.
Turkey-Africa BITs: Termination and Renegotiation
Short Title of BIT Date of Adoption In force
Turkey-Tunisia BIT May 29, 1991 Y
Turkey-Tunisia BIT Dec. 27, 2017 N
Turkey-Sudan BIT Dec. 19, 1999 N
Turkey-Sudan BIT Apr. 30, 2014 N
Turkey-Nigeria BIT Oct. 8, 1996 N
Turkey-Nigeria BIT Feb. 2, 2011 N
Source: Author's Compilation from Information Available on
UNCTAD's Website5 5 4
2. Consultation and Treaty Review
Turkey and countries in Africa could consider reviewing their
different BITs with a view to addressing perceived flaws and possibly
amending relevant clauses. The bad news is that, with the exception
of the Turkey-Kenya BIT, most BITs that Turkey has concluded with
countries in Africa do not provide for periodic meetings of contracting
parties nor do they provide for , consultation upon request.555
Furthermore, although the Turkey-Kenya BIT provides for
consultation between the contracting parties, it does not mandate
consultation, and it does not spell out the modalities for
consultation.55 6 In this regard, Article 11 of the Turkey-Kenya BIT is
very different from Articles 36(1) and (2) of the India-Belarus BIT,
which address the issue of consultation in clear detail. A side-by-side
comparison of the two provisions is as follows:




556. Turkey-Kenya BIT, supra note 65, at art. 11.
1026 [VOL. 52: 949
EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES AND INVESTMENT LAW
Turkey-Kenya BIT India-Belarus BIT (2018)




shall, at the request of
either Contracting Party,
hold consultations for the
purpose of reviewing the
implementation of this
Agreement and studying
any issue that may arise
from this Agreement. Such
consultations shall be held
between the competent
authorities of the
Contracting Parties in a




36.1 Either Party may
request, and the other Party
shall promptly agree to,
consultations in good faith
on any issue regarding the
interpretation, application,
implementation, execution
or any other matter









(iv) subject to Article 30,
addressing disputes arising
under Chapter IV of this
Treaty or any other disputes
arising out of investment.
36.2 Further to
consultations under this
Article, the Parties may take
any action as they may
jointly decide, including
making and adopting rules
supplementing the
applicable arbitral rules
under Chapter IV or
Chapter V of this Treaty,
issuing binding
interpretations of this
Treaty, and adopting joint
measures in order to
557. Id.
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improve the effectiveness of
this Treaty.558
In addition to providing for consultation, recent BITs provide for
the periodic meetings of contracting parties. Consider Article 36(3) of
the India-Belarus BIT (2018), which stipulates: "The representatives
of the Parties shall meet every five years after the entry into force of
this Treaty to consult and review the operation and effectiveness of
this Treaty as may be necessary."5 5 9
3. Treaty Amendment
The BITs between Turkey and countries in Africa can be
amended in accordance with international law. Pursuant to Article 39
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "[a] treaty may be
amended by agreement between the parties."560 Whether a treaty can
be amended and the process of amending the treaty are issues that
are typically addressed in a treaty. Most of the BITs that Turkey has
concluded with countries in Africa explicitly provide for treaty
amendment (See Annex D). Turkey's BIT with Gambia,56 1
Cameroon,562 and Kenya563 all address treaty amendment. A common
formulation of the amendment clause is found in Article 13(3) of the
Turkey-Kenya BIT, which states "[t]his Agreement may be amended
by mutual written consent of the Contracting Parties at any time."564
To date, no country in Africa has recorded any amendments to any of
the BITs involving Turkey.
4. Treaty Replacement
Treaty replacement is an option for a state unhappy with a
particular treaty. Treaty replacement essentially involves
terminating an old treaty and renegotiating a new treaty.
Historically, BIT replacement occurred rarely and infrequently.5 6 5
558. India-Belarus BIT, supra note 380, at art. 36.3.
559. Id. at art. 36.2.
560. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 447, at art. 39.
561. Turkey-Gambia, supra note 63, at art. 13(3).
562. Turkey-Cameroon BIT, supra note 61, at art. 12(3).
563. Turkey-Kenya BIT, supra note 65, at art. 13(4).
564. Id.
565. Kathryn Gordon & Joachim Pohl, Investment Treaties Over Time - Treaty
Practice and Interpretation in a Changing World, 2 OECD WORKING PAPERS ON INT'L
INV. 4, 36 (2015), http://www.oecd.org/industry/inv/investment-policy/WP-2015-02.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N79P-GEY6] (archived Oct. 9, 2019) (observing that treaty
replacements have not been a major channel used by countries seeking to change the
way their treaties are interpreted and that this may reflect the high political and
economic costs of treaty renegotiation and possibly the difficulty in getting both treaty
partners to agree to a replacement).
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However, in recent years, more and more states are resorting to
treaty replacement.566 In short, recently, "the emphasis of treaty
negotiations has shifted somewhat to replacing older treaties and
away from creating treaties with countries with which no previous
treaty relation existed."5 67 Surprisingly, even when African countries
conclude new treaties, presumably to replace older agreements, they
often do not appear to be in any hurry to ratify the new treaties.
Although Turkey and Tunisia concluded their first BIT on May 29,
1999, and their second BIT on December 27, 2017, only the 1999 BIT
is in force.5 68 Overall, as previously discussed above, Turkey has
negotiated new BITs with three countries in Africa-Nigeria, Sudan,
and Tunisia-but presently none of these new agreements have
entered into force.569
VII. REFORMING TURKEY-AFRICA BITS: COMPLICATING POLICY
FACTORS PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A growing number of countries are reforming their BITs and
other investment treaties to make them more oriented towards
sustainable development.570 Countries are undertaking reform
because it is increasingly recognized that international investment
agreements "are concluded in a specific historic, economic and social
context and respond to the then existing needs and challenges" and
that today there is a need to design treaties that respond to new
challenges.5 71 Indeed, "[i]n the last ten years, the need for systematic
reform of the global international investment agreements . . . regime
has become increasingly evident."572 UNCTAD estimates that "since
2012, over 150 countries have undertaken at least one reform action
in the pursuit of sustainable development-oriented HAs and most
new treaties contain key reform elements." 573 To UNCTAD, reform of
international investment agreement has made significant progress
and has entered the mainstream of international investment
566. Id.
567. Id.
568. Investment Policy Hub - Turkey, supra note 1.
569. Id.
570. See generally UNCTAD's REFORM PACKAGE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT REGIME, supra note 30.
571. Id. at 14.
572. Id. at 7 (observing that as more than half a century has passed since the
first BIT was concluded, it is no surprise that BITs have gone through a significant
evolutionary process during this period and that today they face a new context and new
challenges).
573. Id. at 4.
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policymaking.574 This begs several questions: Will countries in Africa
press Turkey to address perceived shortcomings in Turkey-Africa
BITs? If pressed, is Turkey likely to agree to improve the BITs that it
has concluded with countries in Africa? What policy and practical
considerations are likely to affect the Turkey-Africa BIT regime now
and in the future? The policy and practical considerations that shape
Turkey-Africa relations and are likely to influence any discussions
about possible reform of Turkey-Africa BITs are analyzed in this
Part.
A. Key Policy Considerations that Shape Turykey-Africa BIT Regime
A number of policy considerations are likely to shape the
dynamics of Turkey-Africa BITs now and in the future. Key among
these factors are: Turkey's desire to be seen as a friend of Africa,5 7 5
Turkey's membership in the Council of Europe,576 Turkey's own self-
interest and possible pressure from Turkish investors and
businesses,5 77 Turkey's ability or inability to deliver on many of its
promises to countries in Africa,5 78 and Turkey's so-called mosque-
building diplomacy that is raising serious concerns and critiques.579
1. Turkey's Desire to Be Seen as Africa's "Friend"
Turkey is clearly casting herself as a true friend of Africa.58 0
According to the "talking points" for a Turkey-Africa Partnership
High Level Officials Meeting, in 2013, "Turkey considers herself a full
member of the AU, and it is for this very reason that Turkey
formulates her African policies in line with the decisions and
declarations of the AU." 5 8 1 In a 2014 speech, Erdogan declared that
all sides had mutually completed the opening up process and that it
574. Id.
575. See infra Part VII.(A)(1).
576. See infra Part VII.(A)(2).
577. See infra Part VII.(A)(3).
578. See infra Part VII.(A)(4).
579. See infra Part VII.(A)(5).
580. See Richaed Gueli & Oguzhan Kase, Turkey Ready to Befriend Africa,
SUNDAY INDEP. (Feb. 10, 2008, 4:24 PM), http://www.iol.co.za/news/world/turkey-ready-
to-befriend-africa-1.388625 [https://perma.cc/AU53-MRNE] (archived Sept. 11, 2019)
(written after the authors' participation in the third International Turkish-African
Congress in December 2007); Recep Tayyip Erdokan, Turkey: Africa's Friend,
Compatriot, and Partner, AL JAZEERA (June 1, 2016), http://www.aljazeera.com/in
depth/opinion/2016/06/turkey-africa-friend-compatriot-partner-160601070207148.htm
[https://perma.cc/HR8E-4RQM] (archived Sept. 11, 2019).
581. Turkey-Africa Partnership High Level Officials Meeting (Talking Points),
supra note 114.
1030 [VOL. 52:949
EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES AND INVESTMENT LAW
was "now necessary to move to a new and more advanced stage based
on equal partnership."5 8 2 As Erdokan put it:
At this point, I would like to point out that we are ready to stand by and
execute a more efficient and a deeper cooperation especially in priority areas of
African Union and its member countries such as agriculture, energy, health,
education, small and medium-sized enterprises, employment, promotion of
investment, energy and transport. As highlighted in the theme of the Summit,
we will walk together and resolutely, towards a new partnership model on the
path to development and integration.
58 3
The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mevlift Qavugoklu, has
also echoed the promises of solidarity, equal partnership, a win-win
outcome, and mutual benefit.M "Our approach to Africa is based on
transparent, long-termed, and strategic partnership," the Turkish
Minister of Foreign Affairs reiterated in a 2018 speech given in
celebration of Africa Day.5 85 "As I mark the Africa Day with joy, I
underline Turkey's commitment to our partnership with Africa based
on the principles of equality, partnership, solidarity, sustainability,
and mutual respect," Mevlfit Qavugoglu stated in his 2018 speech.586
According to Qavugoklu:
The continent has the aspiration to take strides across all Sustainable
Development Goals. Africa's aspirations include not only eliminating absolute
poverty, but also reducing inequality, offering a wealth of valuable education
opportunities to all and reinforcing good governance as the norm . . . We have
every reason to be proud a partner of the African nations. Turkey's engagement
is based on building lasting relationships. Our principal purpose is to establish
deep-rooted cooperation with our African counterparts in a manner that is
sustainable and mutually productive.
58 7
2. Turkey's Membership in the Council of Europe
As a member of the Council of Europe, Turkey is obliged to abide
by the principles of the organization and to promote the
582. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President of the Republic of Turk., Speech at the
Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit (Nov. 21, 2014) (transcript available at Turkey's
Ministry of Foreign Affairs website).
583. Id.
584. Mev1it Qavugoflu, How Thrkey and Afica ar Bildng a Solid Partnership, CITIZEN
(May 25, 2018), http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/oped/-How-Turkey-and-Africa-are-Building-a-
Solid-Partnership/1840568-4579932-101vywp/index.html [https://perma.cclNC57-XJC7]
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organization's agenda.5 8 8 Human rights and sustainable development
are high on the agenda of the Council of Europe.5 8 9 In a 2015 letter to
then-Secretary General of the United Nations Ban Ki-Moon, the
Council of Europe Secretary General, Thorbjorn Jagland, observed
that "[t]he Council of Europe is an organization founded on the
universal values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Our
contribution must therefore focus on these values. They are not only
values in their own right, but important factors of sustainability for
any societal model."5 90 Sustainable development also features
prominently in the agenda and programs of the Council of Europe.591
The Council of Europe is addressing issues at the intersection of
business and human rights. In policy instruments, such as the
Declaration (16 April 2014) of the Committee of Ministers supporting
the UN Guiding Principles5 9 2 and Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)3
on Human Rights and Business,5 9 3 the organization calls on member
states to consider the human rights impact of the trade and
investment agreements that they negotiate and sign and to take
appropriate steps, including through the incorporation of human
588. See 47 Member States, COUNCIL OF EUR.,
https://www.coe.int/enl/web/portal/47-members-states (last visited Sept. 11, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/W7WH-3RHH] (archived Sept. 11, 2019) (Turkey became the
thirteenth member of the Council of Europe on Apr. 13, 1950).
589. See Council of Europe Contribution to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development Goals, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://www.coe.intlen/web/un-
agenda-2030/home (last visited Sept. 11, 2019) [https://perma.cclAA62-7GVT] (archived
Sept. 11, 2019) (observing that "With its global and overarching political approach, UN
Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development has been highly relevant for the Council of
Europe, which has, from the outset, been contributing to the process which led to the
adoption of Agenda 2030.").
590. Letter from Thorbjorn Jaglad, Sec'y-Gen. of the Council of Eur., to Ban Ki-
Moon, U.N. Sec'y-Gen., on the Council of Europe's contribution to the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development (May 29, 2015); see also SEC'Y-GEN. OF THE COUNCIL OF
EUR., STATE OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW: POPULISM - How
STRONG ARE EUROPE'S CHECKS AND BALANCES? (Council of Eur. 2017).
591. See COUNCIL OF EUR., ENDING ALL FORMS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN
BY 2030: THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE 2030 AGENDA AND THE
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS (2017); Letter from Thorbjorn Jaglad, Sec'y-Gen.
of the Council of Eur., to Ant6nio Guterres, U.N. Sec'y-Gen., on the Council of Europe's
Contribution to the U.N. 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (May 17, 2017) (on
file with author); Letter from Amina J. Mohammed, Deputy Sec'y-Gen. of the U.N., to
Thorbjorn Jaglad, Sec'y-Gen. of the Council of Eur., on the Council of Europe's
contribution to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (May 8, 2019).
592. Comm. of Ministers, Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on the UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, COUNCIL OF EUR. (Apr. 16, 2014),
https://www.coe.intlen/web/human-rights-intergovernmental-cooperation/work-
completed/human-rights-and-business [https://perma.cclSH97-SPCY] (archived Sept.
11, 2019).
593. Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)3 of the Committee of
Ministers to Member States on Human Rights and Business, COUNCIL OF EUR. (Mar. 2,
2016), https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result -details.aspx?ObjectD=09000016805clad4
[https://perma.cc/HJ53-J366] (archived Sept. 11, 2019).
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rights clauses, to mitigate and address identified risks of adverse
impacts on human rights.594
3. Turkey's Self-Interest
Western nations, in their role as capital exporters, relied heavily
on BITs to protect the interest of their investors in overseas
markets.5 95 Today, as emerging market economies increasingly
export capital to foreign markets, it is not surprising that they are
turning to BITs to protect the interest of their investors.
596 With
growing investments in Africa and other overseas markets, Ankara is
clearly under pressure to protect its investors and investment and is,
in turn, putting pressure on new partners to conclude BITs.
59 7 During
his visit to Algeria, Erdogan reportedly "praised the good relations
between Algeria and Turkey, but put pressure on the topic of
investment protection."59 8 According to the report, Erdoaan argued
"that with the help of a bilateral agreement that secures investments
in Algeria, trade between the two countries could increase to more
than double in the coming years."59 9 The main purposes of Turkey's
BIT programs are to increase the bilateral flows of capital and
technology, and to provide protection to the investments of
international investors in Turkey as well as Turkish investors
abroad.600
594. Id.
595. See, e.g., Bilateral Investment Treaties, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties (last
visited Sept. 11, 2019) [https://perma.cc/9644-F5LP] (archived Sept. 11, 2019)
(explaining that "The U.S. bilateral investment treaty (BIT) program helps to protect
private investment, to develop market-oriented policies in partner countries, and to
promote U.S. exports.").
596. Author's assessment is based on recent BIT practice of countries like
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Brazil.
597. Turkey has negotiated a lot of BITs in recent years. In 2018 alone, Turkey
negotiated eight BITs with diverse partners including: Serbia (Jan. 31, 2018), Belarus
(Feb. 14, 2018), Mali (Mar. 2, 2018), Mauritania (Feb. 28, 2018), Cambodia (Oct. 21,
2018), Krygyzstan (Apr. 9, 2018), Lithuania (Aug. 28, 2018), and Zambia (July 28,
2018). Turkey also concluded a BIT with Palestine, on Sept. 5, 2018). See Investment
Policy Hub - Turkey, supra note 1; see also Jan Philipp Wilhelm, Turkey's Erdogan
Seeks More Influence in Africa, DEUSTCHE WELL (Mar. 2, 2018),
https://www.dw.com/en/turkeys-erdogan-seeks-more-influence-in-africa/a-
42 7 88 010
[https://perma.cc/779A-J3W3] (archived Aug. 18, 2019).
598. Wilhelm, supra note 597.
599. Id.
600. See Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 266 ("[T]he main purposes of
Turkey's BIT program are to increase the bilateral flows of capital and technology, and
provide protection to the investments of international investors in Turkey well as
Turkish investors abroad against non-commercial risks in the framework of
international law.").
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4. Ankara Ability or Inability to Deliver on Its Many Promises to
Countries in Africa
Whether countries in Africa are willing and able to press Turkey
on the BIT issue will depend on whether Ankara can deliver on its
promises of aid to the continent. Arguably, some African.leaders are
apt to ignore flaws in investment agreements if they believe that they
can secure other benefits from Turkey. Will Erdokan's current
excursion to Africa deliver the desired outcome for all actors, and
what happens if it does not?6 0 1
The long-term sustainability of Turkey's humanitarian
engagement in Africa is questioned in some circles.602 Experts believe
that Turkey's primary challenge "will be sustaining its lofty
ambitions in Africa." 603 According to Alex Vines and Daragh Neville,
"[d]espite significant rhetoric, the economic impact has been
limited.604 Although bilateral trade reached $19.5 billion in 2015, a
threefold increase in volume compared to 2003, Africa's share of
Turkey's total global trade remains minimal."605 Vines and Neville
add:
Turkey's relatively slow progress, however, has been criticized by African
leaders. At the second Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit in Equatorial Guinea
in 2014, Nkosazana Diamini-Zuma, chair of the African Union Commission,
noted: 'Many of the outcomes of the first Africa-Turkey summit are yet to be
realized." This inertia has had real-world implications: while Turkey received
the support of all but two African countries in its bid for a non-permanent seat
on the U.N. Security Council in 2009-10, such support was not forthcoming in a
subsequent and ultimately unsuccessful bid in 2015-2016.606
5. Competition for Capital From Emerging Markets
African countries are not the only countries seeking to increase
their FDI inflow, nor are they the only countries trying to attract
capital from emerging market economies.607 The intense competition
601. See Neville & Vines, supra note 203 ("It remains to be seen whether
Erdokan's current excursion to Africa will deliver the desired outcome for all actors.").
602. Some scholars have pointed out a major gap between Turkey's mounting aid
expenditures and its long-term capacity. In a 2014 report, the Graduate Institute of
Geneva observed that "As with most other emerging economies, Turkey's economic
growth is not yet sustained and is vulnerable to global economic developments," and
concluded that "Given the current level of development within Turkey, it is safe to
assume that an economic decline would immediately affect the scope of Turkish
humanitarian donorship." See Andrea Binder, The Shape and Sustainability of
Turkey's Booming Humanitarian Assistance, 5 INT'L DEV. POL'Y 1, 1 35 (2014).




607. See generally McKinsey & Co., The Tough Competitors in Emerging Market,
MCKINSEY Q. (Mar. 2019), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-
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for capital from emerging market economies may make it more
challenging for countries in Africa to press Ankara to address
perceived flaws in their BITs.608 Turkey is courting countries in
Africa at the same time that it is courting countries in Asia, the
Caucuses, and Latin America.609 As one observer put it, "[w]ith a
strong impetus coming from the business associations that represent
the private sector, Turkey has introduced new campaigns to bolster
its economic and trade ties with Africa, Latin America and East
Asia."610
6. Disturbing Questions that Critics May Dare to Ask
The real motives behind Ankara's interest in Africa and
generosity to countries in the region is an issue that critics are
wondering about.611 Questions are also increasingly asked about the
effectiveness of Turkey's engagement in Africa.
612
Ankara's apparent Pan-Islamic inclination is a concern in some
quarters. In 2006, the Religious Leaders Meeting of African Muslim
corporate-finance/our-insights/the-tougher-competitors-in-emerging- markets
[https://perma.cc/8R5J-P52X] (archived Aug. 18, 2019); Jonathan Woetzel et al., The
Best-Performing Emerging Economies Emphasize Competition, HARV. Bus. REV. (Sept.
17, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/09/the-best-performing-emerging-economies-emphasize-
competition [https://perma.cc/9UXW-XCM3] (archived Aug. 18, 2019).
608. McKinsey & Co., supra note 607; Woetzel et al., supra note 607.
609. Sadik Unay, Turkey's Emerging Power Politics in Latin America, DAILY
SABAH (Feb. 14, 2015), https://www.dailysabah.com/columns/sadik-unay/
2 015/02 /1 4 /
turkeys-emerging-power-politics-in-latin-america [https://perma.cc/36G3-BLQW]
(archived Aug. 18, 2019); Juan Vagni, Amdrica Latina y el mundo drabe: un
acercamiento desde la di-plomacia puiblica y la cooperaci6n cultural, FLACSO-ISA




Oct. 9, 2019; see also Ariel Gonzalez & Huseyin Zengin, A Decade of Opening: Turkey's
New International Role in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, 3 TIEMPO
DEVOTADO 262 (2016); Ariel Gonzalez Levaggi, Turkey and Latin America: A New
Horizon for a Strategic Relationship, 18 PERCEPTIONS 99 (2013); Meliha Altunisik, The
Turkish Model and Democratization in the Middle East, 27 ARAB STUD. Q. 45, 45
(2005); Meliha Altunisik, The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey's Soft Power in the
Middle East, 10 INSIGHT TURK. 41, 41 (2008); Deha Erpek, Turkey and the Least
Developed Countries: A New Partnership, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPUBLIC OF
TURK., http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-and-the-least-developed-countries_--a-new-
partnership.tr.mfa (last visited Oct. 9, 2019) [https://perma.cc/7SM2-HX9F] (archived
Aug. 18, 2019).
610. Fidan, supra note 96, at 93.
611. See Omer Taspinar, Turkey's Middle East Policies Between Neo-Ottomanism
and Kemalism, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE (Oct. 7, 2008),
https://carnegieendowment.org/2008/10/07/turkey-s-middle-east-policies-between-neo-
ottomanism-and-kemalism-pub-22209 [https://perma.ccP7TX-4JW5] (archived Aug. 18,
2009); see also Mehmet Ozkan, What Drives Turkey's Involvement in Africa?, 37 REV.
AFRICAN POL. ECON. 533 (2010).
612. See Neville & Vines, supra note 203.
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Countries was held in Istanbul.613 In October 2015, the first summit
of Muslim religious leaders from the Asian and Pacific opened in
Turkey.614 In 2018, Turkey hosted the "World Muslim Minorities
Summit."6 1 5 Turkey's "mosque-building diplomacy" has been noted by
many.6 16 Some critics are concerned that the religious undertone in
Ankara's Africa policy could stoke the flames of religious intolerance
in the continent and undermine efforts to stem religious extremism in
Africa. 6 17 Abdullah Bozkurt, the Ankara Bureau Chief for Today's
Zaman, reputed to be Turkey's best-selling English daily newspaper,
has argued that "[b]ehind the fagade of trade, investment and aid
initiatives lies a sinister campaign of turning Africa into a hotbed of
Turkish Islamists who want to create proxies as leverage like they
have done in Syria, Libya and other Arab and African countries."6 1 s
In a recent article in the National Review, Michael Rubin notes
that in its outreach to countries in Africa, "Turkey has promoted
Islamist causes"619 and warns that "[a]s Turkey has invested in
Africa, it has sought to promote itself and more-extreme Islamist
interpretations at the expense of the West and the post-World War II
liberal order."620 "What Saudi Arabia was to Islamic Extremism
across the Arab world in the late 20th century, Turkey could be to
Africa in the 21st," Rubin opines. According to Rubin:
613. Ozkan & Akgiin, supra note 71, at 538.
614. First Summit of Asian, Pacific Muslims to Focus on Cooperation, DATLY
SABAH (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/2015/10/14/first-summit-of-
asian-pacific-muslims-to-focus-on-cooperation [https://perma.cc/96BV-24Z2] (archived
Aug. 18, 2019).
615. Turkey has also hosted Muslim leaders from Latin America. See Turkey's
Top Religious Body to Host Latin American Muslim Leaders, HURRIYET DAILY NEWS
(Sept. 15, 2004), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-top-religious-body-to-host-
latin-american-muslim-leaders-.aspx?pagelD=238&nlD=71736&NewsCatlD=393
[https://perma.ccl5W96-U6R8] (archived Aug. 18, 2019).
616. See, e.g., Thomas Seibert, Turkey's Mosque-Building Diplomacy, AL-
MONITOR (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/02/turkey-
mosque-building-soft-power.html [https://perma.cc/5N2Y-XQJG] (archived Aug. 18,
2019); see also STEPHEN KINZER, CRESCENT AND STAR: TURKEY BETWEEN TWO WORLDS
(Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2008).
617. See Behlil Ozkan, Turkey, Davutoglu and the Idea of Pan-Islamism, 56
SURVIVAL 119 (2014); Behlill Ozkan, Repairing the Legacy of the AKP's Pan-Islamism,
EuR. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (July 16, 2015), https://www.ecfr.eularticle/
reparing-thelegacy of the-akps-pan-islamism3068 [https://perma.cc/C8UK-QXJJ]
(archived Oct. 9, 2019).
618. Turkey's Erdogan Sowing the Seeds of Jihadist Ideology Among African
Students, TURKISH MINUTE (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.turkishminute.com/2018/03/01/
opinion-turkeys-erdogan-sowing-the-seeds-of-jihadist-ideology-among-african-students/
[https://perma.cclTZ2F-TU94] (archived Aug. 18, 2019).
619. Michael Rubin, Turkey's Africa Strategy Threatens to Breed Islamist
Extremism, NAT'L REV. (June 26, 2019, 6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/
2019/06/turkey-africa-strategy-threatens-to-breed-islamist-extremism/
[https://perma.cc/4RL5-AZCX] (archived Oct. 9, 2019).
620. Id.
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A half century ago, Saudi Arabia pumped money to extremist organizations
across the globe while, for the sake of diplomatic nicety and strategic
convenience, the United States stayed silent. Today, Turkey is doing the very
same thing, trying to radicalize a generation of Africans through a combination
of aid, anti-Western propaganda, religious indoctrination, and military
training. That the United States and Europe turn a blind eye toward Turkey's
African agenda effectively cedes to Erdogan the strategic advantage on the
second-largest continent in terms of both population and land area.
6 21
Criticism has also come from other Gulf states. Saudi Arabia's Crown
Prince Mohammed bin Salman has accused Erdokan of trying to build
an "Ottoman caliphate" in Africa.622
Some critics point to a lack of transparency and accountability in
many Turkey-Africa arrangements.623 According to Kemal Kirisci, a
senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, "[t]he greatest challenge
here is that, increasingly, Turkish humanitarian and developmental
assistance is not transparent and suffers from little
accountability."624
The effectiveness of Turkey's representational role at the G20
2015 Summit and Ankara's claim of solidarity with poor developing
countries has also been questioned.6 25 According to one editorial,
"[m]uch of the G20's 2015 progress on its development agenda
reflected processes begun before Turkey's presidency. Turkey did
little to leverage or otherwise specify these processes in terms of its
stated intent to represent low income, least developing, or SSA
countries."626 According to this editorial, "[a]side from its hosting of
the WTO Trade Ministers' meeting, Turkey failed to strategically
apply its G20 presidency . . . to engage other development platforms
on behalf of low income, least developed, and SSA countries.
627
Overall, the editorial concludes that Turkey "has yet to realize its
self-styled description as a leader of, and model for, low income, least
621. Id.
622. Erdogan trying to build new "Ottoman caliphate" - Saudi Crown Prince,
AHVAL (Mar. 7, 2018), https://ahvalnews.com/saudi-turkey/erdogan-trying-build-new-
ottoman-caliphate-saudi-crown-prince [https://perma.cc/WJ84-Q7E2] (archived Oct. 9,
2019).
623. Neville & Vines, supra note 203.
624. Ventura, supra note 119 (discussing Turkey's increasing involvement in
development assistance and criticisms of this new role).
625. G20 2015 Turkey, the Group Development Agenda, and Sub-Saharan Africa
Representation1, HEINRICH BOLL STIFTUNG (June 23, 2017), https://tr.boell.org/de/2017/
06/23/g20-2015-turkey-group-development-agenda-and-sub-saharan-africa-
representation1 [https://perma.cc/G3MH-D5SD] (archived Aug. 18, 2019).
626. Id. ("Turkey's role in the G20 was more one of continuing pre-existing
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developed, and SSA countries."628 Unfortunately, "given Turkey's
current domestic and regional challenges including those of a security
and economic nature, representation of these countries is no longer a
priority." 62 9
7. Crisis in International Investment Law and Ongoing Reform
Efforts
Across the globe government officials, 630 scholars,6 3' lawyers,63 2
and civil society organizations633 are voicing concerns about the
international investment legal regime and about bilateral investment
treaties in particular.634 Concerns have been raised regarding the
nature, content, and scope of international investment law.635 One
628. Id.
629. Id.
630. See, e.g., Press Release, European Comm'n, Improving ISDS to Prevent
Abuse- Statement by EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht on the Launch of a
Public Consultation on Investment Protection in TTIP (Mar. 27, 2014).
631. In 2015, law professors wrote several open letters to members of Congress
urging them to omit ISDS from the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership ("TTIP"). See, e.g., Open letter by the
Alliance for Justice, to Majority Leader McConnell, Minority Leader Reid, Speaker
Boehner, Minority Leader Pelosi, and Ambassador Froman (Mar. 2015) (on file with
author) (expressing opposition to the inclusion of Investor-State Dispute Settlement
(ISDS) provisions in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP)).
632. An Open Letter From Lawyers to the Negotiation of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Urging the Rejection of Investor-State Dispute Settlement, TPP LEGAL (May
8, 2012), http://tpplegal.wordpress.com/open-letter/ [https://perma.cc/892P-7BMH]
(archived Aug. 18, 2019).
633. See generally FABIAN FLUES, THE MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT COURT
LOCKING IN ISDS: TEN REASONS WHY THE EU's PROPOSAL FOR A MULTILATERAL
INVESTMENT COURT DOESN'T FIX A FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED SYSTEM (2017);
EBERHARDT & OLIVET, supra note 436.
634. Australia-Uruguay BIT, supra note 536.
635. In a March 7, 2019 letter to the UNCITRAL Working Group, seven
independent human rights experts appointed and mandated by the United Nations
Human Rights Council to report and advise on human rights issues from a thematic or
country-specific perspective, stressed their continuing conting concern regarding the
content and effect of international investment agreements. The letter noted stressed
that international investment agreements "have often proved to be incompatible with
international human rights law and the rule of law." The letter was authored by: (i) the
Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other
business enterprises; (ii) the Special Rapporteur on the right to development; (iii) the
Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment
of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable nvironment; (iv) the Independent Expert on
the effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States
on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural
rights; (v) the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples; (vi) the
Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international
order; and (vii) the Special Rapporteur on the human rights to safe drinking water and
sanitation. See Lettter from Independent Human Rights Experts Appointed and
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strand of criticism focuses on perceived imbalances in investment
treaties.636 Critics argue that most BITs are unbalanced in the sense
that they focus on investor protection but not on investor obligation,
and they focus on the obligation of host states but not on the rights of
host communities.637 Critics are also concerned that BITs restrict
domestic policy space and make it extremely difficult for host states
to regulate in the public interest.
6 38 While these concerns are
prompting some countries to withdraw from the system altogether,
639
most countries are simply focusing their attention on reforming and
updating their BITs.640 After a multiyear BIT review, India revamped
its IIA regime. In 2016, India released a new Model BIT.
64 1 Recent
BITs have a tendency to contain provisions designed to preserve
domestic policy space and to balance the rights and obligations of
investors vis-&-vis those of host states.
6 42 Intergovernmental
organizations such as UNCTAD are also calling for reform of
international investment policy.64
3 Reform elements found in recent
BITs but not typically found in Turkey-Africa BITs include:
* A security exception;644
* A balance of payment exception;645
Mandated by the U.N. Human Rights Council to the UNCITRAL Working Group 1-2
(Mar. 7, 2019) (on file with U.N. Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights).
636. Id.
637. Id.
638. Id. at 2 (noting that IIAs pose risks to the regulatory space required by
States to comply with their international human rights obligations as well as to
achieve the Sustainable Development Goals). Following a review of South Africa's
BITs, South Africa's Department of Trade and Industry concluded that: "Major issues
of concern for developing countries are not being addressed in the BIT negotiating
processes.... New investment rules in BITs prevent developing country governments
from requiring foreign companies to transfer technology, train local workers, or source
inputs locally. Under such conditions, investment fails to encourage or enhance
sustainable development." REPUBLIC S. AFR., DEP'T OF TRADE & INDUS., BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATY POLICY FRAMEWORK REVIEW: GOVERNMENT POSITION PAPER 1, 11
(2009).
639. Indonesia is an example of a country that has terminated most of its BITs
and is exploring reform options. See Arif Havas Oegroseno, Revamping Bilateral
Treaties, JAKARTA POST, July 7, 2014, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/
2 014/07 /
07/revamping-bilateral-treaties.html [https://perma.cc/TXE8-JSG8] (archived Aug. 18,
2019) [hereinafter, Oegroseno, Revamping Bilateral Treaties]; see also Oegroseno,
Indonesia's Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 544.
640. See, e.g., Netherlands Model BIT, supra note 529. On October 19, 2018, the
Dutch government adopted Netherland's new model BIT.
641. See 2016 Indian Model BIT, supra note 29; see also Ilge & Singh, supra note
29.
642. See generally UNCTAD's REFORM PACKAGE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT REGIME, supra note 30 (discussing reform of international investment
agreements and noting that a growing number of countries are engaging in reform).
643. See generally WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2012: TOWARDS A NEW
GENERATION OF INVESTMENT POLICIES, supra note 31.
644. See, e.g., Kazakhstan-Singapore BIT, supra note 512, at art. 20.
645. See, e.g., id. at art. 9.
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* Limits on the national treatment guarantee through the
protection of sensitive sectors;646
* Clarification of vague obligations such as the obligation to
accord foreign investors "full protection and security";647 and
* A clause on investor responsibility and corporate social
responsibility.6 48
In a BIT, a security exception allows contracting parties to apply
measures they consider necessary to protect their essential security




Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to:
(a) require a Party to furnish any information, the disclosure of which it
considers contrary to its essential security interests; or
(b) preclude a Party from applying measures that it considers necessary for the
fulfilment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of
international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security
interests.
6 5 0
In a growing number of BITs, policy space is provided to enable
host states to address serious balance-of-payments crises and
external financial difficulties. For example, Article 9 of the
Singapore-Kazakhstan BIT Provides:
ARTICLE 9
RESTRICTIONS TO SAFEGUARD THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
In the event of serious balance-of-payments and external financial difficulties
or threat thereof, a Party may adopt or maintain restrictions on payments or
transfers related to investments. It is recognised that particular pressures on
the balance of payments of the State of a Party in the process of economic
development may necessitate the use of restrictions to ensure, inter alia, the
646. See, e.g., id. at art. 4.
647. See, e.g., Kazakhstan-Singapore BIT, supra note 512, at art. 3.
648. See, e.g., Brazil-UAE BIT, supra note 449, at art. 15; Australia-Hong Kong
BIT, supra note 470, at art. 16.
649. See, e.g., India-Belarus BIT, supra note 380, at art. 33.
650. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the
Government of the Republic of Singapore on the Promotion and Mutual Protection of
Investments, Kaz.-Sing., Nov. 21, 2018, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/
international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5700/download [https://perma.cc/
U6WX-7FFK] (archived Oct. 21, 2019) [hereinafter Singapore-Kazakhstan BIT].
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maintenance of a level of financial reserves adequate for the implementation of
its programme of economic development.
6 51
Even while guaranteeing national treatment, in a growing
number of recent BITs, contracting states reserve the right to exclude
sensitive sectors of the economy from the national treatment




1. Each Party shall accord to investors of the State of the other Party and their
investments treatment no less favorable than a treatment which it accords to
investors of its State and their investments concerning the management,
maintenance, use, enjoyment or any other form of disposition of investments
unless otherwise provided in its national legislation, governmental policies and
guidelines.
2. Each Party in accordance with its national legislation, governmental policies
and guidelines reserves the right to identify the sensitive sectors of economy
and/ or other related activities that would be limited or excluded from the scope
of this obligation.6 5
3
Compare the National Treatment clause in the Kazakhstan-
Singapore BIT (2018) with the national treatment clause in Turkey-
Rwanda BIT (2016):
Kazakhstan-Sing. BIT (2018) Turkey-Rwanda BIT (2016)
Article 4 Article 4
National Treatment Treatment of Investments
1. Each Party shall accord to 2. Each Contracting Party shall
investors of the State of the other accord to these investments, once
Party and their investments established, treatment no less
treatment no less favorable than favourable than that accorded in
a treatment which it accords to like circumstances to
investors of its State and their investments of its investors or to
651. Id.
652. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of
Kazakhstan and the Government of the United Arab Emirates on Promotion and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, art. 4(2), Kaz.-U.A.E., Mar. 24, 2018,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-
files/5733/download [https://perma.cc/5G43-WUUC] (archived Sept. 11, 2019)
[hereinafter Kazakhstan-UAE BIT] ("The Contracting Party in accordance with its
national legislation shall reserve the right to identify the sensitive sectors of economy
and/ or other related activities that shall be limited or excluded.").
653. Id. at art. 4.
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investments concerning the investments of investors of any
management, maintenance, use, third State, whichever is the
enjoyment or any other form of most favourable, as regards the
disposition of investments unless management, maintenance, use,
otherwise provided in its national operation, enjoyment, extension,
legislation, governmental policies sale, liquidation or disposal of the
and guidelines. investment.655
2. Each Party in accordance with
its national legislation,
governmental policies and
guidelines reserves the right to
identify the sensitive sectors of
economy and/ or other related
activities that would be limited or
excluded from the scope of this
obligation.654
In recent BITs, contracting states are taking care to limit legal
liability by clarifying the meaning of vague termS.656 For example,
the obligation on host states to offer investors "full protection and
security" is increasingly defined and clarified.65 7 Article 3 of the
Kazakhstan-UAE BIT is an example:
Article 3
Protection of investments
1. Investments by investors of either Contracting Party and returns shall enjoy
full protection and security in the territory of the other Contracting Party in a
manner consistent with national legislation and this Agreement and applicable
rules of international law...
2. Full protection and security shall not create any obligation to the
Contracting Party other than what the host state accords to its own nationals
and other aliens.6 5 8
Compared to the "full protection and security" obligation in the
Turkey-Rwanda BIT, Article 3 of the India-Belarus BIT (2018) is
more carefully worded:
654. See Kazakhstan-Singapore BIT, supra note 512, art. 4.
655. See Rwanda-Turkey BIT, supra note 66, art. 4.
656. UNCTAD's REFORM PACKAGE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
REGIME, supra note 30, at 33-47 (discussing strategies countries are using to limit
exposure to legal risks associated with BITs).
657. Id.
658. Kazakhstan-UAE BIT, supra note 652, at art. 3.
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659. Rwanda-Turkey BIT, supra note 66, at art. 3.2.
660. India-Belarus BIT, supra note 380, at art. 3.2.
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Finally, some recent investment agreements explicitly address
corporate social responsibility. Article 9 of the Brazil-Malawi
Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement is titled
"Corporate Social Responsibility.",66  Article 9 stipulates that
investors and their investment "shall strive to achieve the highest
possible level of contribution to the sustainable development of the
Host Party and the local community, through the adoption of a high
degree of socially responsible practices, based on the voluntary
principles and standards set out in [the] Agreement."6 62 Investors are
required to use their best efforts to, inter alia, "[r]espect the human
rights of those involved in the companies' activities, consistent with
the international obligations and commitments of the Host Party";663
"[e]ncourage the strengthening of local capacities building through
close cooperation with the local community";664 "[e]ncourage the
development of human capital, especially by creating employment
opportunities and facilitating access of workers to professional
training"; 665 and "[s]upport and maintain good corporate governance
principles, and develop and apply good practices of corporate
governance."66 6
B. Practical Considerations
1. Turkey's Immense Experience with BITs
Compared to countries in Africa, Turkey is not a newcomer to
BITs. Turkey signed its first BIT in 1962 with Germany.66 7 Today
Turkey has concluded about one hundered and twenty-eight BITs and
an additional twenty-one treaties with investment provisions
(TIPs).668 Turkey has signed BITs with developed as well as
developing countries.66 9 Compared to most African countries, Turkey
has a dynamic BIT program670 and has its own Model BIT. 671 The
661. Investment Cooperation and Facilitation Agreement Between the
Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic of Malawi, Braz.-Malawi, art. 9, June
26, 2015, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/
treaty-files/4715/download [https://perma.cclUQE8-QYNZ] (archived Oct. 9, 2019).
662. Id. at art. 9(1).
663. Id. at art. 9(2)(b).
664. Id. at art. 9(2)(c).
665. Id. at art. 9(2)(d).
666. Id. at art. 9(2)(f).
667. See Investment Policy Hub - Turkey, supra note 1 (indicating that Turkey's
first BIT was concluded in 1962, with Germany).
668. Id.
669. Id.
670. Id. ("Turkey also follows a dynamic program to conclude new BITs and
modify the old ones in line with the new developments in global investment law.").
671. According to a 2011 PowerPoint presentation of the Ministry of Economy,
Republic of Turkey, 'Turkey has its own BIT Model text, and updates it regularly to
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implications for countries in Africa are evident. To negotiate from the
position of strength, countries in Africa must be prepared and use
experts experienced in international investment law and treaty
making.
2. Turkey's Deployment of Soft Power in the African Continent
Turkey's deployment of soft power in Africa is a complicating
factor.672 Turkey-Africa BITs are negotiated and concluded against
the backdrop of increased display of Turkish soft power in the
continent.673 Turkey's increased deployment of soft power can make it
difficult for African leaders to press Ankara when it comes to
renegotiating BITs.6 74 In October 2017, Turkey opened its largest
overseas military base in Mogadishu, Somalia.6 75 In January 2017,
Erdogan, announced plans to open an embassy in every African
capital.676 "Our goal is to have embassies in all African countries, and
turn Africa into a continent with which we have much closer bilateral
ties," Erdoaan declared in January 2017, before departing for his
four-day Africa tour which included stops in Tanzania, Mozambique,
and Madagascar.677
3. Lack of Coordination on the African Side
Most countries in Africa lack a coherent international
investment policy and most lack a well-defined BIT strategy.
6 78 In
their engagement with Turkey, there is no evidence that African
countries have a coordinated or synchronized approach to the BITs
meet international standards as well as reflect its experience gained through
international arbitration cases involving Turkey." Hasan Aslan Akpinar, Bilateral
Treaties, MINISTRY OF ECON., REPUBLIC OF TURK. (Oct. 13, 2011).
672. See Kalm, supra note 197, at 7 (offering a definition of soft power and
explaining why it could explain Turkey's "success" in Africa).
673. Id.
674. Id.
675. Orhan Coskun & Abdirahman Hussein, Turkey Opens Military Base in
Mogadishu to Train Somali Soldiers, REUTERS, Sept. 30, 2017,
https://www.reuters.com/articlelus-somalia-turkey-military/turkey-opens-military-
base-in-mogadishu-to-train-somali-soldiers-idUSKCNIC50JH [https://perma.cclV3R5-
4JLA] (archived Aug. 18, 2019).
676. Andac Hongur & Izzet Taskiran, Turkey Seeks to Boost Diplomatic Ties with
Africa, ANDALOU AGENCY (Jan. 22, 2017), https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/turkey-
seeks-to-boost-diplomatic-ties-with-africa/7
3 2 4 9 9  [https://perma.cc/A35B-GNM5]
(archived Aug. 18, 2019).
677. Id.
678. Author's expert conclusion is based on her study over the years of more than
one hundred and fifty BITs involving African states. Wide disparities in the BITs of
any single country suggests that countries are willing to sign any BIT that a
negotiating partner presents.
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they are concluding or that they are negotiating against the backdrop
of continental vision and goals.6 7 9
A careful study of Turkey-Africa BITs suggests that most are
not the products of intense negotiations, but were hastily concluded to
coincide with visits of high-ranking Turkish officials to Africa.680 By
some accounts "[w]ith the exception of the year 2008, President
Erdokan [has] traveled to Africa at least once yearly since 2005."681
Since 2004, Erdokan has made about forty trips to twenty-four
countries in Africa. 682 Between February and March 2018, Erdokan
visited four African countries.68 3 Erdokan also visited six African
countries in 2017,684 seven in 2016,685 and three in 2015.686 Erdogan
is the first leader in the history of Turkey to visit twenty-three
African countries and is now among the world leaders with the most
visits to Africa. 687 From every indication, some countries in Africa
chose to reward these visits with BITs and other investment
contracts.688
Erdogan Visit by Year and Turkey-Africa BITs by Year
Year of Visit Country Visit BIT
2018 Mali Turkey-Mali BIT (2018)
2018 Mauritania Turkey-Mauritania BIT
(2018)
2017 Chad Turkey-Chad BIT (2017)
2017 Mozambique Turkey-Mozambique BIT
679. Author's expert conclusion is based on a survey of all BITs between Turkey
and countries in Africa. The similarity in the text of Turkey's BITs with countries in
Africa suggests that Turkey negotiates on the basis of a Model BIT and is the 'rule
giver' in the unfolding relationship.
680. Author's conclusion is based on a study of the relationship between
President Erdokan's visits to Africa and the dates that the different BITs that Turkey
has with countries in Africa were concluded.
681. Id.
682. President Erdogan to Embark on Four-Country Africa Tour, HURRIYET
DAILY NEWS (Feb. 24, 2018), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/president-erdogan-to-
embark-on-4-country-africa-tour-127846 [https://perma.cc/94PF-P5CC] (archived Aug.
18, 2019).
683. Id. (Algeria, Mauritania, Senegal, and Mali).
684. Id. (Sudan, Chad and Tunisia, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Madagascar).
685. Id. (Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria, and Guinea in Feb.-Mar. 2016; Kenya,
Uganda and Somalia).
686. Id. (Somalia, Ethiopia, and Djibouti).
687. Erdogan Becomes First Turkish Leader to Visit 23 African Countries, YENI
SAFAK (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.yenisafak.comlen/newslerdogan-becomes-first-
turkish-leader-to-visit-23-african-countries-2604064 [https://perma.cc/B8MV-ZUSN]
(archived Aug. 18, 2019).
688. Author's conclusion is based on a study of the relationship between
President Erdogan's visits to Africa and the dates that the different BITs that Turkey
has with countries in Africa were concluded.
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(2017)
2017 Tunisia Turkey-Tunisia BIT (2017)
2016 C6te d'Ivoire Turkey-C6te d'Ivoire BIT
(2016)
2016 Somalia Turkey-Somalia BIT (2016)
2016 Ghana Turkey-Ghana BIT (2016)
VIII. CONCLUSION
Presently, Africa-Turkey relations are growing, deepening, and
widening. From every indication, relations between Turkey and
countries in Africa have reached the stage of strategic
partnerships.689 In a little over a decade the position of Turkey in
Africa moved from that of having an "Observer Status" in the African
Union to that of becoming a "Strategic Partner" of the African
continent.690 According to the Joint Implementation Plan 2015-2019,
"[t]he relations between Africa and Turkey have reached the stage of
a mutually reinforced Strategic Partnership." In October 2018, the
African Union Commission Department of Economic Affairs and the
Turkish Embassy signed a Framework Cooperation Agreement.
691 In
October 2018, the Turkey-Africa Second Economic and Business-
Forum (Turkey-Africa II. Economic and Business Forum) was jointly
organized by the Turkish Ministry of Commerce, the African Union
Commission and DEiK under the motto of "Building a Sustainable
Future Together through investments and joint ventures."
692
689. Turkey-Partnership Overview, supra note 155; see also Chigozie Enwere &
Mesut Yilmaz, Turkey's Strategic Economic Relations with Africa: Trends and
Challenges, 1 J. ECON. & POL. ECON. 216, 221 (2014).
690. In 2005, the African Union granted Turkey an "Observer Status." See Non-
African States and Organisations Accredited to the AU, AFRICAN UNION,
https://au.intlen/organs/Non-African-States [https://perma.cc/2P87-NWL4] (archived
Aug. 18, 2019). In 2008, the AU declared Turkey a "Strategic Partner" of the African
Continent. See Africa's Strategic Partnership with Other Parts of the World, AFRICAN
UNION, https://au.int/en/partnerships/intro [https://perma.cc/6U2H-SK46] (archived
Aug. 18, 2019). The framework of Africa's strategic partnership takes four distinct
forms: (i) continent to continent partnerships; (i) continent to country partnerships
such as Africa-India, Africa-Turkey, Africa-China, and Africa-Japan; (iii) partnerships
in demand as new states or regions request additional partnerships; and (iv)
partnership with other institutions such as the Organisation of American States (OAS),
the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) the Commonwealth and La
Francophonie.
691. Press Release, African Union, Signature of the Framework Cooperation
Agreement Between the AUC Department of Economic Affairs and the Turkish Embassy
(Sept. 10, 2018) (on file with author).
692. Press Release, African Union, Africa and Turkey Hold Second Africa Turkey
Forum to Promote Cooperation Opportunities (Oct. 11, 2018) (on file with author).
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Signaling another important milestone in the Turkey-Africa
relationship, during the Turkey-Africa II. Economic and Business
Forum, the African Union Commission and the Ministry of Trade of
the Republic of Turkey signed a Memorandum of Understanding on
Trade and Investment Cooperation.693
Developed countries have had a long presence in Africa.
Following in their footsteps, emerging powers are establishing their
presence in the continent and are seeking to grow their presence.694
Although Turkey has adopted a nuanced and multitrack approach in
its engagement with countries in Africa, Turkey's engagements with
Africa are largely driven by economic considerations and are
occurring against the backdrop of renewed competition for Africa's
natural resources and geostrategic positioning by developed countries
and emerging powers alike.695 In the Joint Implementation Plan
2015-2019, all sides agreed to: "[e]xplor[e] the possibilities to support
the common objectives of the parties to expand trade and investment
volume from US$30 billion in 2013 to US$50 billion by 2019."696
Furthermore, a communique issued in February 2018 following the
Second Ministerial Review Conference of African Union-Turkey
Partnership, "noted the importance of trade and investment as key
components of relations between African countries and Turkey" and
reiterated the desire "to further strengthen economic and commercial
relations."6 97
Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdokan appears to be invested
in Africa for the long-term, although Turkey's trade and investment
in the region is presently very modest compared to its trade and
investment with other regions of the world.698 Thus far, President
Erdokan and the Justice and Development Party have been
693. Press Release, Foreign Econ. Relations Board of Turk. (DEIK, Turkish
President Erdogan Calls on Africa to do Business in Local Currency (Oct. 10, 2018) (on
file with author).
694. Judd Devermont, The World is Coming to Sub-Saharan Africa. Where is the
United States?, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INVL STUD. (Aug. 24, 2018),
https://www.csis.org/analysis/world-coming-sub-saharan-africa-where-united-states
[https://perma.ccl5BSX-JLYP] (archived Oct. 9, 2019).
695. Alexis Habiyaremye & Tank Oguzlu, Engagement with Africa: Making
Sense of Turkey's Approach in the Context of Growing East-West Rivalry, 11
ULUSLARARASI ILISKILER 65, 66 (2014) (suggesting an economic underpinning to
Turkey-Africa relations and noting that "Turkish interest in, and opening up to Africa,
came at a time when many African economies had started to enjoy relatively robust
growth rates as a result of a booming trade with China.").
696. Second Joint Implementation Plan, supra note 179, at T 6(h).
697. The Second Ministerial Review Conference of African Union: Turkey
Partnership, Communique, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPUBLIC OF TURK. (Feb.
12, 2019), http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-second-ministerial-review-conference-of-african-
union-_-turkey-partnership-en.en.mfa [https://perma.cc/ATL4-F3E3] (archived Oct. 9,
2019).
698. SHINN, supra note 8, at 17 (stating that "The breadth of Turkey's
involvement in SSA suggests that its intention is to engage for the long term.").
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instrumental in forging Turkey-Africa relations.
6 99 Whether Turkey-
Africa relations will survive any future change of government in
Turkey is anyone's guess.
70 0
In its forays into Africa, is Turkey using the same types of legal
instruments, for example BITs, that Western nations used in the past
and are still using? To the extent that Turkey is using the same legal
instruments that Western nations used in the past, is Turkey using
these instruments in the same way or are these instruments serving
a completely different purpose in unfolding relationships?
Specifically, do Turkey-Africa BITs depart markedly from the BITs
that countries in Africa concluded with Western nations? Compared
to traditional BITs, are Turkey-Africa BITs more oriented towards
sustainable development? Are the principles of solidarity, equal
partnership, a win-win outcome, and mutual benefit, which underpin
Turkey-Africa relations, reflected in the BITs? And if so, to what
degree?
First, like most Western nations, Turkey has embraced the
international investment law in general and BITs in particular.
Turkey has not shown any interest in following in the footsteps of
emerging market economies like India,
70 1 Indonesia,702 and South
Africa703 that are terminating their BITs and appear to be rejecting
the international investment law regime. In sharp contrast to many
699. Id. at 18 (noting that Erdokan has been the chief architect of Turkey's
renewed engagement in SSA).
700. Id. (predicting that while a change in government could cause Turkey to
reduce, for example, its huge political and humanitarian engagement in Somalia,
"Ankara will almost certainly continue to retain its strong commercial relations with
SSA countries" and that "business and cultural connections are too deeply embedded to
allow interest in Turkey's Africa strategy to cease.").
701. Amiti Sen, India's Bilateral Investment Pacts Under Cloud, Bus. LINE (Apr.,
9, 2017), https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/indias-bilateral-investment-
pacts-under-cloudlarticle9625580.ece [https://perma.cc/M59X-9G5V] (archived Aug. 18,
2019).
702. In March 2014, Indonesia announced publicly plans not to renew its BIT
with Netherlands but let the said treaty expire effective July 1, 2015. Subsequently,
Indonesia announced plans to let all of its sixty-seven BITs expire. Oegroseno,
Revamping Bilateral Treaties, supra note 639; see also Phuong Nguyen, Indonesia's
Foreign Policy under Jokowi: A Giant Comes Knocking, COGITASIA (Jan. 13, 2015),
http://cogitasia.com/indonesiasforeign- policy-under-jokowi-a-giant-comes-knocking/
[https://perma.cc/SK7T-KQVJ] (archived Aug. 18, 2019).
703. To date, South Africa has terminated BITs with a number of countries,
including Argentina, Austria, Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union, Denmark, France,
Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. See
International Investment Agreements Navigator-South Africa, U.N. CONFERENCE ON
TRADE & DEV., https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-
agreements/countries/195/south-africa (last visited Aug. 10, 2019) [https://perma.cc/
6M8T-FCCC] (archived Oct. 9, 2019) [hereinafter Investment Policy Hub - South
Africa]; see also Qobo & Soko, supra note 545.
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developing countries that have been critical of bilateral investment
treaties, Turkey has stepped up its investment treaty-making
practice. In the last decade, since 2009, Turkey has concluded forty-
nine known BITs with countries in diverse regions of the world.704
Second, Turkey's conception of BITs as primarily investor-
protection instruments mirrors those of most Western nations. With
its role changing from that of a capital importer to that of both a
capital importer and exporter, Turkey is clearly under pressure to
protect Turkish investors and is increasingly using BITs, not
necessarily to attract investors, but to protect Turkish investors who
are venturing into oversea markets. In years past, Turkey viewed
BITs primarily as a tool to improve domestic investment climate and
to attract foreign investment. Today, Turkey increasingly views BITs
as "the only tool that can be relied on by the Turkish entrepreneurs
investing all around the world to protect their investments and
related rights."70 5
Third, despite its avowed commitment to the principles of
solidarity, equal partnership, win-win outcomes, and mutual benefit
in Turkey-Africa relations, these principles are not reflected in the
BITs that Turkey has concluded or is concluding with countries in the
region. For the most part, these principles are only found in hortatory
instruments such as the 2008 Instabul Declaration and the 2014
Malabo Declaration.
Finally, very much like traditional BITs, Turkey-Africa BITs are
not development cooperation instruments and were not specifically
designed promote and sustainable development in host states.
However, although Turkey-Africa BITs are primarily investor-
protection instruments, they are constantly evolving and more recent
BITs appear to have been drafted with a view to striking a more
appropriate balance between investor/investment protection and
sustainable development. Indeed according to Turkey's Ministry of
Trade, "Turkey ... follows a dynamic program to conclude new BITs
and modify the old ones in line with the new developments in global
investment law."70 6 While improvements are undoubtedly called for,
recent Turkey-Africa BITs do provide some policy space for host
states.
It is up to countries in Africa to review their BITs and design
BIT programs that strike an appropriate balance between investment
and sustainable development. It is imperative that countries in Africa
approach BIT negotiations seriously and strategically. Policy
coherence is important in investment policymaking.707 It is
704. Investment Policy Hub - Turkey, supra note 1.
705. Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 266.
706. Id.
707. G20 Guiding Principles, supra note 268, at I V ("Investment policies and
other policies that impact on investment should be coherent at both the national and
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imperative that countries in Africa develop a coherent international
investment policy and ensure that the BITs that they conclude are
consistent with national, regional, and continental development goals
and strategies. For example, African Union Agenda 2063 is the
"continent's strategic framework that aims to deliver on its goal for
inclusive and sustainable development.7 08 The vision of Agenda 2063
is that of "an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its
own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international
arena."70 9 Among the "Aspirations" identified in Agenda 2063 are
those of: "A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and
sustainable development," (Aspiration 1), "An Africa of good
governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule
of law" (Aspiration 3); and "An Africa whose development is people-
driven, relying on the potential of African people, especially its
women and youth, and caring for children" (Aspiration 6).710
Although in their engagement, both sides emphasize the centrality of
the African Union Agenda 2063 as one of the guideing frameworks for
the unfolding partnershion, it is debatable and, even doubtful, that
Turkey-Africa BITs modeled as they are after traditional BITs, will
help the two sides achive their desired goals.
Countries in Africa must look beyond the charm offensive of
emerging partners and critically evaluate the values, motivations,
and strategies of each partner. This begs several questions. First,
what are Turkey's real motivations? The question is important
because as some commentators have noted, "the question of why
Turkey has shown what some consider to be an unexpected interest
in the continent still does not have a clear answer for Turkey's
African partners."711 Second, while Turkey is ready and prepared to
engage with countries in Africa, are these countries prepared and
well-equipped to engage with Turkey?712 While Turkey appears to be
ready and fully-equipped to engage with countries in Africa, most
countries in Africa appear to be ill-prepared to engage strategically
with a country like Turkey. For one thing, Turkish foreign policy
international levels and aimed at fostering investment, consistent with the objectives
of sustainable development and inclusive growth.").
708. Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want, AFRICAN UNION COMM'N,
https://www.un.org/enlafricalosaalpdflaulagenda
20 63 .pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/F2UB-RVBC] (archived Oct. 9, 2019).
709. Id.
710. Id.
711. Ali Bilgic & Daniela Nascimento, Turkey's New Focus on Africa: Causes and
Challenges, NORWEIGIAN PEACEBULDING RES. CTR. (Sept. 2014), https://repository.
lboro.ac.uk/articles/Turkey s_new focus_on_Africa-causes and-challenges/9467
2 91
[https://perma.cc/N6D5-8NZL] (archived Oct. 9, 2019).
712. Sadik Unay, Economic Diplomacy for Competitiveness: Globalization and
Turkey's New Foreign Policy, 15 PERCEPTIONS 21, 21 (2010) [hereinafter Unay,
Economic Diplomacy for Competitiveness].
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makers have an array of instruments in their tool kit that would
enable them to engage with countries in Africa from a position of
strength.71 3 For another, the suppliant position of most countries in
Africa vis-a-vis Turkey undermines their ability to engage in hard
bargaining in any trade and investment agreement. It is important
that African leaders pay careful attention to the links between
Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy and its economic diplomacy in
Africa.7 14
Turkey's claims of a win-win economic partnership need to be
routinely interrogated and Turkey's overall ambition in the continent
constantly reassessed. In a recent article, Turkey and the New
Scramble for Africa: Ottoman Designs or Unfounded Fears?, Zach
Vertin rightly notes that "[a] right-sized assessment of Turkish
ambitions and its influence in the Horn of Africa requires zoom,
medium, and wide-angle lenses" and highlights how Turkey's
regional competition with Gulf rivals may be playing out in Africa.71 5
It is imperative to examine Turkish multifaceted and nuanced
engagements in Africa. There are many questions that African
leaders must answer as they forge deeper ties with Turkey. What are
the costs and benefits of Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy in Africa?
Does Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy weaken the capacity of
African leaders to press Ankara on important trade and investment
issues? Given deep rivalry between Turkey and Gulf States such as
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, what are the
opportunity costs for Africa, of unquestioned alliance with Turkey?
It is important to move beyond Turkey's anticolonial and benevolent
partner discourse and ask some hard questions. What is in it for
countries in Africa and are the legal instruments that underpin
Turkey-Africa unfolding relationships really designed to deliver win-
win outcomes and sustainable development benefits to all sides? This
question is very important because while there are many
noneconomic factors at play, Turkey's engagement with Africa is
largely driven by economic considerationS.716 As Ali Bilgic and
Daniela Nascimento put it:
713. Gonca Biltekin & Volkan Ipek, Turkey's Foreign Policy Implementation in
Sub-Saharan Africa: A post International Approach, 49 NEw PERSPECTIVES ON TURKEY
121, 121 (2013).
714. Elem Eyrice Tepeciklioglu et al., Turkish and BRICS Engagement in Africa,
8 J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 48, 51 (2017) (observing that studies show that
Turkey's soft power initiatives in SSA "have been an important complement to its
official diplomatic and developmental efforts as well as its business and political
interests in SSA.").
715. Zach Vertin, Turkey and the New Scramble for Africa: Ottoman Designs or
Unfounded Fears?, BROOKINGS INST. (May 19, 2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/turkey-and-the-new-scramble-for-africa-ottoman-
designs-or-unfounded-fears/ [https://perma.cc/NGL8-MX4L] (archived Oct. 9, 2019).
716. Tepeciklioglu et al., supra note 713, at 49 (observing that "Turkey's
engagement with Africa is also mostly driven by economic considerations,
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Turkey's increasing involvement in Africa can be understood in terms of its
political, economic, and development aid ambitions and motivations, framed
through close economic ties with sub-Saharan countries (in the form of
diplomatic activity, trade and aid), which are not only aimed at exploiting the
sub-Saharan market, but also at establishing a Turkish presence in Africa vis-
A-vis other, mainly Western, but also Southern, donor countries.
7 1 7
An exhaustive analysis of the political economy of Turkey-Africa
relations is beyond the scope of this paper. It is too early to determine
whether Turkey's initiatives in Africa will deliver sustainable
development benefits that benefit ordinary Africans.7
1 8 This Article
suggests that countries in Africa are yet to develop a robust strategy
for engaging Turkey. Some commentators have described African
reaction to Turkey's African diplomacy as a "mixture of mild
expectation and confusion."7 19 In their BITs with Turkey, countries in
Africa have been "rule takers" rather than "rule makers" with the
result that, like traditional BITs, Turkey-Africa BITs are primarily
designed to protect capital exportes and not capital importers.
Regarding Turkey-Africa economic relations, countries in Africa
must start by educating themselves about the values and motivation
that underpin Turkey's foreign policy 720 and must pay close attention
to Turkey's foray into countries outside of Africa.
7 2 1 Countries in
Africa must also educate themselves about the role of emerging
markets and middle powers in global governance and seek to
understand the strategies of these new actors.72
2 Beyond Turkey-
predominantly by a quest for new export opportunities for Turkish companies. That is,
the Turkish government aspires to create markets for Turkish products.").
717. Bilgic & Nascimento, supra note 710, at 3.
718. Id. (observing that it is still yet to be established to what extent Turkey's
new approaches in Africa "can actually help to build up a sustainable and mutually
beneficial cooperation relationship that has a positive impact on the living conditions of
African people, or whether Turkey's new orientation towards Africa simply ends up
reflecting the old principle of 'business as usual."').
719. Mehmet Ozkan, Turkey's Rising Role in Africa, 9 TURKISH POL'Y Q. 93, 103
(2010).
720. Ibrahim Kalin, Turkish Foreign Policy: Framework, Values, and
Mechanisms, 67 INT'L J. 7, 7 (2011); see also Kemal Kirieci, The Transformation of
Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State, 40 NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
TURKEY 29, 29 (2009).
721. Paul Kubicek, Debating the Merits of the "Turkish Model" for
Democratization in the Middle East, 12 ALTERNATIVES TURKISH J. INT'L REL. 66, 66
(2013); see also T.C. Bagbakanlik Dig Ticaret Miistegarliki, Turkey Trade Development
Strategy Towards the Americas, ANKARA DTM (2006).
722. Joshua Walker, Learning Strategic Depth: Implications of Turkey's New
Foreign Policy Doctrine, 32 INSIGHT TURK. 32, 32 (2007); see also Hongying Wand &
Erik French, Middle Range Powers in Global Governance, 34 THIRD WORLD Q. 985, 985
(2013); Dmitri Trenin & Sinan Ulgen, A Place in the Sun or Fifteen Minutes of Fame?
Understanding Turkey's New Foreign Policy, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE
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Africa relations, countries in Africa must develop strategies for
engaging with emerging partners, must develop their own foreign
policy instruments, and must train and deploy a seasoned, educated,
committed, and diversified pool of actors involved in the foreign policy
domain.
[https://perma.cc/8STJ-HU93] (archived Aug. 18, 2019); Uinay, Economic Diplomacy for
Competitiveness, upra note 712.
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Annex A
Turkey-Africa Bilateral Investment Treaties: In Force Treaties
Country Status Date Date in Text
Concluded Force Available
1 Egypt In force 04/10/1996 31/07/2002 Yes
2 Ethiopia In force 16/11/2000 10/03/2005 Yes
3 Libya In force 25/11/2009 22/04/2011 Yes
4 Mauritius In force 07/02/2013 30/05/2016 No
5 Morocco In force 08/04/1997 30/05/2004 Yes
6 Senegal In force 15/06/2010 17/07/2012 Yes
7 Tunisia In force 29/05/1991 28/04/1994 Yes
Source: Author's Compilation from Information Available on
UNCTAD's Website
Annex B
Turkey-Africa Bilateral Investment Treaties: Signed But Not in
Force





1 Algeria Signed 03/06/1998 Yes
(not in
force)
2 Benin Signed 11/12/2013 No
(not in
force)
3 Burundi Signed 14/06/2017 No
(not in
force)
4 Cameroon Signed 24/04/2012 Yes
(not in
force)
5 Chad Signed 26/12/2017 No
(not in
force)
6 C6te d'Ivoire Signed 29/02/2016 No
(not in
force)
7 Djibouti Signed 25/09/2013 No
(not in
force)
8 Gabon Signed 18/07/2012 , Yes
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(not in
force)
9 Gambia Signed 12/03/2013 Yes
(not in
force)
10 Ghana Signed 01/03/2016 No
(not in
force)
11 Guinea Signed 18/06/2013 No
(not in
force)
12 Kenya Signed 08/04/2014 Yes
(not in
force)
13 Mali Signed 02/03/2018 No
(not in
force)
14 Mauritania Signed 28/02/2018 No
(not in
force)
15 Mozambique Signed 24/01/2017 No
(not in
force)
16 Nigeria Signed 08/10/1996 No
(not in
force)
16 Nigeria Signed 02/02/2011 Yes
(not in
force)
17 Rwanda Signed 03/11/2016 Yes
(not in
force)
18 Somalia Signed 01/06/2016 No
(not in
force)
19 South Africa Signed 23/06/2000 Yes
(not in
force)
20 Sudan Signed 30/04/2014 No
(not in
force)
20 Sudan Signed 19/12/1999 Yes
(not in
force)
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Source: Author's
UNCTAD's Website
Compilation from Information Available on
Annex C



































22 Tunisia Signed 27/12/2017 No
(not in
force)
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Tunisia (29/05/1991)





-Africa RIT~ (~nPra 1 F.ycpti ~n aIS~rii ritv Fvr~ntinn ~
General Security Corporate Social
Exception Exception Responsibility/Investor
Accountability
Algeria No No No
(1998)
Cameroon Yes Yes No
(2012)
Cote Yes Yes No
D'Ivoire
(2016)
Egypt No No No
(1997)
Ethiopia No No No
(2000)
Gabon Yes Yes No
(2012)
Gambia Yes Yes No
(2013)
Ghana Yes Yes No
(2016)
Kenya Yes Yes No
(2014)
Libya No No No
(2009)
Morocco No No No
(1997)
Nigeria No No No
(1996)
Nigeria Yes Yes No
(2011)
Rwanda Yes Yes No
2016
Senegal No 723  Yes No
2010
South No No No
Africa
723. Turkey-Senegal BIT, supra note 58, at art. 4 (Aricle 4, titled "Right to
Regulate", contains a security exception but not a standard general exceptions clause).
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(2000)
Sudan No No No
(1999)
Tunisia Yes7 2 5  Yes No
(1994)724
Tanzania Yes Yes No
(2011) 1 1
Source: Author's Compilation from Information Available on
UNCTAD's Website
Annex E
Turkey-Africa BITs: Termination, Consultation, and Amendment
Initial Survival Consultation Amendment
Term clause
Algeria 10 10 No Yes
(1998)
Cameroon 10 10 No Yes
(2012)
Cote 10 10 No Yes
D'Ivoire
(2016)
Egypt 10 10 No Yes
(1997)
Ethiopia 10 10 No Yes
(2000)
Gabon 10 10 No Yes
(2012)
Gambia 10 10 No Yes
(2013)
Kenya 10 10 Yes Yes
(2014)
Libya 10 10 No Yes
(2009)
Morocco 10 10 No No
(1997)
Nigeria 10 10 No Yes
(1996)
724. In 2017, Turkey negotiated a new treaty with Tunisia. However, the
Turkey-Tunisia BIT is not yet in force. Turkey-Tunisia BIT, supra note 45.
725. Id. at art. IX ("This agreement shall not preclude the application by either
Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order and morals, the
fulfillment of its obligatiohs with respect to the maintenance or restoration of
international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security
interests.").
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Nigeria 10 10 No Yes
(2011)
Rwanda 10 10 No Yes
(2016)
Senegal 10 10 No Yes
(2010)
South 10 10 No Yes
Africa
(2000)
Sudan 10 10 No Yes
(1999)
Tunisia 10 10 Yes Yes
(1994)
Tanzania 10 10 No Yes
(2011)




Compilation from Information Available on
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